Gaither v. Sterrett

• Decision Date: 07 August 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 72 F 31.
• Citation: 346 F. Supp. 1095
• Parties: Ruthie Lee GAITHER and James R. Gaither, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, et al., Plaintiffs, v. William R. STERRETT, Individually and in his capacity as Administrator of the Indiana State Department of Public Welfare, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

346 F. Supp. 1095

Ruthie Lee GAITHER and James R. Gaither, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, et al., Plaintiffs, v. William R. STERRETT, Individually and in his capacity as Administrator of the Indiana State Department of Public Welfare, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 72 F 31.

United States District Court, N. D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

August 7, 1972.

Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Fort Wayne, Ind., David P. Matsey, Seymour Moskowitz, Gary, Ind., John P. Forhan, South Bend, Ind., Louis F. Rosenberg, Harold R. Berk, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.

George M. Curry, Elizabeth H. Hamacher, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant.

Before PELL, Circuit Judge, and GRANT and ESCHBACH, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

ESCHBACH, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated seek the issuance of a preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of Indiana Public Law No. 93 (House Enrolled Act 1155) and Indiana Department of Public Welfare Bulletin No. 275 on the grounds that they are in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that they are in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) as interpreted by 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a), (February 23, 1971). The named plaintiffs are members of a class of stepfathers, natural or adoptive mothers, and needy, dependent stepchildren, which children are otherwise eligible for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, one of the four "categorical assistance" programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. Defendants are the members of the Indiana State Board of Public Welfare and the Administrator of the Indiana State Department of Public Welfare.

Plaintiffs' action is founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction having been determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). See, e. g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). Because the constitutional issues were not insubstantial and because the complaint sought an injunction restraining the enforcement and execution of a state statute and state-wide regulation on the grounds of their unconstitutionality, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. On April 25, 1972, a single judge of this three-judge panel issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from enforcing the provisions of Indiana Department of Public Welfare Bulletin No. 275 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as DPW No. 275) as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2284(3).

This cause is presently before the panel on defendants' motion to dissolve that restraining order,¹ defendants' motion to dismiss the cause in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction, and plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. This court has concluded that defendants' motion to dismiss must be denied, and plaintiffs' application for preliminary injunction will be granted.

The court finds the prerequisites to a valid class action have been met pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b) (2). See, e. g., Grubb v. Sterrett, 315 F.Supp. 990 (N.D.Ind.1970), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 922, 91 S.Ct. 187, 27 L.Ed.2d 182 (1971); Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409, 411 n. 1 (D.Conn.1969), aff'd mem., 396 U.S. 5, 90 S.Ct. 25, 24 L.Ed. 2d 5 (1969). The present class consists of all Indiana families which include a stepfather, natural or adoptive mother, and needy, dependent stepchildren otherwise eligible for AFDC but whose AFDC benefits were terminated or threatened to be terminated because of the implementation of DPW Bulletin No. 275.

Plaintiffs are recipients of AFDC assistance, including Medicaid, pursuant to the AFDC program administered by the Indiana State Department of Public Welfare. Indiana operates in conjunction with the federal government to provide these benefits, and the State of Indiana has agreed by statute to follow the provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 and the regulations issued thereunder in administering the AFDC program. See Ind.Ann.Stat. §§ 52-1113, 51-1113a (Burns 1964 Repl.), IC 1971, XX-X-X-XX, XX-X-X-XX. The Social Security Act of 1935 provides that in order for a child to be eligible for AFDC benefits, the child must be "dependent" within the meaning of the act. Title 42, U.S.C. § 606(a) defines a dependent child as a

"Needy child * * * who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent * * *."

Pursuant to his authority under 42 U.S. C. § 1302, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) has specified by regulation how a state welfare administrator shall determine what constitutes deprivation of "parental support by reason of continued absence from the home." This regulation provides that the determination of whether a child has been deprived of parental support

". . . will be made only in relation to a child's natural or adoptive parents, or in relation to a child's stepparent who is ceremonially married to a child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally obligated to support the child under the state law of general applicability which requires stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their children." 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (a) (eff. February 27, 1971).

In Grubb v. Sterrett, supra, it was determined that under then-existing Indiana law a stepparent in Indiana was not under a legal duty to support his or her stepchild. Therefore, the court concluded in Grubb, supra, that Indiana regulation, Manual III-C-3, which provided for termination of AFDC benefits for those stepchildren who had a stepfather in the home, was not in compliance with Part A of Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1964) as interpreted by 45 C.F.R. § 203.1(a).²

The current action arises out of Indiana's statutory response to the Grubb, supra, decision. In February of 1972, the Indiana General Assembly enacted Public Law No. 93 (House Enrolled Act 1155) which became effective February 17, 1972.³ This law is an amendment to the Indiana welfare provisions and purports to make stepfathers responsible for the support of their stepchildren who reside with them if those stepchildren would otherwise be eligible for AFDC assistance. In order to implement the provisions of Public Law No. 93, the Indiana Department of Public Welfare adopted and promulgated DPW Bulletin No. 275, which set out the guidelines for the county welfare agencies to follow in implementing the revised policy regarding AFDC benefits to stepchildren. Pursuant to the provisions of DPW No. 275, plaintiffs and members of the class they represent received notice that their AFDC benefits would be terminated or reduced by reason of the enforcement of Public Law No. 93.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants first contend that this court does not properly have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1343(3). Defendants submit that jurisdiction founded upon § 1343(3) is only available for actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the federal right sought to be vindicated is one dealing with personal liberty, and that § 1343(3) is not available for the mere deprivation of rights in property, which defendants contend is the nature of the right asserted here. See Tichon v. Harder, 438 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1971); Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970), vacated, 92 S.Ct. 1318 (1972); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841, 91 S. Ct. 82, 27 L.Ed.2d 75 (1970). Assuming, however, the nature of the right asserted here is that of property, it is now clear that there is no meaningful distinction between personal liberty and property rights as a guide to the contours of § 1343(3) jurisdiction. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972), the Supreme Court expressly rejected that distinction and found that Congress intended to provide a federal judicial forum for the redress of wrongful deprivation of property by persons acting under color of state law. Lynch, supra at 1117, 1120. The nature of the right asserted here is not, therefore, a bar to this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1343(3).

Defendants next contend that the Eleventh Amendment⁴ to the Constitution of the United States precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter before us. Defendants argue that the relief sought here renders this suit one against the State of Indiana even though state officials are the nominal defendants. See generally Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573, 66 S.Ct. 745, 90 L.Ed. 862 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945).

This court finds defendants' argument devoid of merit. Plaintiffs seek to prospectively enjoin state officials from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute and regulation. The principle has been well embedded since Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908), that when injunctive or declaratory relief is sought, the federal courts can exercise their equity powers against state officials to protect rights secured and activities authorized by paramount federal law, and the Eleventh Amendment is no jurisdictional bar to such relief. See, e. g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed. 2d 701, Brennan, J., concurring at 106, 91 S.Ct. at 687 (1971); Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 228, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L. Ed.2d 256 (1964); Georgia Railroad and Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304, 72 S.Ct. 321, 96 L.Ed. 335 (1952).

Defendants direct this court's attention to Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F.Supp. 12 (D.Me.1970), as support for their proposition concerning the preclusive effect of the Eleventh...