Gaither v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 26 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 8414.,8414.
• Citation: 333 A.2d 57
• Parties: John L. GAITHER, Jr., Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

333 A.2d 57

John L. GAITHER, Jr., Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 8414.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 25, 1974.

Decided February 26, 1975.

Mabel D. Haden, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Leo N. Gorman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corp. Counsel, Louis P. Robbins, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before FICKLING, GALLAGHER and HARRIS, Associate Judges.

FICKLING, Associate Judge:

Appellant brought suit in the Superior Court against the District of Columbia for injuries he received while an inmate at the Lorton Reformatory. At the close of appellant's case, the trial court directed a verdict and entered judgment for the District of Columbia. Appellant brings this appeal.

The issues raised which are dispositive of this appeal are: (1) whether appellant was required to prove that the District of Columbia owned and operated the Lorton complex; and (2) whether appellant established a prima facie case of negligence against the District of Columbia.

The facts are as follows: On the evening of December 26, 1972, appellant, an inmate at Lorton, was on duty in the inmates' dining hall. Part of his job in the dining hall was to light the gas burner under the coffee pot. On this occasion, as he had done for nearly one year on the job, he lit the burner without difficulty. He was then ordered by a guard in the area to light the burner under the coffee pot in the officers' dining hall. Appellant had never lit that particular burner which was similar to, but slightly different from, the one in the inmates' dining hall. When he approached the burner, he smelled a heavy odor of escaping gas. His olfactory nerves having been activated, he asked the guard to be excused from lighting the burner because of the danger normally associated with escaping gas. The guard, who could also smell gas, nevertheless ordered appellant to light the burner. Whereupon, appellant struck a match and brought it to the point of ignition causing a flame to jump out. He suffered injury to his face, eyes, neck, and chest. He was then taken to the Lorton Reformatory hospital for treatment.

At trial appellant's only witness, in addition to himself, was his mother. After appellant rested his case, the government moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that appellant had shown neither any specific act of negligence nor that the District of Columbia owned and operated Lorton Reformatory.

Before addressing the substance of the appeal, we first briefly state that the standard of review afforded an appeal from a directed verdict is identical to the standard applied at trial. Calloway v. Central Charge Service, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 440 F.2d 287 (1971). Precisely, the standard is: The evidence presented must be viewed most favorably toward the party against whom the motion is made, and that party must also be given the benefit of all rational inferences raised by the evidence. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458 (1943); Princemont Construction Corp. v. Smith, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 111, 433 F.2d 1217 (1970); Alden v. Providence Hospital, 127 U.S. App.D.C. 214, 382 F.2d 163 (1967). Therefore, we view the evidence presented at trial most favorably toward the appellant.

Substantively the government initially argues that the appellant did not offer evidence to prove that the Lorton Reformatory complex is owned and operated by the District of Columbia, and that such proof is necessary since this fact is not common knowledge. We disagree for two reasons.

First, it is clear that a reasonable person with reasonable knowledge of the District of Columbia community would understand that the District owns and operates its own reformatory. Material appears in the news media almost daily bearing evidence to the fact that the District owns and operates the Lorton complex. Therefore, we believe that this fact is of sufficient common knowledge in the District to be judicially noticed. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2571, 2580 (3d ed. 1940).

Second, by act of Congress in D.C.Code 1973, §§ 24-441, 2-1-443, a Department of Corrections was created in and for the District of Columbia to have charge of the Lorton Reformatory. While there have been subsequent reorganizations of the departments in charge of the reformatory, it is still, nevertheless, under the control of the District of Columbia pursuant to this statute. See Organization Order No. 7, Commissioner's Order No. 67-94, Dec. 26, 1967, as further amended Dec. 22, 1969, Nov. 7, 1972, Appendix, Title I, D.C.Code 1973 at 232.

It is well recognized that a court takes judicial notice of laws and statutes of the jurisdiction in which the court sits. 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 16 at 846-49 (1964). Such a rule is self-evident under our system of jurisprudence. Indeed, to require a litigant in the Superior Court to prove statutes...