Gaines v. City of Dall.

• Decision Date: 28 December 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-1867-L
• Parties: LYDIA M. GAINES, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

LYDIA M. GAINES, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-1867-L

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

December 28, 2018

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

By Order of Reference, filed June 19, 2018 (doc. 28), before the Court for recommendation is Defendant City of Dallas's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Federal Complaint and Brief in Support, filed June 14, 2018 (doc. 27). Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion should be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Lydia M. Gaines (Plaintiff) sues her employer, the City of Dallas (Defendant), under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) for "discrimination and harassment in the workplace based on age and the creation of a hostile workplace." (doc. 26 at 1.)¹ She contends that Defendant has discriminated against her and disparately applied its policies and procedures by:

1. Failing to provide a safe workplace for plaintiff, free from harassment, verbal abuse, destruction of personal property and the threat of violence by other city employees, based on age[.]

2. Defaming Plaintiff's name and work ethics throughout the accounting and human resources departments. Defendant, through accounting management, defamed Plaintiff, in particular, by creating false accusations of mental illness and instability.

3. Failing to address numerous grievances relating to disparate application of Defendant's policies and procedures related to provision of a safe workplace.

4. Den[ying] cross-training opportunities for the accountant three position, and denial of other accounting department opportunities where younger employees were deployed.

5. Consistently threatening Plaintiff regarding imminent termination for speaking out about the hostile environment and the abusive and threatening employees in the accounting department.

6. Evaluating Plaintiff'[s] high level work, in a biased manner, at the same level of performance as younger employees with documented errors of performance.

(Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff, a senior office assistant, alleges that although she was trained to replace an employee who was retiring, that position was ultimately "given to a younger female" employee. (Id. at 2-3.) She volunteered to worked on Saturdays for over a year in order to "close out" systems but did not get paid and only had her time adjusted. (Id.) When she requested a day off, her supervisor "slammed his fist on the desk" and told her that she was paid to be at work. (Id.) She then informed management that she was no longer available on Saturdays, and a younger employee then began working on Saturdays and was paid. (Id.) Her supervisor eventually asked her to begin working on Saturdays again and told her that she would be paid, but "they [then] stopped close out on Sat[urday] when prior to [that] it was mandatory." (Id.) On one occasion, a younger employee allegedly attempted to attack Plaintiff in front of her supervisor during a meeting, but management did nothing. (Id.) Plaintiff "was told by the supervisor that [she] had better worry about what they were going to do to [her] even though he told [her] that [she] handled the situation professionally." (Id.) After management failed to take action, the younger employee who attacked her would go to Plaintiff's desk and make statements such as, "I like to fight, . . . she better get her old [expletive] somewhere and sit down!" (Id. at 4.) Management subsequently met with them to "smoothe [sic] it over." (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendant has trained employees on violence and harassment in the workplace, and that there are policies under which employees "will face disciplinary action for arguing over the work." (Id.) She filed grievances based on the policies because there were "many situations" involving arguments over work, but her grievances were denied. (Id.) She filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and received a right to sue letter on April 17, 2017. (Id. at 1.) On July 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed her pro se complaint in this case, alleging age discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment under the ADEA and seeking $100,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages. (See doc. 3.)² She claims that Defendant's actions have caused her "stress, anxiety, medical bills, mental distress, humiliation, embarrassment and damage to [her] professional reputation." (Id.)

On September 28, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss this action. (doc. 14.) On April 13, 2018, it was recommended that the motion be granted, and that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, but that she be given the opportunity to amend. (See doc. 20.) On May 31, 2018, Plaintiff filed her amended complaint. (doc. 26.) She appears to assert the same claims as in her original complaint, and she seeks the same damages. (Id. at 1-5.) On June 14, 2018, Defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. (doc. 27.) Plaintiff did not respond, and the motion is now ripe for recommendation.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (doc. 27.)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the 12(b)(6) standard, a court cannot look beyond the face of the pleadings. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). It is well-established that "pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981). Nonetheless, regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts, not mere conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). The court must accept those well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker, 75 F.3d at 196.

"[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555; accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasizing that "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"). The alleged facts must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In short, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Wherea complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When plaintiffs "have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A. Age Discrimination

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff "has failed to state a plausible age discrimination claim under the ADEA." (doc. 27 at 8-12.)

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). "A plaintiff may prove age discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence." Joseph v. City of Dallas, 277 F. App'x 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Where a plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence of discrimination, her age discrimination claim is subject to the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applicable to claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII).³ See Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010) (while the Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to ADEA claims, "we are bound by our circuit precedent applying McDonnell Douglas to age discrimination cases."). Under the framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Mossv. BMC Software Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007)). While a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination in the motion to dismiss context, Flores v. Select Energy Servs., L.L.C., 486 F. App'x 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)), the prima facie elements are not entirely irrelevant, and no plaintiff is exempt from her obligation to allege sufficient facts to state all the elements of her claim. Puente v. Ridge, 324 F. App'x 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2009).

The ADEA "authorizes two types of discrimination claims: disparate treatment and disparate impact." Powell v. Dallas Morning News L.P., ...