Gahnney v. State Farm Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 98-4659(JEI).,CIV. A. 98-4659(JEI). |
| Parties | Kwesi GAHNNEY and Mangowa Gahnney, Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE CO., John Doe, and ABC Corp., Defendants. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Law Offices of Ronald DeSimone, P.C., Mt. Laurel, NJ, for Plaintiffs.
Jamieson, Moore, Peskin & Spicer by Thomas P. Weidner and David F. Swerdlow, Princeton, NJ, for Defendants.
Kwesi and Mangowa Gahnney ("plaintiffs") entered into a homeowners insurance contract with the defendant State Farm Insurance Company ("State Farm") on August 27, 1995. The plaintiffs allege that State Farm failed to honor the terms of the insurance contract when it refused to reimburse the plaintiffs for the full amount of the damages caused to the their residence as a result of snow and ice from a 1996 winter storm. Before this Court is State Farm's motion for summary judgement, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). For the reasons set forth below, State Farm's motion for summary judgement is granted.
The plaintiffs are the owners and residents of 81 Bunning Drive in Voorhees, New Jersey. On August 27, 1995, defendant State Farm issued the plaintiffs an insurance policy, # 30-BB-0283-4, which covers, inter alia, water damage to the plaintiffs' Voorhees residence.1 The policy expired on August 27, 1996. During the winter of 1995-96, the heavy weight of the ice and snowfall caused damages to the plaintiffs' premises.
In January of 1996, the plaintiffs began to notice the damaging effects of the storm when water began leaking through their skylight, the windows of the master bedroom the French doors and the family room. In May of 1996, the plaintiffs realized the full extent of the water damages when the snow completely melted. It was not until July of 1996, that the plaintiffs contend that they realized the full extent of the soot damages.
Plaintiffs claim that the full extent of the general damages include: roof repair, gutter, facet board behind gutter, front porch roof, siding repairs, water damages (living room, foyer, office, family room, master bedroom, master bathroom), and soot damages (living room, foyer, dining room, downstairs hall, office, family room, upstairs hall, kitchen, master bedroom, master bathroom, and all three remaining bedrooms).
On July 16, 1996, the plaintiffs hired Messers Remmey ("Remmey") of Remmey Adjustment Company to advise and assist in the adjustment of the plaintiffs' claim. The plaintiffs assert that they gave State Farm notice of their claim on the same day when Remmey allegedly faxed the plaintiffs' claim request to State Farm representative Carl Hafer ("Agent Hafer"). State Farm disagrees and alleges that the plaintiffs did not report the damages until September 30, 1996.
On October 9, 1996, Agent Hafer and Remmey inspected the plaintiffs' home. As a result of the inspection, State Farm offered the plaintiffs a total replacement cost of $3,270 and an actual cash value of $2,686.2 According to State Farm, Remmey told the plaintiffs that the damage estimate was fair and that they should accept the offer. On February 10, 1997, the plaintiffs ended their relationship with Remmey on the grounds that he failed to do his job adequately and failed to conduct an independent estimate of the damages to their home.
On March 11, 1997, the plaintiffs submitted to State Farm a damage estimate calculated by Mark Woodruff ("Woodruff") of Metro Public Adjusters, Inc. ("Metro"). Woodruff estimated the damages to the plaintiffs' home at $23,906.72. Plaintiffs allege that following the Woodruff estimate, on March 20, 1997, Agent Hafer increased the amount of his damage estimate. However, the actual amount of the new estimate is unknown because Agent Hafer was fired before the plaintiffs received notice of the new award. The plaintiffs' claim was then assigned to Mr. Garcia ("Agent Garcia") of State Farm.
On or about April 11, 1997, the plaintiffs requested an appraisal.3 However, State Farm requested a chance to re-inspect the premises before resorting to an appraisal. On May 13, 1997, State Farm's Agent Garcia and Kevin Rogers met with Mrs. Gahnney and Woodruff to re-inspect the damages. State Farm did not increase its offer, choosing instead to maintain the initial estimate of a total replacement cost of $3,270 and an actual cash value of $2,686. Unsatisfied with the outcome, the plaintiffs and State Farm commenced the independent appraisal.
G. Michael Murphy and Alan Burke were the independent appraisers appointed by State Farm and the plaintiffs, respectively. On August 5, 1997, the independent appraisers agreed to a total replacement cost of $4,716.22 and an actual cash value of $3,984.68. On August 27, 1997, State Farm sent a check to the plaintiffs in the amount of the $3,984.68. The plaintiffs contend that the appraisal award became known to them on September 4, 1997, when it was forwarded by Metro. The plaintiffs did not cash the check because it was significantly less than Metro's estimate of $23,906.72.
On August 7, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey and on October 9, 1998, State Farm filed a notice of removal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1441, and 1332. On May 13, 1999, State Farm filed the instant motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
"[S]ummary judgment is proper `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Although the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, there is no requirement that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party may not simply rest on its pleadings to oppose a summary judgment motion, but must affirmatively come forward with admissible specific evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact. See id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the moving party has carried its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Idus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir.1986). The role of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law governing the dispute will determine which facts are material, and only disputes over those facts "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Idus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotations omitted); see also J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring).
State Farm asserts three independent grounds for summary judgment: 1) plaintiffs filed the suit after the one-year period required by the insurance policy; 2) plaintiffs are bound by the appraisal award and have failed to demonstrate any impropriety with respect to this award; and 3) the fraud, consumer fraud and punitive claims should be dismissed as a matter of law.
This Court must first determine whether the plaintiffs are barred from filing a suit against State Farm due to the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations outlined in the homeowners insurance policy. The plaintiffs' homeowners policy is modeled after New Jersey fire insurance statute, N.J.S.A. 17:36-5.204, and reads, in pertinent part, as follows: "[t]he action must be started within one year after the date of loss or damage."(emphasis added).
This Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to the plaintiffs' failure to file suit against State Farm within the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the plaintiffs are barred from bringing any claim in connection with the 1996 winter storm against State Farm.
State Farm argues that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to file suit within one year of the damages as required by the insurance policy. Plaintiffs argue that they filed the suit within the relevant period of limitations because according to New Jersey law, the negotiation period tolls the statute of limitations. State Farm argues that even if the relevant period is tolled, the plaintiffs still failed to file within the relevant statute of limitations.
In New Jersey, the general rule is that the statute of limitations applicable to contracts also governs insurance actions as well. Breen v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indemn. Ins. Co., 105 N.J.Super. 302, 309, 252 A.2d 49, (Law Div.1969), aff'd, 109 N.J.Super. 473, 263 A.2d 802 (App.Div.1970). N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, states, in pertinent part, as follows: "recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, shall be commenced within 6 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued." Therefore, "[a]bsent a provision in the insurance policy or an express statute to...
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