Gagnon v. Sprint Corp.
| Citation | 284 F.3d 839 |
| Decision Date | 19 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-2505.,01-2505. |
| Parties | William E. GAGNON, Jr., Appellant, v. SPRINT CORPORATION, doing business as Sprint Spectrum Finance Corporation, doing business as Sprint PCS, Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Dennis E. Egan, argued, Kansas City, MO (Henry R. Cox, Benjamin K. Byrd, on the brief), for appellant.
John J. Yates, argued, Kansas City, MO (Joseph H. Knitting, on the brief), for appellee.
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BEAM, RILEY, Circuit Judges.
William Gagnon brought this reverse race discrimination and retaliation case under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"). Gagnon appeals the district court's issuance of judgment as a matter of law ("JAML") at the close of plaintiff's case in favor of Sprint PCS on his discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and the MHRA. Gagnon also appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sprint PCS on his USERRA discrimination and retaliation claims1. Upon a de novo review of the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On January 31, 1997, Gagnon retired from the United States Army as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving more than twenty-one years. Gagnon then worked at Cubic Applications, Inc. ("Cubic"), a defense contractor. He was in Cubic's employ for three months prior to becoming associated with Sprint PCS.
Gagnon began working for Sprint PCS in March 1997. Sprint PCS hired Gagnon as a curriculum developer in it's training department ("TAPS") at a starting salary of $44,100 with a short-term incentive potential ("STI") of $3,000. Gagnon was directly supervised by Kathleen Wilder, the director of the department, from his initial starting date in March until his promotion. Gagnon was promoted in October 1997 to CBT-Manager, a new management position in the department. At the time of Gagnon's promotion, Wilder was out of the office on maternity leave and Jim Keenan, the department manager, and Lynn Meredith-Ball, another manager in Wilder's department, assumed Wilder's responsibilities as director of the training group. In Wilder's absence, Vice-President Jim Mendenhall was instrumental in promoting Gagnon to the manager position.
Because Gagnon's position was new at Sprint PCS, it did not have a dollar figure assigned for compensation. Therefore, Gagnon submitted a job description for the position, with the assistance of Meredith-Ball, to the Human Resources Department ("HR") so that a compensation amount could be assigned. The Sprint PCS compensation group within HR established a market reference point ("MRP") of $66,000 with a STI of $9,500. The MRP is not a guaranteed salary point, but rather a targeted reference point for a tenured employee in that position.
As a matter of procedure at Sprint PCS, when a salary increase greater than ten percent is sought, a Compensation Exception Request form stating the amount of the raise requested is completed, sent to HR for a recommendation, then forwarded to a vice president in charge of the department for a recommendation. Then, finally the appropriate chief officer or his designee reviews all recommendations and makes final decisions on salary increases. In conjunction with Gagnon's promotion, Meredith-Ball prepared a Compensation Request Form to raise Gagnon's salary from $44,100 to $66,000, reflecting the full MRP established by the compensation group. HR did not support Meredith-Ball's proposed raise to the full $66,000 but instead proposed a salary at eighty-five percent of MRP, the equivalent of a twenty-five percent raise for Gagnon. Meredith-Ball and Julie Moylan, the HR Compensation Manager, signed the proposed compensation form on October 1, 1997. At that time, the form reflected Meredith-Ball's request for a base salary increase to $66,000 and Moylan's recommended twenty-five percent increase. Meredith-Ball submitted the request with both proposals to Vice-President Mendenhall for his approval. Mendenhall rejected both proposals on the compensation exception request form.
Mendenhall's rejection of the initial compensation request is an important part of Gagnon's claim of discrimination. According to trial testimony, Mendenhall looked at the document with the attachments and threw it back across his desk at Meredith-Ball stating, "I'm not going to pay him that, he's a white guy, isn't he?" Mendenhall further allegedly stated, "If he were a woman or a minority, I would have to pay him, but I don't have to pay him." Meredith-Ball recalls Mendenhall refusing to discuss his stated position and clearly stating, Mendenhall also stated,
After failing to obtain approval of either the full $66,000 salary for Gagnon or the proposed twenty-five percent increase recommended by Moylan, Meredith-Ball revised the compensation form to request an eleven percent raise followed by an automatic ten percent raise in six months. HR approved the eleven percent raise but did not endorse the automatic ten percent raise in six months, suggesting that Gagnon seek a ten percent raise in six months, dependent on his performance. Meredith-Ball took the revised compensation request form to Mendenhall who approved Meredith-Ball's recommendation in its entirety, including the automatic raise in six months. The form was then presented to Al Kurtze, the chief operating officer. Kurtze had the final vote on this compensation decision. Kurtze agreed with HR's recommendation and approved only the immediate eleven percent raise, with the suggestion that the automatic increase in six months be processed with separate approval action.
Gagnon filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in April 1998 because he was dissatisfied with his compensation increases. Gagnon claims his workplace environment deteriorated after he filed his EEOC claim and it became difficult for him to timely complete work tasks because Wilder stopped seeking his advice and stopped discussing department issues with him.
In August 1998, Gagnon and Meredith-Ball organized a discussion with four other Sprint PCS employees outside the training department building. Gagnon and Meredith-Ball informed the group of employees, all of whom possessed prior military experience, of Sprint PCS's growth outside Wilder's department. During that discussion, various statements indicated (although all parties are not in agreement) that Gagnon and Meredith-Ball advised the four employees that Wilder was uncomfortable with the number of employees in her department with prior military experience and, therefore, would not promote anyone with such a background. However, the record also reflects that during a managers' meeting two months prior, Wilder stated there was a perception among some employees in the department that employees had to be retired military to advance. Gagnon responded at the managers' meeting that the perception was not true. Wilder also admitted at this managers' meeting that she was uncomfortable that some of her employees thought they were being treated differently because they were not military. Wilder later told Gagnon she was uneasy with the number of military employees in the department.
As a result of the alleged statements made during the meeting outside the training department regarding Wilder's comfort, or lack thereof, Gagnon and Meredith-Ball were placed on written reminder, a form of reprimand. This written reminder prohibited Gagnon and Meredith-Ball from seeking a promotion or transfer without a vice president's approval for a period of six months. Gagnon claims the written reminder, in addition to Wilder's failure to give him a promised ten percent raise in July, and the continued isolation of Gagnon in his department constituted retaliation.
Gagnon subsequently filed this lawsuit charging Sprint PCS with violating USERRA for setting his initial salary $1,000 lower due to his lack of corporate experience and for disciplining him following the meeting outside the Sprint PCS training department building. Gagnon also charged Sprint PCS with violating Title VII and the MHRA for denying his salary raise upon receiving the promotion to CBT Manager.
The grant of a judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo, applying the same standards used by the district court. Fogelbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 270 F.3d 696, 700 (8th Cir.2001). Pursuant to Rule 50, judgment as a matter of law should only be granted when a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). "In making this determination, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party without making credibility assessments or weighing the evidence." Phillips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir.2001).
Plaintiffs like Gagnon pursuing claims of discrimination under Title VII have two models under which they may proceed. First, a plaintiff can proceed under the three-stage, burden-shifting standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this standard, Gagnon must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to Sprint PCS to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct....
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