Gagnon v. St. Maries Light & Power Co., Ltd.

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: AILSHIE, C. J.
• Citation: Gagnon v. St. Maries Light & Power Co., Ltd., 141 P. 88, 26 Idaho 87 (Idaho 1914)
• Decision Date: 16 May 1914
• Parties: LOUIS GAGNON, Appellant, v. ST. MARIES LIGHT & POWER CO., LTD., a Corporation, Respondent

141 P. 88

26 Idaho 87

LOUIS GAGNON, Appellant, v. ST. MARIES LIGHT & POWER CO., LTD., a Corporation, Respondent

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 16, 1914

PLEADING-DEMURRER ON GROUND OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-ON GROUND OF DEFECT OF PARTIES-PERSONAL INJURY-EMPLOYEE OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES-DEGREE OF PROTECTION TO INVITEE.

1. Held, that the complaint in this case states a cause of action.

2. Under the rule in force in this state requiring a liberal construction of pleadings, a demurrer to the complaint in a personal injury case should not be sustained on the ground that it disclosed contributory negligence on its face, when all the allegations of the complaint taken together, and considered in the sense in which the pleader has evidently used and employed the language therein contained, charge negligence of the defendant and care and diligence on the part of plaintiff.

3. Where an electric light and power company made a contract for the painting of its transformer station, and an employee of the contractor, not familiar with the premises or the appliances, was injured by coming in contact with uninsulated and unprotected loose wires which were not obviously dangerous, and in regard to which he had received no warning an action for damages may properly be prosecuted by the employee of the contractor against such corporation.

4. The employee of an independent contractor doing work on the premises of another is an invitee by special agreement, and the proprietor of such premises is under obligation to see that he have a reasonably safe place to work and that he have reasonable protection against the consequences of hidden dangers known to the proprietor.

5. Those who deal in electricity as a business are held to the highest degree of care with reference to all persons not themselves wrongdoers who in any capacity may accidentally or otherwise come in contact with their electrical appliances.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District for Kootenai County. Hon. R. N. Dunn, Judge.

Action for damages for personal injury received by plaintiff while in the employ of an independent contractor. Demurrer to complaint sustained. Reversed.

Reversed and remanded, with direction. Costs awarded in favor of appellant.

E. N LaVeine, W. D. Keeton and W. F. Morrison, Jr., for Appellant.

John P Gray and Frank M. McCarthy, for Respondent.

The authorities cited by counsel are mentioned in the opinion infra.

AILSHIE, C. J. Sullivan, J., concurs.

OPINION

AILSHIE, C. J.

The complaint in this action, after setting forth the corporate capacity of the defendant, alleges that at the times mentioned it was operating an electric lighting and power plant and engaged in furnishing electric light and power in the vicinity of the city of St. Maries; that for such purpose it maintained a frame building in said city which it used for a transformer station and office, with which were connected transmission wires carrying a load of about 2,200 volts of electricity; that these wires entered the building about three feet below the eaves; "that at the point where said wires were connected to said building, the defendant carelessly and negligently allowed and permitted two short, separate wires connected with said transmission wires which were bare and uninsulated and unprotected at the ends, which wires were unused, to hang down and dangle loosely near the side of said building, and carelessly and negligently allowed and permitted a strong current of electricity to pass into and be in said loose ends of said wires so hanging down from said connection as aforesaid."

Then follow allegations of carelessness and negligence in that the defendant permitted such loose wires, so charged with electric current, to hang uninsulated and unprotected, and an averment of its duty "to see that persons employed to work upon said building were afforded a reasonably safe protection from the said dangerous agency." The fifth and seventh paragraphs we quote in full:

"V. That some time prior to the 16th day of April, 1913, defendant engaged one R. B. Ward, a contracting painter, to paint the aforesaid station and office building; that said R. B. Ward hired, among others, the plaintiff to paint said building; that, shortly after commencing to work in the employment aforesaid, on the afternoon of the 16th day of April, 1913, plaintiff let himself down below said charged wires and connections; that in painting he carefully avoided contact with said charged wires which entered said building and which evidently were or might have been carrying electricity; that while engaged in painting and while exercising due care in so avoiding said wires, and inadvertently, but without negligence or lack of care on his part, plaintiff's left forearm came in contract with the uninsulated and unprotected ends of the said two unused wires which were separately and loosely hanging down the side of said building as aforesaid, and that by reason of said contract with the ends of said wires plaintiff was severely burned, and shocked by reason of said injury, suffered great bodily pain and mental anguish, and was compelled to expend large sums of money for medical attendance and care and is still required to be attended by a physician."

"VII. That plaintiff had no knowledge of the danger lurking in said two unused and unprotected wires, and had no reason to apprehend any danger from contact with them; that plaintiff had a right to rely, and did rely, upon the defendant furnishing a reasonably safe place for him to work, and if said wires were dangerous to have had them joined, protected or insulated, or a warning given him of their dangerous character, or to have them removed; that the said loose ends were by reason of the carelessness and negligence of the said defendant, its officers, servants or employees, not removed, nor connected and insulated, nor was plaintiff warned by defendant nor by any person by or on behalf of the defendant, of the dangerous character of said loose wires; that defendant remained and was at all of the said times in possession of said building and in control of said wires and said electric current and that all of the hidden danger due to or arising out of the carelessness, negligence and improper care of said wires, was solely within the knowledge of the said defendant or should by the exercise of reasonable care have been within its said knowledge."

The remaining paragraphs of the complaint set forth the permanent injury to plaintiff's left had and arm and allege his earning capacity. To this complaint defendant demurred on the following grounds:

"1. That said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant.

"2. That there is a defect of parties defendant as appears upon the face of said complaint in this: That it is alleged in paragraph five of said complaint that the plaintiff at the time of the alleged injury was working for R. E. Ward, a contracting painter, and upon the face of the complaint it shows that plaintiff's cause of action, if any he has, is against said Ward, his master, and not against the defendant named."

A third ground is that of uncertainty with reference to the allegations of earning capacity, but which counsel do not urge in this court.

The trial court sustained the demurrer specifically on the first ground, viz., that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and gave plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff elected to stand on his pleading and appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing the action.

Respondent contends that the complaint itself shows appellant to have known and appreciated the danger of his employment on respondent's premises, and that he therefore assumed the risk. He particularly calls attention to the language used in paragraph 5, where after stating that plaintiff "carefully avoided contact" with the main transmission wires which entered the building, the pleader goes on to say: "and inadvertently, but without negligence or lack of care on his part, plaintiff's left forearm came in contact with the uninsulated and unprotected ends of the said two unused wires." From this language, and especially the use of the word "inadvertently," it is urged that both knowledge of the danger and negligence in the avoidance of it is imputable to plaintiff, and that for this reason alone he could not recover.

We think, however, that the meaning of the pleader may be fairly gathered from a succeeding allegation in paragraph 7, where he avers that plaintiff "had no knowledge of the danger lurking in said wires, and had no reason to apprehend any danger from contact with them." We are not disposed to commend the allegations of paragraph 5 as affording a model of good pleading in a personal injury case, but taking the complaint as a whole, and viewing the allegations of paragraph 5 together with those of paragraph 7, at the same time bearing in mind the rule for liberal construction of pleadings which has been so often applied by this court, we are inclined to think that so far as this contention is concerned, the demurrer should have been overruled.

A more important question is raised by the second ground of defendant's demurrer, and although the lower court did not sustain the demurrer specifically on this ground, yet as the same question must arise in proceeding further under the complaint, it seems advisable to dispose of it in this opinion. It is also true that if the demurrer was good on any ground stated, it would be the duty of this court to sustain the trial court, even though he sustained the demurrer on an erroneous ground.

Respondent's contention is, that since the complaint...