Gahr v. Trammel, 85-1612

• Decision Date: 24 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1612,85-1612
• Citation: 796 F.2d 1063
• Parties: 33 Ed. Law Rep. 1074 Kenneth E. GAHR, Appellant, v. Patricia TRAMMEL, Woodrow Horton, Inez Reavis and Dino Mengareli, All Members of the School Board for Turrell, Crittenden County, Arkansas and Mahlon McFatridge, Superintendent of Schools, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1063

796 F.2d 1063

33 Ed. Law Rep. 1074

Kenneth E. GAHR, Appellant, v. Patricia TRAMMEL, Woodrow Horton, Inez Reavis and Dino Mengareli, All Members of the School Board for Turrell, Crittenden County, Arkansas and Mahlon McFatridge Superintendent of Schools, Appellees.

No. 85-1612.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1986.

Decided July 24, 1986.

Chadd L. Durrett, Jr., West Memphis, Ark., for appellant.

Elton A. Rieves, IV, West Memphis, Ark., for appellees.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge and ROSS, Circuit Judge.

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.

Kenneth E. Gahr brought suit in federal district court against the individual members of the school board of Turrell, Arkansas, and the superintendent of Turrell schools, alleging that the defendants terminated Gahr's employment as a teacher in violation of his first and fourteenth amendment rights. The district court ¹ granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that an Arkansas state court's affirmance of the school board's decision to terminate Gahr precluded litigation of Gahr's constitutional claims in federal court under the doctrine of res judicata. Gahr challenges this holding on appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

For almost twelve years, Kenneth Gahr taught at the Turrell Public Schools in Turrell, Arkansas. In about February 1982, the superintendent of Turrell schools, Mahlon McFatridge, learned that some students were complaining that they were not learning anything in one of Gahr's classes. During an investigation resulting from these complaints, McFatridge heard that Gahr had told several persons that McFatridge and other school personnel were stealing food from the school cafeteria. Gahr later denied making these accusations, although he admitted that he had heard rumors concerning those thefts.

On March 12, 1982, McFatridge suspended Gahr with pay pending an investigation of whether Gahr had, in fact, accused McFatridge and the others of stealing. In a subsequent letter confirming the suspension, McFatridge informed Gahr that he had a statutory right to a hearing before the school board on the suspension. Gahr retained an attorney, who requested a hearing and a list of all witnesses that would be called on behalf of Turrell Public Schools.

Before the board held the hearing, McFatridge formally notified Gahr in writing that he was recommending to the school board that it terminate Gahr's teaching contract. McFatridge attached affidavits to the notification from three persons attesting that they heard Gahr make statements accusing a school employee and a school board member of stealing from the school cafeteria, and implying that McFatridge tolerated these thefts. McFatridge informed Gahr that he believed that the Turrell school system "[could not] tolerate unfounded accusations being made in the community by you which reflect upon the integrity" of school personnel.

At the time that these events transpired, Arkansas law provided that teachers could be terminated during their contract term only for reasons that were not "arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory." Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 1979, Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 80-1264.4 (1980) (repealed effective July 4, 1983). ² A teacher notified of the superintendent's decision to recommend termination could request a hearing before the school board on the recommendation. Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 80-1264.8. A "nonprobationary" teacher, one employed by the district for more than three years, who is subsequently terminated by the school board, could appeal the board's decision to the state circuit court of the county in which the school district is located. Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 80-1264.9(b). The statute provides that this appeal constitutes "[t]he exclusive remedy for any person aggrieved by the decision of the school board * * *." Id. ³

By agreement of the parties, the school board ⁴ met on April 13, 1982, to hear the matter of Gahr's suspension and the recommended termination. At Gahr's request, the board held a public hearing and kept a record of the proceedings. Both the school and Gahr were represented by counsel. Both sides submitted documentary evidence, called witnesses, cross-examined those called by opposing counsel, and objected to certain evidence. Gahr was among the persons testifying, contending that he had not accused the school personnel of stealing, although he may have once told another person that rumors to such effect had been floating around town. The attorneys for Gahr and the school made closing statements, alternatively asserting or denying that the proposed termination of Gahr was "arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory." Following closing arguments, the school board members withdrew for deliberations. After an undisclosed period of time, the board members returned to the hearing, and each publicly voted to terminate Gahr.

Gahr appealed the board's decision to terminate him to the appropriate state circuit court. He alleged as grounds for his appeal that he "was terminated during the term of his contract without valid cause," and requested "all proper relief to which [he] may be entitled." By stipulation of counsel, the parties submitted the matter to the court on the pleadings and the transcript of the school board hearing. By order of January 27, 1983, the circuit court affirmed the board's action, holding that Gahr's termination was not arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory, and that Gahr had received a fair hearing before the school board. Gahr did not exercise his right to appeal this decision to the Arkansas appellate courts.

Over a year and one-half after entry of the circuit court's order, Gahr filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that his termination constituted a "patently unjust, arbitrary and capricious denial of [his] due process rights," and a retaliation against him for allegedly accusing school personnel of theft. The district court held that, under Arkansas law, the doctrine of res judicata would bar litigation of Gahr's constitutional claims in the Arkansas courts. The district court concluded that the full faith and credit requirements of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738 (1982) demanded that Gahr be likewise precluded from pursuing his claims in federal court. The district court consequently granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738, federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments in section 1983 actions as the judgments would receive in the courts of the rendering state. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80-81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896-97, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-97, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-16, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); see Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 768, 771-72, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1331-32, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985). If, under Arkansas law, Gahr is precluded from litigating his claims in state court, he cannot pursue them in federal court unless the prior state proceeding did not provide Gahr with a full and fair opportunity to present his claims. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1896-97, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981); cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (arbitration ruling will not be given preclusive effect in subsequent Title VII case because, in part, arbitration procedures inadequately protected federal rights guaranteed by Title VII).

We are therefore presented with two issues in this appeal. First, we must determine whether, under Arkansas law, the state court affirmance of Gahr's termination would bar Gahr from litigating his due process and his first amendment claims in Arkansas courts. In identifying the state law, we generally defer to the reasonable interpretation of the law by the district court. Hickman v. Electronic Keyboarding, Inc., 741 F.2d 230, 232 (8th Cir.1984). If the Arkansas law of preclusion bars Gahr's action, we must then decide whether Gahr had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in the state proceedings. The state procedures will be judged adequate if they "satisfy the minimal procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. at 481, 102 S.Ct. at 1897.

A. Res Judicata Under Arkansas Law

1. The Due Process Claim

The main focus of Gahr's section 1983 action rests on his allegation that his termination by the school board constituted a "patently unjust, arbitrary and capricious denial of [his] due process rights." The district court concluded that this due process claim had been raised and decided by the state circuit court. It held that Arkansas preclusion law would therefore prevent Gahr from relitigating the claim in state court.

The Arkansas law of claim preclusion ⁵ forecloses litigation of all matters that were or could have been litigated in a prior suit when (1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was based on proper jurisdiction; (3) the first suit was fully contested in good faith; (4) both suits involve the same claim or cause of action; and (5) both suits involve the same parties or their privities. Bailey v. Harris Brake Fire Protection Dist., 287 Ark. 268, 697 S.W.2d 916, 917 (1985); see Wells v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 272 Ark. 481, 616 S.W.2d 718, 719 (1981); The Estate of Knott by Knott v. Jones, 14 Ark.App. 271, 687 S.W.2d 529, 531 (1985); Gwin v. R.D. Hall Tank Co., 10 Ark.App. 12, 660 S.W.2d 947, 948 (1983). When these conditions are satisfied, a judgment affirming an administrative decision, and, in some instances, the administrative decision itself may have preclusive effect. See, e.g., Mohawk...