Gaissert v. Gaissert

• Decision Date: 20 October 1961
• Docket Number: No. 2824.,2824.
• Citation: 174 A.2d 195
• Parties: Julian GAISSERT, Appellant, v. Cuba GAISSERT, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

174 A.2d 195

Julian GAISSERT, Appellant, v. Cuba GAISSERT, Appellee.

No. 2824.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Submitted September 25, 1961.

Decided October 20, 1961.

Thurman Hill, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Leon Shampain, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges, and SMITH, Chief Judge of The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

QUINN, Associate Judge.

This is an appeal from the granting of summary judgment in an action filed in the Civil Division of the Municipal Court by appellee claiming support arrearages for herself and son under a written separation agreement. Although not raised by the parties, we regard the primary question as being whether the case was filed in the appropriate branch of the Municipal Court.

The Act of April 11, 1956,¹ creating the Domestic Relations Branch of the Municipal Court, gave it "exclusive jurisdiction over all * * * civil actions to enforce support of minor children; civil actions to enforce support of wife; * * *."² Construing this language in Thomason v. Thomason, Judge Prettyman declared:

"The term `civil actions' includes all actions, both those formerly known as equitable actions and those known as legal actions; or, in other phraseology, both suits in equity and actions at law. * * *"³

On the basis of this interpretation, we believe the Domestic Relations Branch was the appropriate forum for appellee's complaint. It is therefore necessary that we remand the case to the trial court with directions (1) to set aside the order granting summary judgment, and (2) to transfer the case to the Domestic Relations Branch for a hearing on the motion.

It is so ordered.

1. Code 1951, 11-758 et seq. (Supp. VIII).

2. Code 1951, 11-762 (Supp. VIII).

3. Thomason v. Thomason, 1959, 107 U.S. App.D.C. 27, 28-29, 274 F.2d 89, 90-91, reversing Hitchcock v. Thomason, D.C. Mun.App., 148 A.2d 458.

HOOD, Associate Judge (concurring).

I concur, but I have some doubts which I believe should be expressed. The exact holding in Thomason v. Thomason, 107 U.S. App.D.C. 27, 274 F.2d 89, was that the Domestic Relations Branch of the Municipal Court has jurisdiction over a counterclaim seeking a money judgment for arrears in payments due under a foreign decree for the support of minor children. Since the jurisdiction of the Domestic Relations Branch is exclusive, it would appear that no other court in the District of Columbia and no other branch of the Municipal Court would have jurisdiction of such a claim.

In holding that the Domestic Relations Branch had jurisdiction of the claim, it was said in Thomason (107 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 29, 274 F.2d 89, 91):

"A money judgment for arrears in payments due under a decree for the support of minor children is available as a means of enforcing collection. It is a means of enforcing an original decree, which decree is prospective in nature. Thus the money judgment is as much a part of the effort to enforce support of minor children as is the original decree. A complaint seeking such a money judgment is a civil action to enforce the support of minor children."

The portions of the above which I have emphasized raise doubts in my mind whether the holding is limited to an action brought for the enforcement of the provision of a prior court decree, or is broad enough to include an action brought to enforce the provisions of a contract for...