Gaige M. v. Winterer

Decision Date23 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. S–14–538,S–14–538
Citation862 N.W.2d 76
PartiesMelanie M., individually and as next friend of Gaige M. et al., her minor children, appellant, v. Kerry T. Winterer and Ryan C. Gilbride, in their individual and official capacities as employees and agents of the State of Nebraska, Department of Health and Human Services, and the State of Nebraska, Department of Health and Human Services, appellees.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

862 N.W.2d 76

Melanie M., individually and as next friend of Gaige M. et al., her minor children, appellant
v.
Kerry T. Winterer and Ryan C. Gilbride, in their individual and official capacities as employees and agents of the State of Nebraska, Department of Health and Human Services, and the State of Nebraska, Department of Health and Human Services, appellees.

No. S–14–538

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed April 23, 2015


William J. Erickson, Broken Bow, and Blaine T. Gillett, North Platte, for appellant.

Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Blake E. Johnson, for appellees.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller–Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error.An appellate court will affirm a lower court's grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error.In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted, and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.

3. Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error.To the extent that the meaning and interpretation of statutes and regulations are involved, questions of law are presented which an appellate court decides independently of the decision made by the court below.

4. Constitutional Law: Due Process.The process required under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment is that necessary to provide “fundamental fairness” under the particular facts of the case.

5. Due Process.There are three factors a court considers in resolving a procedural due process claim: first, the private interest that the official action will affect; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

6. Evidence.The importance of demeanor evidence depends on the role that credibility plays in a particular determination.

7. Administrative Law.Agency regulations properly adopted and filed with the Secretary of State of Nebraska have the effect of statutory law.

8. Administrative Law.Regulations bind the agency that promulgated them just as they bind individual citizens, even if the adoption of the regulations was discretionary.

9. Administrative Law.An agency does not generally have the discretion to waive, suspend, or disregard a validly adopted rule.

10. Administrative Law.For purposes of construction, a rule or regulation of an administrative agency is generally treated like a statute.

11. Administrative Law.In the absence of anything to the contrary, language in a rule or regulation is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.

12. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error.A court accords deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations

862 N.W.2d 80

unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent.

13. Attorney Fees.Generally, a party may recover attorney fees and expenses in a civil action only if provided for by statute or if a recognized and accepted uniform course of procedure allows the recovery of attorney fees.

14. Federal Acts: Attorney Fees.A plaintiff is a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) if the plaintiff obtains actual relief on the merits of his or her claim that alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.

15. Federal Acts: Attorney Fees.A plaintiff who obtains temporary injunctive relief is not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) if the plaintiff eventually loses on the merits.

16. Injunction: Intent.The purpose of a temporary restraining order is only to maintain the status quo until a court can hear both parties on the propriety of a temporary injunction.

17. Federal Acts: Attorney Fees.The catalyst theory does not apply to claims for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012).

18. Federal Acts: Attorney Fees: Civil Rights.A plaintiff who prevails under state law can obtain fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) if the claim on which the plaintiff prevailed is accompanied by a substantial, though undecided, claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) from the same nucleus of facts.

Connolly, J.

SUMMARY

Melanie M. requested an administrative hearing after the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) informed her that it was going to change her benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The Department informed Melanie—a resident of North Platte, Nebraska—that it would hold the hearing in Lincoln, Nebraska. Melanie could participate telephonically at the Department's North Platte office or travel to Lincoln and participate in person.

Melanie filed a complaint in district court, asserting that the Department's regulations and the Due Process Clause required a “face-to-face” hearing in North Platte. The court entered a temporary restraining order, but overruled Melanie's motion for a temporary injunction and sustained the defendants' motion for summary judgment. After applying the three-factor test under Mathews v. Eldridge,1 we affirm the summary judgment as to Melanie's due process claim. But we reverse, and remand for further proceedings on her prayer for relief under the Department's regulations.

BACKGROUND

Melanie is the mother of four minor children who reside with her in North

862 N.W.2d 81

Platte. She works 15 to 20 hours per week in a retail position. Her husband is estranged, but sometimes helps care for the children.

According to Melanie, caring for one of her children, Ethan M., presents “logistical problems” that are “more than simply extraordinary.” Ethan was born without kidneys and suffered

a brain embolism. He cannot care for himself. Ethan's former attending physician opined that Melanie's absence from Ethan “is far more than a mere inconvenience” because Melanie is Ethan's “primary caregiver.” Melanie said that it is very difficult to find someone else to care for Ethan.

Melanie receives benefits under “SNAP,” formerly known as the Food Stamp Program. In Nebraska, the Department administers SNAP and issues electronic benefits transfer cards to eligible households, which they can use to purchase food.2

In early 2014, the Department notified Melanie that her SNAP benefits were going to change because her net adjusted income had changed. The Department also informed Melanie that it planned to recover overpayments. Melanie requested an administrative hearing regarding the proposed changes. Her attorney sent a letter to the Department demanding an “in-person, face-to-face hearing in the local office in North Platte.”

The Department sent Melanie notices informing her that it would hold a hearing in Lincoln and that Melanie could participate “in person” or telephonically. The notices informed Melanie that she had certain rights, including the right to testify, present testimony from other witnesses, submit documentary evidence, and confront adverse witnesses. Ryan C. Gilbride signed the notices as the hearing officer.

Before any administrative hearing occurred, Melanie filed a complaint in district court individually and as next friend of her four minor children. The complaint named as defendants Kerry T. Winterer and Gilbride (identified as “Employees and Agents of State of Nebraska—Department of Health and Human Services”) in their individual and official capacities. Melanie also sued “The State of Nebraska—Department of Health and Human Services.”

Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), Melanie alleged that the defendants' refusal to grant her a face-to-face hearing at the Department's North Platte office deprived her of procedural due process. She stated that her “ability to confront and

cross-examine witnesses is certainly crippled by the Hobson's choice of either travelling approximately 450 miles round-trip, or participating by telephone without the ability to even see the fact-finder or the adverse witnesses.” Melanie also alleged that regulations required the Department to offer her a face-to-face hearing in North Platte and, pending the administrative hearing, to maintain her SNAP benefits at their original level.

Melanie requested...

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  • Abbott v. City of Neb.
    • United States
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    • 3 de dezembro de 2021
    ...for by statute or if a recognized and accepted uniform course of procedure allows the recovery of attorney fees. Melanie M. v. Winterer , 290 Neb. 764, 862 N.W.2d 76 (2015). Section 1988(b), however, provides that in "any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [§] 1983, ... the cour......
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    ...886 (2006).19 See State ex rel. Douglas v. Ledwith , 204 Neb. 6, 281 N.W.2d 729 (1979).20 See Melanie M. v. Winterer , 290 Neb. 764, 862 N.W.2d 76 (2015) (discussing termination of temporary restraining order by overruling of motion for temporary injunction and sustaining of motion for summ......
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    ...inconsistent. We have cited and applied this principle on many occasions over the last several decades. See, e.g., Melanie M. v. Winterer , 290 Neb. 764, 862 N.W.2d 76 (2015) ; Kosmicki v. State , 264 Neb. 887, 652 N.W.2d 883 (2002) ; Wagoner v. Central Platte Nat. Resources Dist. , 247 Neb......
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