Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1955
• Docket Number: No. 17002,17002
• Citation: 227 S.C. 200,87 S.E.2d 486
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Jack W. GAINEY, Respondent, v. COKER'S PEDIGREED SEED CO., Appellant.

Page 486

87 S.E.2d 486

227 S.C. 200

Jack W. GAINEY, Respondent, v. COKER'S PEDIGREED SEED CO., Appellant.

No. 17002.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 12, 1955.

John F. Wilmeth, Robert W. Shand, Philip Wilmeth, Hartsville, for appellant.

James P. Mozingo, III, Benny R. Greer, John L. Nettles, Darlington, for respondent.

BAKER, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff-respondent has brought an action against his former employer, Coker's Pedigreed Seed Company, now appellant, for breach of an alleged contract of employment. This appeal comes from an order of the Circuit Court overruling appellant's demurrer to the complaint. The question for determination is whether an employee's forbearance to file and prosecute a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Law is a sufficient consideration for a contract of employment in lieu of anticipated benefits from the provisions of the compensation law.

The complaint alleges that in the summer of 1947, respondent was permanently injured when he inhaled cotton poison fumes and dust which came from a cotton dusting machine, belonging to appellant, which he was repairing while in the course of his employment; that as a result of these injuries respondent was entitled to compensation for disability and payment of medical claims under the Workmen's Compensation Law, applicable to respondent and appellant, but he was induced by appellant to forbear his claim through a promise that he would have continuous employment with appellant until he died or reached the age of sixty-five years, whichever occurred first.

The respondent says he fulfilled his part of the agreement and did not file a claim with the South Carolina Industrial Commission, which claim is now barred because more than one year has passed; that on September 1st, 1951, appellant breached the agreement by refusing to pay respondent any money or provide him with any work, and as a result of the injuries he is totally disabled and unable to provide the necessities of life for himself and family, and asks for damages for the wrongful breach of the contract in the sum of $20,000.00.

Appellant's demurrer is that the South Carolina Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any claims of respondent for compensation on account of the alleged injuries in that the alleged agreement or promise is invalid and unenforceable (1) because there is no valid consideration alleged to support the promise of appellant to provide employment to respondent, and (2) enforcement of the agreement in a court of law would be in violation of the provisions of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law, Code 1952, § 72-1 et seq.

The demurrer was heard before the Honorable J. Woodrow Lewis, Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, who, as already stated, overruled the demurrer, basing his order upon the conclusion 'that the plaintiff is not bringing an action for injuries sustained, but bases his consideration for the contract of employment upon his forbearance to file a claim. There is no question raised as to the principle that forbearance to sue is valid consideration for a contract.'

There are two exceptions to this order. First, that the lower Court erred in ruling that no question was raised as to the principle that forbearance to sue is a valid consideration for a contract; and second, in holding that agreement for forbearance of a claim for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Law is valid and enforceable.

The lower Court is in error in holding that appellant's demurrer did not attack the validity of the alleged consideration. The demurrer does not in precise language assert the proposition that forbearance to sue is an invalid or illegal consideration for a contract such as this but the principle is inherent in the fundamental issue as to whether exclusive jurisdiction is vested by the Compensation Law in the Industrial Commission. This, however, does not solve the appellate issue, but is merely preliminary to the pivotal point.

The demurrer admits the truth of allegations of fact which are well pleaded, but does not admit conclusions of law. This demurrer, therefore, does not admit that respondent has been deprived of his right to file his claim, and pursue his remedy, through the Industrial Commission.

If the conduct of appellant prevented respondent from filing his claim within the statutory period of one year, the principle of estoppel could be effective. In Young v. Sonoco Products Company, 210 S.C. 146, 41 S.E.2d 860, 864, will be found the following applicable statement of the law:

'* * * We have further held that under some circumstances the employer and carrier may be estopped from taking advantage of the employee's failure to formally file a claim within the one year limitation. Lowther v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 206 S.C. 286, 33 S.E.2d 889. In Meyers v. Lehigh Valley Transp. Co. et al., 138 Pa.Super. 569, 10 A.2d 879, 880, the Court said: 'The conduct of defendant and its insurance carrier may be such as to estop them from...