Gagnon v. City of Butte
Decision Date | 23 February 1926 |
Docket Number | No. 5819.,5819. |
Citation | 75 Mont. 279 |
Parties | GAGNON v. CITY OF BUTTE. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow County; George Bourquin, Judge.
Action by George L. Gagnon against the City of Butte. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
N. A. Rotering and A. C. McDaniel, both of Butte, for appellant.
John T. Andrew and F. E. Blodgett, both of Butte, for respondent.
In the year 1910 Joseph R. Silver, Jr., as contractor, constructed certain concrete sidewalks in accordance with plans and specifications within the confines of special improvement district No. 81 of the city of Butte. His work was approved, and he was paid therefor and accepted improvement district bonds, payable on or before 10 years after January 1, 1910, with interest coupons attached. In this action the plaintiff, as the assignee of the contractor, seeks recovery from the city of Butte on certain of such improvement district bonds.
In the complaint it is alleged that special improvement district No. 81 was duly and regularly created; that the special improvements to be provided consisted of the construction of concrete sidewalks in front of the real property embraced within the district; that a contract for the making of such improvements in accordance with the specifications was regularly awarded to Joseph R. Silver, Jr., and by him accepted; that the contractor duly performed the work to be done in accordance with his contract, which was accepted by the city, and thereupon delivery was made to him of special improvement bonds of the district in payment for the work; that the defendant duly levied an assessment against all the real property within the district for the redemption of the bonds in the year 1911 and subsequent years; that the bonds have not been paid; that the first of the special assessments levied against the property became due in 1911; that the unpaid installments of interest due upon the bonds provided for the payment of interest thereon, and that a large amount of interest became delinquent, and still remains unpaid; that the delinquent assessments are a lien against the real property against which they were levied; that the defendant has failed and neglected to collect the delinquent assessments against the real estate embraced within the district; and that the plaintiff cannot enforce payment thereof; and, further, that the defendant has failed, neglected, and refused to take up the bonds in full, or pay any interest accrued thereon since January 1, 1920. The bonds of the series involved herein are dated August 3, 1910, and, as shown by the plaintiff's complaint, recite:
The bonds in suit are 10 in number, aggregating the principal sum of $1,077.63, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from January 1, 1920. In the prayer of plaintiff's complaint, he asks judgment against the city for the amount of the bonds sued upon, together with interest. Issue was joined by the defendant's answer containing certain admissions and denials of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint, and affirmatively alleging as reason for the nonpayment of the bonds that “there is not money within special improvement district No. 81 fund with which to pay the same.” The cause was tried before the court without a jury. At the conclusion of the trial the court made its findings in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, pursuant to which judgment was regularly entered for the defendant. The appeal is from the judgment.
By testimony introduced upon the trial the plaintiff sustained the allegations of his complaint. It also appears therefrom, without dispute, that the city treasurer now holds to the credit of the improvement district fund the sum of $45.88 available for the payment of the sum due on the plaintiff's bonds.
Neither from the allegations of the complaint nor from the proof does it appear that the plaintiff has ever resorted to mandamus or other appropriate legal proceedings to compel the city authorities to make collection of the delinquent assessments.
The court found:
“That all matters stated in plaintiff's complaint are true as matters of fact, save and except that defendant failed to make a reasonable effort to collect the assessment and could have collected the same, and that plaintiff cannot enforce his lien; and the court further finds that the only reason the bonds were not paid is because there is no money in the fund to pay the same, and therefore the court concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for in the complaint; that the plaintiff is entitled to take nothing; and that the defendant is entitled to have judgment entered in its favor.”
The assignments of error require the determination of but one question, viz. the general liability of the city for the payment of these bonds.
It is apparent that special improvement district No. 81 was created pursuant to the provisions of chapter 3 of article 10, sections 3367 to 3429, inclusive, of the Revised Codes of 1907, whereby it is provided, so far as pertinent to this inquiry, as follows:
The several sections above set forth, excepting the last two, were enacted in 1897 as a part of House Bill No. 204, Laws 1897, p. 212. Sections 3425 and 3427 were adopted by chapter 75 of the Laws of 1907.
The plaintiff predicates the city's liability to pay the bonds upon the failure to collect the assessments levied from the property owners for the benefit of the bond holders, and this, notwithstanding the contractual and statutory provisions expressly requiring the holders of the bonds to look for payment from the special improvement district fund alone, relieving the city from any general liability for their payment.
It is argued that it was the city's duty to collect the assessments under adequate power conferred upon it, and, having failed so to do, it has become liable; and, further, that, if the plaintiff ever did have a right to enforce the liens of the bonds under the provisions of section 3425 of the Revised Codes of 1907, set forth above, it was taken away by chapter 89 of the Laws of 1913; it being urged that, although some of the assessments became delinquent prior to the enactment of the last-mentioned statute, yet the plaintiff's right of action, if any existed, could not accrue until the year 1920, or 10 years from the date of the...
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