Gajewski v. Bratcher
| Decision Date | 08 April 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 9175,9175 |
| Citation | 240 N.W.2d 871 |
| Parties | Loren R. GAJEWSKI and Mervin A. Gajewski, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lyle D. BRATCHER et al., Defendants-Appellees. Civ. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A party does not lose the right to appeal from an order of the district court by filing motions in the district court, pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., which, in effect, challenge the validity of the district court's order.
2. A party seeking to set aside a decision of this Court, after the case has been remanded to the district court, need not obtain this Court's permission before filing in the district court a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P.
3. On appeal, findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous; conclusions of law, however, are fully reviewable by this Court. Whether a particular finding is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law will be determined by the reviewing court.
4. In reviewing a decision of the district court to grant relief from a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., the function of the Supreme Court is to determine whether or not the district court abused its discretion in setting aside the judgment or order being challenged.
5. A judgment on the merits of a dispute, once rendered by this Court on appeal, after becoming final, should be set aside under Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., only in exceptional circumstances where the application of equitable principles demands that such an extraordinary remedy by used to prevent an injustice from occurring.
6. Relief under subdivision (3) of Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., is extraordinary relief, to be granted ony in exceptional circumstances. The burden is on the movant to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the adverse party obtained the judgment through fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct.
7. Every case of fraud in obtaining a judgment does not justify relief from such judgment. A motion for relief from a judgment should not be used as a substitute for a separate independent action. Where the irregularity which is complained of can be more appropriately cured by another remedy, a judgment of the appellate court should not be set aside or vacated.
8. In the instant case, a judgment quieting title to land, although having an impact on future dealings with such land, is not a judgment having prospective application within the meaning of such term in Rule 60(b)(5), N.D.R.Civ.P.
9. Rule 60(b)(6), N.D.R.Civ.P., may not be used where any of subdivisions (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b) might be employed unless something more of an extraordinary nature justifying relief from the operation of the judgment is present.
10. For reasons stated in the opinion, we hold that the district court erred in granting the movant's motion, pursuant to Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., for relief from the decision of this Court.
11. The same standard of conduct for honesty and good faith is applicable to a party proceeding Pro se as it is to a licensed attorney who represents another person before the Court.
12. In the instant case, fraud upon the district court and the Supreme Court was not committed where the evidence did not sustain a finding that the questionable conduct was such an interference with the adjudication, on the merits, of the dispute that it constituted an unconscionable plan or scheme designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.
Loren R. Gajewski and Mervin A. Gajewski, Alexander, pro se.
Bjella & Jestrab, Williston, for defendants and appellees; argued by Frank F. Jestrab.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, loren R. Gajewski and Mervin A. Gajewski (hereinafter referred to as the Gajewskis), from an order of the McKenzie County District Court directing the reinstatement of the district court's judgment quieting title to certain land in the defendants, Lyle D. Bratcher and Sharon Bratcher (hereinafter referred to as the Bratchers), after such judgment was reversed and the case was remanded by this Court to the district court of McKenzie County.
The facts in this case are set forth in this Court's opinion in Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614 (N.D.1974) but will be set forth as necessary to place the issues presented for our review in this appeal in proper context. In Gajewski v. Bratcher, supra, this Court reversed the district court's original judgment (dated August 4, 1972), quieting title to the disputed land in the Bratchers, and remanded the case with directions that the district court vacate and set aside its judgment; and that such court enter judgment quieting title to such land in the Gajewskis, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. However, the district court never entered judgment on remand and thereafter granted the Bratchers' motion, under Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., and ordered that its original judgment be reinstated. The district court's decision reinstating the original judgment was based upon its finding that the Gajewskis had accepted substantial benefits under the terms of the district court's judgment while the Gajewskis' appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, and that they were, therefore, precluded from contesting the validity of such judgment. The case is again before us on appeal from an order of the district court which, in effect, quieted title to the disputed land in the Bratchers.
The underlying dispute in the instant case involves title to certain land described as follows:
The Southwest Quarter of Section 12, Township 151 North, Range 102, situated in McKenzie County of this State.
This Court held in Gajewski v. Bratcher, supra, that title to such land was properly vested in the Gajewskis by virtue of a quitclaim deed executed and delivered on December 6, 1961. Such quitclaim deed transferred title to such land from Glenna I Gajewski, a widow, and Lloyd M. Gajewski, her son, as grantors, to 'L. R. Gajewski and Mervin, Gajewski', as grantees. This Court also concluded that the warranty deed under which the Bratchers claimed title to the land was champertous and void. Gajewski v. Bratcher, Syll. 9, Supra.
This Court's opinion in Gajewski v. Bratcher, supra, was filed on June 27, 1974. On August 26, 1974, this Court denied the Bratchers' petition for rehearing and on September 10, 1974, issued its mandate, reversing the judgment of the district court and remanding the case to such court.
On April 15, 1975, the Bratchers filed with this Court a motion, pursuant to Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., seeking reinstatement of the district court's original judgment quieting title to the land in the Bratchers. As grounds supporting such motion, the Bratchers claimed that the Gajewskis had accepted the benefits of the district court's judgment by the negotiation and cashing of a $5,000 bank money order which had been delivered to the Gajewskis after the district court had entered its judgment; and the Bratchers further contended that such negotiation and cashing of the bank money order was without the knowledge of and in fraud of the rights of the Bratchers.
On April 16, 1975, this Court denied the Bratchers' motion for relief under Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., and suggested, by letter dated April 16, 1975, from Luella Dunn, Clerk of the Supreme Court, to counsel for Bratchers that they 'seek whatever relief you believe you are entitled to from the district court'. 1
On May 8, 1975, the Bratchers filed a motion in the district court, pursuant to Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., requesting that the district court reinstate its original judgment quieting title to the land in the Bratchers. Such motion was based on substantially the same grounds as had been set forth in the Bratchers' motion which was filed in this Court on April 15, 1975. In their motion the Bratchers again contended that the Gajewskis' action in negotiating and cashing the $5,000 bank money order had been motion was supported by the affidavit of LaVern C. Neff, counsel for the Bratchers, and by the affidavit of Theodore Omlid, assistant vice president of the First International Bank of Watford City, North Dakota.
The district court on May 14, 1975, conducted a hearing on the Bratchers' Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., motion. Such hearing was recessed, and was reconvened on May 28, 1975.
On July 1, 1975, the district court issued its order granting the Bratchers' motion for relief under Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., setting aside the decision of this Court in Gajewski v. Bratcher, supra, and ordered that the district court's original judgment be reinstated.
On July 10, 1975, the Gajewskis filed a motion in the district court, pursuant to Rule 52(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., requesting that such court amend its July 1, 1975, 'Findings, Conclusions and Order Granting Defendants Bratcher's Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P. and Reinstating District Court Judgment', and the judgment entered pursuant thereto.
On September 12, 1975, the Gajewskis filed their own motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., contending that the district court's July 1, 1975, order reinstating the original district court judgment should be vacated and set aside on the grounds that the Bratchers had allegedly perpetrated a fraud upon the court and upon the Gajewskis by purchasing another parcel of land from the Glenna I. Gajewski Estate at a 'reduced and insufficient price', and by subsequently then attempting to recover an additional $5,000 from the Gajewskis. On September 24, 1975, the district court conducted a hearing on both of the Gajewski motions.
By separate orders, both dated September 25, 1975, the district court denied the Gajewskis' Rule 52(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., motion; and also denied the Gajewskis' motion for relief under Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P.
On October 20, 1975, the Gajewskis timely served, pursuant to Rule 4(...
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