Gagnon v. United Aircraft Corp., Hamilton Standard Division

• Decision Date: 07 April 1970
• Citation: 268 A.2d 660,159 Conn. 302
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: George E. GAGNON v. UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, HAMILTON STANDARD DIVISION, et al.

Page 660

268 A.2d 660

159 Conn. 302

George E. GAGNON v.UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, HAMILTON STANDARD DIVISION, et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

April 7, 1970.

William S. Zeman, Hartford, for appellant(plaintiff).

George A. Downing, East Hartford, for appellees(defendants).

Before ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM, RYAN and SHAPIRO, JJ.

THIM, Associate Justice.

The sole issue before this court on appeal is whether a workmen's compensation commissioner has jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of a waiver executed pursuant to General Statutes § 31-325¹ after it has been approved by the commissioner and where there is no claim for compensation.The relevant facts are undisputed since the parties agreed to limit the hearing before the commissioner to the question of jurisdiction.The record discloses that the plaintiff, an employee of the Hamilton Standard Division of the United Aircraft Corporation, signed a waiver on September 25, 1967, for a 'subtotal gastectomy scar; laxity both internal inguinal rings, more pronounced on right.'The waiver was approved by the compensation commissioner two days later, whereupon it became effective under the terms of the statute.On October 2, 1968, a limited hearing was held before the commissioner for the sixth congressional district on the plaintiff's application that the waiver be declared null and void.No compensable injury or disability was claimed, and the application was denied.An appeal was taken to the Superior Court and was dismissed, the court concluding that the compensation act did not grant the commissioner power to make an award with respect to the subject matter of the application.

At no time has the plaintiff made a claim for compensation which would entitle him to a hearing under General Statutes §§ 31-297-31-299.His contention is that no such claim is necessary since the commissioner has continuing jurisdiction over the waiver and may annul it at any time after it becomes effective.We cannot agree.

Section 31-325 makes it permissible for an employee with a physical defect to waive any right to compensation for injury or death arising out of his employment which is found to be attributable in a material degree to that physical defect.Such a provision is an exception to the general rule that an employee cannot waive his right to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 100 C.J.S.Workmen's Compensation§ 389.The purpose of this type of statutory exception is to encourage conditional employment of those persons who are affected by or susceptible to a particular disease or injury to a degree which would ordinarily prevent them from securing a job.Modern Upholstered Chair Co. v. Henry, 213 Tenn. 475, 376 S.W.2d 441;Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation v. Vance, 203 Va. 557, 125 S.E.2d 879.

Because any attempted waiver of benefits under the compensation act must be carefully scrutinized, our statute requires the commissioner to find that the employee fully understood the meaning of his act before the waiver may be approved and become effective.Such approval is not automatic since the statutory test must be met.As in the case of approving voluntary agreements as to compensation (see§ 31-296), great care must be exercised by the commissioner in approving waivers so that the purpose of the compensation act is not thwarted.SeeWelch v. Arthur A. Fogarty, Inc., 157 Conn. 538, 545, 255 A.2d 627.

The plaintiff's claim that jurisdiction over the waiver is continuous and that it may be annulled at any time is unwarranted, however.There is nothing in the act which grants power to the commissioner to reopen the question of the waiver's validity, and it is settled law that the commissioner's jurisdiction is 'confined by the act and limited by its provisions.'Jester v. Thompson, 99 Conn. 236, 238, 121 A. 470, 471;Morisi v. Ansonia Mfg. Co., 108 Conn. 31, 33, 142 A. 393.Unlike the case of voluntary agreements as to compensation, which the General Statutes expressly provide may be modified by the commissioner and over which he is given continuing jurisdiction (see§§ 31-296,31-315), the jurisdiction of the commissioner to declare a waiver null and void ends when he has approved it.

When a claim for compensation is made, however, § 31-325 requires that the commissioner determine if the injury involved was materially attributable to the condition described in the waiver before the waiver may be held to bar recovery.Furthermore, because of the...