Galac v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 August 1975
• Docket Number: No. 21941,21941
• Citation: Galac v. Chrysler Corp., 235 N.W.2d 359, 63 Mich.App. 414 (Mich. App. 1975)
• Parties: Nick GALAC, Deceased, by Ann Galac, widow, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 63 Mich.App. 414, 235 N.W.2d 359
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

Page 359

235 N.W.2d 359

Nick GALAC, Deceased, by Ann Galac, widow Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21941.

63 Mich.App. 414, 235 N.W.2d 359

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Aug. 14, 1975.

Released for Publication Nov. 5, 1975.

[63 MICHAPP 415] Le Vasseur, Werner, Mitseff & Brown by Carl Mitseff, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Lacey & Jones by Larry P. Beidelman, Detroit, for defendant-appellee; Hayim I. Gross, Detroit, of counsel.

Before T. M. BURNS, P.J., and QUINN and KELLY, JJ.

KELLY, Judge.

On August 18, 1968, plaintiff-appellant's decedent, Nick Galac, arrived at work and proceeded to go about the normal course of his employment as a foreman at a Chrysler Corporation plant. Shortly after disciplining an employee in his section, he was found lying on the floor. He was taken to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Three physicians testified as to the cause of death.

[63 MICHAPP 416] The workmen's compensation hearing referee found that death arose out of and in the course of his employment and awarded benefits accordingly. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board reversed the decision of the hearing referee by a three-to-two decision.

Plaintiff alleges factual error. The factual findings of the appeal board are conclusive in the absence of fraud

LeVasseur, Werner, Mitseff & Brown by and substantial evidence on the whole record. Const.1963, art. 6, § 28; M.S.L.A. § 418.861; M.S.A. § 17.237 (861), Tillotson v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 47 Mich.App. 427, 209 N.W.2d 611 (1973). The issue of medical causation is one of fact. Pastaleniec v. The Great A. & P. Tea co., Inc., 49 Mich.App. 702, 212 N.W.2d 734 (1973).

If the board decided this case in a legally improper framework, using improper standards, we are required to reverse. The question is whether the board overburdened the plaintiff by requiring an unnecessary quantum of evidence. The controlling opinion distinguished this case from two 1971 cases in which an autopsy was performed. We quote the controlling opinion in the instant case:

'In the case at hand, no testimony indicated that the day of death presented decedent problems more stressful than those in the every day job of supervision. In the absence of an autopsy, the details of how the cause of death was determined on the death certificate are questionable. Testimony revealed that while on the supervisor's job decedent had grown more tired and irritable but he was working the same number of hours he did as a union steward for 10 years. He had no history of heart trouble, no health history at all.

'Liability in this case can only be based on speculation and in reversing the referee's award of benefits we would cite Draper v. Regents of University of Michigan, 195 Mich. 449, 161 N.W. 956 (1917), Rubin v. G.M.C. Fisher [63 MICHAPP 417] Body, 205 Mich. 605, 172 N.W. 534 (1919), Fries v. Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace Co., 338 Mich. 65, 61 N.W.2d 87 (1953), and, Kroon v. Kalamazoo County Road Commission, 339 Mich. 1, 62 N.W.2d 641 (1954).

'In Hagger v. Tanis, 320 Mich. 295, 30 N.W.2d 876 (1948), the standard burden of proff that a plaintiff must fulfill was outlined. The Court wrote:

"Under the test that an injury to be compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, must have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, an injury which cannot be fairly traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment is not compensable.'

'Plaintiff in the case at bar has failed to present the preponderance of evidence that traces the cause of death to decedent's employment, indeed they have failed to establish what the cause of death was.

'The referee is reversed, benefits are denied.'

The controlling appeal board opinion couches its findings in patently factual terms. Cause of death is obviously a factual question. The pivotal question is whether or not from a fair reading of the entire opinion, plaintiff's claim was denied because no autopsy was performed and therefore no autopsy report available for review by the fact-finder. It is a close question but we find that the appeal board opinion cannot be construed as requiring an autopsy. We therefore find no error in this regard.

Nor do we find that the appeal board applied an improper burden of proof. It is still true in this state that a person claiming workmen's compensation is required to prove his or her claim. Levanen v. Seneca Copper Corp., 227 Mich. 592, 199 N.W. 652 (1924); Trobaugh v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Mich.App. 758, 197 N.W.2d 183 (1972). Inasmuch as the appeal board explicitly recites the 'preponderance of evidence' standard we are unable to agree with [63 MICHAPP 418] plaintiff's claim that in fact the board applied a different standard.

We do not think that the result is altered by Whetro v. Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 243, 174 N.W.2d 783 (1970), and Nemeth v. Michigan Building Components, 390 Mich. 734, 213 N.W.2d 144 (1973), wherein the court stated: '(I)f the employment is the occasion of the injury, even though not the proximate cause, compensation should be paid'. Plaintiff would read those cases for the proposition that no causation whatsoever need by shown. A careful examination reveals that the rule is more subtle. In Whetro, supra and Nemeth, supra, the court opted for a 'but for' test of causation. Some causal nexus, attenuated though it may be, must link the employment and the injury before there may be recovery. The causal connection need not be 'proximate' as that term is used in the more demanding evidentiary area of tort law. Still, the causal connection must exist.

While we do not find error in the general theory of causation applied by the appeal board, we do question the accuracy of the legal test employed in this purported heart attack case. The board was not free to conclude legally that the employee's death to be compensable required unusual stress or strain, physical or emotional, in a causative connecting chain. The sentences 'In the case at hand, no testimony indicated that the day of death presented decedent problems more stressful than those in the every day job...