Galaktionoff v. State
| Decision Date | 01 July 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 1291,1291 |
| Citation | 486 P.2d 919 |
| Parties | Joe GALAKTIONOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
James D. Gilmore, Asst. Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.
Robert L. Eastaugh, Asst. Dist. Atty., Harold W. Tobey, Dist. Atty., Anchorage, G. Ken Edwards, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Before BONEY, C. J., and DIMOND, RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and ERWIN, JJ.
On January 14, 1970, the appellant, Joe Galaktionoff, was convicted in the district court of petty larceny in violation of AS 11.20.140. He was sentenced to a term of 365 days, the maximum available sentence under the statute. 1 An appeal was had to the superior court on the ground that the sentence imposed by the district court was excessive. 2 The superior court affirmed the district court, and Galaktionoff has appealed to this court contending that the superior court applied an improper standard on review, and that if a proper standard is applied, the sentence is excessive. 3
The events leading to Galaktionoff's arrest and conviction are not complex. At about 3:20 a. m. on January 14, 1970, Galaktionoff entered O. Kraft & Son, Inc., a store in Kodiak, Alaska, and took one-half gallon of orange sherbet and two packages of cigarettes. Galaktionoff was apprehended less than an hour later in the area of the Kodiak Boat harbor. An arraignment proceeding was held at 10:10 a. m. that morning before Acting District Judge Gray.
The arraignment proceeding was brief, and Galaktionoff was not represented by counsel. A plea of guilty was entered, and the sentence was imposed almost immediately. Galaktionoff's explanation of the incident or mitigating circumstances was not solicited or heard. Kodiak Police Chief Rhines was asked to explain the circumstances of the crime and to make a sentence recommendation.
Chief Rhines indicated that Galaktionoff was from Unalaska where he had been in a 'little bit of trouble'. The nature of this trouble was not defined. Chief Rhines stated that Galaktionoff had been arrested twice in Kodiak for incidents involving liquor, but did not indicate that convictions had been obtained. He concluded by saying: Chief Rhines then indicated that Galaktionoff was age 18.
Judge Gray immediately sentenced Galaktionoff to one year in jail, commenting that he was following the recommendation of Chief Rhines. Galaktionoff was not informed of his right to appeal his sentence to the superior court. 4
On January 28, 1970, Galaktionoff was transferred to Anchorage where the superior court advised him of his right to a sentence appeal, and appointed the public defender to represent him.
On February 6, 1970, Galaktionoff appealed the sentence to the superior court on the ground that it was excessive. On April 22, 1970, the superior court affirmed the sentence of the district court. In rendering his decision, the superior court judge indicated that he was uncertain of the proper standard to be applied on review:
I'm somewhat puzzled by the attitude that this Court should take in handling one of these appeals. Is the District Court judgment presumptively correct as it would be under normal circumstances? Do we handle it then as if the District Court judgment is presumptively correct and as if we do not set aside the judgment as being excessive unless there's something completely out of reason about it? So just how do we handle one of these things?
On appeal, both parties concede that the superior court judge chose to apply what was essentially an abuse of discretion standard. Under that standard, the judge concluded that a reversal was not warranted unless the sentence imposed was an unreasonable one. In effect, the superior court judge concluded that the sentence had to be affirmed unless the district judge had acted unreasonably in imposing the sentence.
On appeal Galaktionoff has asserted that the superior court acted improperly in applying an abuse of discretion standard to this sentence appeal, and that under a proper test, the sentence was excessive. This court has never had occasion to define the standard to be applied by the superior court in hearing sentence appeals. However, we do not believe that an extensive analysis is required to ascertain the proper standard and scope of review.
In recent cases, we have set forth the proper standard and scope of review to be applied by this court in reviewing superior court sentences appealed to us pursuant to AS 12.55.120. We believe that it was the intention of the legislature that the superior court apply an identical standard in reviewing sentences appealed to it pursuant to AS 22.15.240(b). 5
In State v. Chaney, 6 we dealt explicitly with the scope of this court's review in sentence appeals. We hold that in the exercise of its sentence appeal jurisdiction, 7 the superior court's scope of review is to be identical with that exercised by this court under Chaney. The application of this standard to the superior court means that when a sentence is appealed to the superior court, the reviewing judge is to make his own examination of the record and he must modify the sentence if he is convinced that the district court was clearly mistaken in imposing the sanction it did. 8
In Chaney, we observed that under the Alaska Constitution, '(p)enal administration shall be based upon the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public'. 9 We also noted that the following objectives are included within those standards:
Within the ambit of this constitutional phraseology are found the objectives of rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of society, isolation of the offender from society to prevent criminal conduct during the period of confinement, deterrence of the offender himself after his release from confinement or other penological treatment, as well as deterrence of other members of the community who might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct similar to that of the offender, and community condemnation of the individual offender, or in other words, reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of maintaining respect for the norms themselves. (Footnotes omitted). 10
Having reviewed the proper standard and objectives of review as announced in Chaney, it is apparent that the superior court judge committed error in simply applying an abuse of discretion standard to Galaktionoff's sentence appeal. The judge departed from acceptable standards of sentence review in affirming Galaktionoff's sentence without considering the objectives of penal administration in an effort to detrmine if the district court was clearly mistaken in imposing the sanction it did.
Having determined that an improper standard of review was applied below, we think it is proper to take this opportunity to provide some guidance in the proper application of the Chaney standard to this case.
Recent opinions by this court have elaborated somewhat on the proper application of the Chaney standard in particular situations. Two of those cases are of considerable relevance to the present case. It must be emphasized that in this case a maximum statutory sentence was affirmed. In reaching that decision, the superior court judge emphasized two factors:
I start off with the idea, and this is where I may be wrong and want some-want some help on it at some future date, but I start off with the idea that the District Judge saw the party involved. He listened to him. He examined him and should be in a much better position to pass sentence than I am reading merely a cold transcript here. * * * I recognize that the man did not plead guilty to larceny in a building or to burglary and yet I can't escape the fact that under the circumstances existing, the circumstances which were available to the District Judge, he was guilty of either larceny in a building or burglary. * * *
It is obvious that the superior court judge placed considerable weight on the trial court's opportunity to observe Galaktionoff at the sentencing proceeding. We have indicated, however, that a trial court's opportunity to observe a defendant at a sentencing proceeding is a fact of little consequence where, as here, a guilty plea has been entered without a trial. This is particularly true in the instant case since Galaktionoff's explanation of the crime was not solicited or heard. Galaktionoff spoke only to state his name, to confirm his age, to indicate he had a copy of the charge, and to state he was guilty.
In Nicholas v. State, 11 we considered the proposition that appellate courts are not in a position to review sentences because they lack the opportunity to observe a defendant's attitude and assess his character. We indicated that this argument is of little merit in the great majority of cases in which a defendant pleads guilty, because the sentencing judge's contact with the defendant is extremely limited in time and scope. In such cases, the sentencing and reviewing courts are in similar positions. 12 Galaktionoff's arraignment provides a clear example of a situation in which a sentencing judge's opportunity to observe a defendant was of little significance; as a result, we do not view the presence of the district judge at the arraignment as a cogent factor on review. This being so, we fell compelled to indicate that in reviewing this case, the superior court judge gave undue influence and consideration to the district judge's opportunity to observe the defendant. In so doing, the reviewing judge failed to make the requisite full and independent examination of the record with a view to determining if the district judge was clearly mistaken in imposing the sanction he did.
As his second major factor justifying affirmance, the...
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Cruel and Unusual Non-Capital Punishments
...(Alaska 1977); Huff v. State, 568 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Alaska 1977); Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 228, 234 (Alaska 1972); Galaktionoff v. State, 486 P.2d 919, 924–25 (Alaska 1971); Yu v. State, 706 P.2d 348, 351 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Husted v. State, 629 P.2d 985, 986–87 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).......