Gaines v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 17-AA-1403

• Decision Date: 27 June 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-AA-1403,17-AA-1403
• Citation: 210 A.3d 767
• Parties: Lemakia GAINES, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent, and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Intervenor.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

210 A.3d 767

Lemakia GAINES, Petitioner,

v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent,andWashington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Intervenor.

No. 17-AA-1403

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued January 17, 2019

Decided June 27, 2019

Bruce M. Bender, Rockville, with whom Justin M. Reiner, Bethesda, and Michael J. Foley, Rockville, were on the brief, for petitioner.

Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General, and Stacy L. Anderson, Acting Deputy Solicitor General at the time the statement was filed, filed a statement in lieu of brief.

Mark H. Dho, with whom Sarah O. Rollman was on the brief, for intervenor.

Before Thompson, Beckwith, and McLeese, Associate Judges.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

Petitioner Lemakia Gaines challenges an order of the Compensation Review Board (CRB) denying her claim for workers' compensation benefits. We vacate the order.

I.

After an evidentiary hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the following facts, which appear to be undisputed. On February 3, 2016, Ms. Gaines was scheduled to work a "swing shift" as a rail-station manager for intervenor Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). Her first shift was at the Dupont Circle station and ended at 4:15 p.m. Her second shift was at the Farragut North station and was scheduled to begin at 6:20 p.m. The period between the two shifts was an unpaid break. After finishing her first shift, Ms. Gaines rode the Metrorail one stop to the Farragut North station. Ms. Gaines was in uniform, and she was required to assist customers while traveling in the Metrorail system, whether or not she was on duty or on a break.

Ms. Gaines planned to take her break and eat lunch in the employee-only auxiliary room at the Farragut North station before starting her next shift. WMATA permits employees to use such rooms as break or lunch rooms. Break rooms are accessible only with a master key issued to station managers and employees.

After Ms. Gaines arrived at the Farragut North station, she took the escalator up to the street to get a soda from a nearby store. Around 4:40 p.m., on her way back down the escalator, she slipped and fell down several steps. Ms. Gaines felt immediate pain in her neck, back, left shoulder, and left arm, and was bleeding on her left leg. She was diagnosed with contusions, abrasions, and strains to the left shoulder, left arm, lumbar spine, thoracic spine, and neck. Ms. Gaines was placed off of work and remained off of work in the following months due to continuing pain. Ms. Gaines filed a workers' compensation claim for medical expenses and disability benefits.

The ALJ granted Ms. Gaines's claim. WMATA sought review by the CRB, which reversed and directed that Ms. Gaines's claim be denied. According to the CRB, Ms. Gaines's claim did not "arise out of" Ms. Gaines's employment, as required by D.C. Code § 32-1501(12) (2019 Repl.), because the injury occurred while Ms. Gaines was on a lengthy break between shifts.

II.

We review a decision of the CRB to determine whether the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Reyes v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 48 A.3d 159, 164 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). We defer to the CRB's reasonable interpretation of statutes that the CRB is charged with administering. Howard Univ. Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 200 A.3d 1244, 1248 (D.C. 2019). Workers' compensation statutes "are remedial in character and are generally construed liberally in favor of claimants." Marsden v. District of Columbia , 142 A.3d 525, 529 (D.C. 2016) ; see also, e.g. , Kolson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 699 A.2d 357, 359 (D.C. 1997) (noting "strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases") (internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

To be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, an injury must "aris[e] out of and in the course of employment." D.C. Code § 32-1501(12). "The requirement that an injury arise out of employment refers to the origin or cause of the injury." Bentt v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 979 A.2d 1226, 1232 (D.C. 2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

[R]isks causing injury to a claimant can be brought within three categories: risks distinctly associated with the employment, risks personal to the claimant, and "neutral" risks[ -- ]i.e. , risks having no particular employment or personal character. Harms from the first are universally compensable. Those from the second are universally noncompensable. To determine whether harm from an injury caused by a neutral risk arises out of one's employment, this court has adopted the positional-risk test. Under the positional-risk test, an injury arises out of employment so long as it would not have happened but for the fact that conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in a position where he [or she] was injured.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The positional-risk test "is a ‘liberal’ standard which obviates any requirement of employer fault or of a causal relationship between the nature of the employment and the risk of injury. Nor need the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of benefit to the employer." Clark v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 743 A.2d 722, 727 (D.C. 2000) (citations omitted).

We determine whether an injury arose "in the course of" employment on the basis of "the time, place[,] and circumstances under which the injury occurred." Bentt , 979 A.2d at 1234 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]n accident occurs ‘in the course of employment’ when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be expected to be, and while he or she is reasonably fulfilling duties of his or her employment or doing something reasonably incidental thereto." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Injuries that occur outside the precise hours of employment may in certain circumstances be deemed to have occurred in the course of employment, if they occur during "a reasonable and foreseeable activity that is reasonably related to or incidental to [the] employment or [that] resulted from a risk created by [the] employment." Vieira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 721 A.2d 579, 583 (D.C. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although "arising out" of employment and "arising in the course of" employment are distinct concepts, "the two are not totally independent; frequently proof of one will incidentally tend to establish the other." Kolson , 699 A.2d at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "when it is established that an injury or death occurs in the ‘course of employment,’ that fact strengthens the presumption that it ‘arises out of the employment,[’] and any doubts as to that fact should be resolved in the claimant's favor." Clark , 743 A.2d at 728 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).¹

B.

We first note two antecedent issues, one factual and one legal. The factual issue is whether Ms. Gaines was on duty or off duty at the time of the injury. It was undisputed that Ms. Gaines was on an unpaid break between her two shifts. Relying on employment records among other things, however, Ms. Gaines contended that she was on duty during the break. WMATA introduced testimony that Ms. Gaines was off duty. The ALJ did not make a finding on that disputed issue. The CRB, however, stated that Ms. Gaines was off duty. We doubt that the CRB was permitted to make its own finding in the first instance on this disputed factual issue. Cf., e.g. , Poole v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 77 A.3d 460, 469 n.12 (D.C. 2013) ("Just as the court is required to defer to the ALJ's factual finding[s], so must the CRB. The CRB may not consider the evidence de novo and make factual findings different from those of the ALJ.") (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). We need not address that issue, however, because it does not affect our disposition. Even if we assume that Ms. Gaines was off duty at the time of the injury, we conclude that the injury was compensable.

The legal issue is whether Ms. Gaines's injury arose from a risk that was distinctly associated with her employment, was personal to Ms. Gaines, or was neutral. The ALJ concluded that the risk at issue was neutral. The CRB did not expressly decide that issue but appears to have at least assumed arguendo that the risk was neutral. In this court, Ms. Gaines argues that the risk was neutral, whereas WMATA contends that the risk was personal to Ms. Gaines. We have no difficulty concluding that the risk of injury in this case was at least neutral. We have treated risks as personal when they are "thoroughly disconnected from the workplace." Muhammad v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 34 A.3d 488, 496 & n.11 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (giving example of dying a natural death); see also, e.g. , Clark , 743 A.2d at 727 (risk is personal "when it is clear that the employment contributed nothing to the episode") (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Gaines's injury was certainly not "thoroughly disconnected from the workplace." The injury occurred in the workplace, as a result of a fall while Ms. Gaines was riding on a WMATA escalator on her way into the station where she was scheduled to work. Ms. Gaines submitted evidence that it had been raining heavily and that the escalator was wet. Although the ALJ did not make an explicit finding on that point, the ALJ did find generally that Ms. Gaines's testimony was credible. Moreover, WMATA does not appear to contest that workplace conditions contributed to Ms. Gaines's fall. This case therefore does not present the question whether compensation is available for injuries arising from falls "resulting from...