Gaines v. Attorney Gen.
| Decision Date | 10 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-11732,18-11732 |
| Parties | TOMMY LEE GAINES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cv-00588-RH-GRJ
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM and FAY, Circuit Judges.
Tommy Lee Gaines, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
In 1990, Gaines pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 1) and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Count 2). Gaines was sentenced by a Florida state court as a habitual offender to concurrent sentences of 30 years as to Count 1 and 10 years as to Count 2. The court stated that he "shall not be eligible for gain time granted by the [Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC")] except that the [FDOC] may grant up to twenty days of incentive gain time each month as provided for in Florida Statute 944.275(4)(b)."
In 1993, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal ("DCA") reversed and remanded the summary denial of Gaines's Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, in which Gaines had alleged that his trial counsel had failed to inform him about the loss of gain time resulting from his plea bargain.
In 2006, Gaines filed a state petition for mandamus relief in the Florida Second Circuit Court for Leon County, in which he argued, in relevant part, that he would not have accepted his plea agreement if he had been made aware that the "direct consequences" of his plea would have placed him on conditional release for a time period equivalent to his earned gain time. The state court denied Gaines'srequest, concluding that the "[i]mposition of Conditional Release supervision has no bearing on [Gaines's] negotiated plea agreement" and the "plea agreement of thirty years has not been compromised" because his total sentence stayed the same regardless of where he served it.
In 2008, Gaines was released from prison on conditional release, which was revocable at the discretion of the Florida Commission on Offender Review ("FCOR"), if, among other things, he was found to have violated the law or statutory conditions of his release. In June 2012, Gaines was alleged to have committed battery; he waived his right to a revocation hearing. In July 2012, the FCOR revoked Gaines's conditional release and denied him credit for time served while out on conditional release.
In 2013, after the revocation of his conditional release, Gaines filed a mandamus petition in the Leon County Circuit Court, seeking credit for the 1,363 days he was out on conditional release prior to his revocation. The court denied the petition, determining that his previously accrued gain time was subject to forfeiture upon revocation; thus, the FDOC had properly calculated the time Gaines was required to serve.
In March 2014, Gaines filed in the Florida Second Circuit Court for Wakulla County a petition for habeas relief, in which he argued that (1) his gain time was revoked in violation of state law, and (2) his conditional release was revoked inviolation of Florida law and the Fourteenth Amendment because he was not provided sufficient notice of the basis for the revocation. The court denied Gaines's petition, concluding that: (1) the FDOC had properly forfeited his gain time and could not be ordered to reinstate it because the restoration of gain time was discretionary; (2) he had waived his right to challenge his revocation; (3) his claims were barred by res judicata; and (4) the basis for his revocation was factually supported.
In April 2014, the Florida Seventh Circuit Court for Putnam County dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a separate habeas petition, in which Gaines "[sought] immediate release relating to gain time issues." In August 2014, Gaines appealed the dismissal to the Fifth DCA, seeking to supplement the record on appeal with the plea agreement and plea colloquy. The Fifth DCA denied Gaines's motion to supplement the record without a written opinion.
In October 2014, Gaines filed an initial 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in the federal district court, in which he alleged he was being illegally detained past the completion of his sentence according to his "contract plea agreement," in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Subsequently, a magistrate judge ordered Gaines to file a § 2241 petition because his claim amounted to an attack on the execution of his sentence, though the magistrate judge noted that § 2241 petitions are still subject to the same limitations as § 2254 petitions.
Gaines filed an amended § 2241 petition and memorandum in support thereof reasserting that he had entered into a contract plea agreement to 30 years of imprisonment as a habitual felony offender, minus 20 days a month in gain time. He argued that he was not awarded credit for the 1,362 days he spent on conditional release, thereby extending his maximum release date from April 8, 2020, to July 26, 2023. Gaines argued that his "sole point" was that his 30-year sentence as a habitual felony offender was completed after he was released early in 2008 due to his accrual of 12 years of gain time; thus, the state of Florida's later revocation of his gain time violated the terms of his plea agreement, in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation ("R&R"). As an initial matter, the magistrate judge concluded that the FDOC had failed to show that Gaines had not exhausted his state remedies, as the FDOC conceded that it was unaware whether Gaines had exhausted his claims in state court.1 The magistrate judge then stated that, regardless of whether Gaines had exhausted his claims, the judge had "no trouble" concluding that the claims were due to be denied on the merits. As for the assertion that the terms of the "contract plea agreement" were for a sentence of 30 years, minus 20 days a month in gain time,the judge stated that it was illogical and contrary to the concept of how gain time was calculated, since gain time was dependent on good institutional behavior and subject to forfeiture. The judge further found that the forfeiture of gain time or the requirement that Gaines serve time on conditional release did "not thwart a plea agreement for a 30-year sentence as a habitual felony offender" or invalidate the plea and noted that Gaines would only serve his agreed-upon 30-year sentence despite the forfeiture of his gain time. Finally, the judge stated that Gaines had not shown how any alleged violation of the plea agreement amounted to a denial of his constitutional rights because the plea agreement was not in evidence and Gaines had not argued how the FCOR or FDOC had violated his constitutional rights in regard to the plea agreement. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended denying Gaines's § 2241 petition and a Certificate of Appealability ("COA").
The district court issued an order labeled "Order Denying the Petition and Denying a Certificate of Appealability."2 The court found that gain time under Florida law is subject to forfeiture if the defendant commits a new offense. Thus, the court stated that a "state must comply with a plea agreement on which a guiltyplea is based . . . but Mr. Gaines has not shown that his plea agreement purported to countermand state law on gain time or conditional release, and his unsupported contrary conclusion makes no sense." The court concluded that, "bottom line," Gaines had received a proper 30-year sentence that fully complied with his plea agreement, which was "precisely in compliance with Florida law." The court adopted the R&R and denied Gaines's petition, but granted him a COA on the issue of whether his claim that the state violated his plea agreement by revoking his gain time was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing.
Our Court sua sponte vacated the COA and ordered a limited remand, instructing the district court to clarify its COA ruling, clarify the statutory basis of the habeas corpus petition, and correct the COA to identify an underlying constitutional claim. On limited remand, the district court clarified that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment obligated the state to comply with any plea agreement it entered into with a defendant. Thus, the district court determined that, if Gaines could show that his plea agreement in fact included a promise of irrevocable gain time that the state violated, reasonable jurists would agree that the state's actions violated Gaines's right to due process. Because reasonable jurists could debate whether Gaines was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim, the district court granted him a COA on the issue of "whether Mr. Gaines's claimthat the state violated his plea agreement by revoking his gain time was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing."
On appeal, Gaines states that he unsuccessfully attempted to obtain his plea agreement or plea-colloquy transcript and asserts that it was clearly unreasonable for the state court and magistrate judge to make assumptions regarding his plea agreement in denying him relief. Gaines also argues that he is entitled to immediate release because the state cannot refute his claim to relief in the absence of the plea agreement.3 He asserts that the forfeiture of his gain time by the FDOC and FCOR frustrated the intent of his plea agreement, his sentence was completed upon his release in 2008 based on the gain time in which he had a vested interest, and, in the alternative, his case should be sent back to the state court for resentencing or withdrawal of his plea.
Habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by state...
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