Galarza v. Keane
| Decision Date | 01 August 1999 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 97-2607,PETITIONER-APPELLANT,RESPONDENT-APPELLEE |
| Citation | 252 F.3d 630 |
| Parties | (2nd Cir. 2001) EDWIN GALARZA,, v. JOHN P. KEANE, SING SING CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Lawrence M. McKenna, Judge) denying petitioner-appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because, inter alia, petitioner-appellant failed to prove that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic members of the venire violated his constitutional rights. We find that with respect to three of the strikes challenged by petitioner-appellant, the trial court failed to adjudicate whether it credited the race-neutral reasons proffered by the prosecutor before denying the challenges. We therefore vacate the district court's denial of petitioner-appellant's habeas petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Julia Pamela Heit, New York, N.Y., for petitioner-appellant.
Efrem Z. Fischer, Assistant Attorney General (Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Edward Johnson, Deputy Solicitor General, Michael S. Belohlavek, Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), New York, N.Y., for respondent-appellee.
Before: Walker, Chief Judge, Pooler, and Sotomayor, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-appellant Edwin Galarza ("Galarza") appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (McKenna, J.) denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court held, inter alia, that Galarza failed to show that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic members of the venire at trial violated Galarza's constitutional rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We find that the trial court correctly determined that his claims as to two potential jurors lacked merit. With respect to Galarza's three remaining Batson claims we find that the trial court failed to rule whether it credited the race-neutral explanations proffered by the prosecutor before denying the challenges. We therefore vacate the district court's denial of Galarza's habeas petition and remand his Batson claims as to these three prospective jurors for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Galarza, a Hispanic individual, was tried before a jury in a New York State court on various narcotics charges. Jury selection began on February 14, 1989. The first panel of jurors consisted of eighteen individuals, and after voir dire, the prosecutor used her peremptory challenges to strike eleven members of the venire. Defense counsel objected, stating:
For the record, Judge, I know that the District Attorney has been systematically taking off blacks and [H]ispanics.... She intimated that the defendant would want [H]ispanics, after seeing her peremptory challenges, it seems clear to me that she is knocking off as many minority members [as she can].... For the record, Adelpho Felix was knocked off, Aurea Valez was knocked off, Edwardo Vasquez was knocked off, David Vargas was knocked off, Catherine Rodriguez was knocked off.... Every [H]ispanic was knocked off peremptorily.
The trial court responded, The prosecutor responded that she did not assume that Felix was Hispanic and that "[t]he only person that I think is obviously [H]ispanic in just talking to her, as to whether they speak Spanish[,] was Ms. Valez." The prosecutor then proffered the following reasons for striking the remaining four prospective jurors that Galarza had identified:
My reason for [striking Ms. Valez] off - I thought she had a problem understanding. I think it was communicated when she was up at the bench yesterday during the initial discussions. Mr. Vasquez, also clearly in my impression, had a problem understanding. He seemed somewhat confused yesterday when he came up to the bench and he was somewhat confused today when you asked him point blank questions about certain things, he would say no, then he would go ahead and answer in the affirmative. Again, that was my reason for striking him from the panel.
Mr. Vargas seemed very soft spoken and I, on a personal [level], did not feel comfortable with that juror. Again, my basis was not because he was Hispanic.
Who is left? [My reason for striking] Ms. Rodriguez was that she equivocated on the issue whether she could be fair and impartial. She thought she could be fair. My impression of that was that she really had no position one way or the other. She would try to be fair but she wasn't sure and that was the basis for striking her from the panel.
Defense counsel objected to the reason proffered by the prosecutor for striking Rodriguez. Counsel argued that the court had commended Rodriguez's answer about being fair and impartial and that the prosecutor could have struck Rodriguez for cause if she truly believed Rodriguez could not be fair. Co-defendant's counsel1 then reiterated the challenges as to the other individuals, stating that the prosecutor had used her peremptory challenges against everyone in the jury box who had a Hispanic surname:
[W]ith respect to all of the individual names, Felix, Valez, Vasquez, Vargas, Garcia - I am sure I have forgotten one along here, but I think it's patently clear that these are people with [H]ispanic names. I think that each one of them has been systematically excluded in the first round by the Assistant District Attorney. I submit this is unfair and I object....
The trial court then ruled on the challenges:
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court essentially described what [the] test is at this juncture and described that the trial judge has certain responsibilities with respect to fairness. I am mindful of those - let me tell you what my perceptions are and clearly, I will watch this in the future.
Vasquez and Valez did join the line yesterday and came up. When I asked them what would you like to say, they looked at me clearly not knowing why they were there.... I had forgotten that. When the Assistant described that, that is clearly what happened.
Vargas could have been excused by either side, [because] Vargas is suing the Police Department because he was falsely arrested apparently by two New York City Police officers.
I am mystified that somebody who is in this line of work, doesn't know Felix a [sic] Hispanic name.2 Since I am satisfied at least three of them have certain articulable [sic] reasons, I am not going to stop the trial. I am not going to force one or all of these people who were challenged to be seated over prosecution's objections. We will all pay attention. We will see what happens next.
Jury selection continued and concluded the following day. Defense counsel raised no further challenges to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges. On May 24, 1989, the jury found Galarza guilty of numerous narcotics offenses.
Galarza appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, First Department, claiming, inter alia, that he was denied equal protection of the law because the prosecutor exercised her peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The Appellate Division rejected Galarza's claim, stating that "[t]o the extent that either defendant has preserved a record of the jury selection voir dire, we agree with the trial court that the prosecutor provided racially neutral reasons for the exercise of peremptory challenges as to each strike at issue." People v. LaFontaine, 190 A.D.2d 609, 610 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dept. 1993). Chief Judge Kaye of the Court of Appeals denied Galarza's leave to appeal, People v. Galarza, 81 N.Y.2d 1014 (1993), and denied it again on reconsideration, People v. Galarza, 82 N.Y.2d 718 (1993).3
On December 21, 1995, Galarza filed, pro se, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging, inter alia, that his due process and equal protection rights were violated under Batson by the prosecutor's use of her peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic individuals from the venire. The district judge referred the petition to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge recommended that the habeas petition be denied. The magistrate judge determined that Galarza's counsel had waived Galarza's Batson challenges by failing to pursue them during voir dire. Assuming arguendo Galarza's Batson claims were not waived at trial, the magistrate judge found that Galarza had preserved for appellate review challenges to only three prospective jurors -Garcia, Rodriguez, and Vargas - and that the trial court had credited the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for striking each of those individuals. Galarza filed timely objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The district court adopted the report and recommendation, denied the writ and dismissed the habeas petition, and granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated Batson. Galarza filed a timely notice of appeal.
We review a district court's ruling on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus de novo. See English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998). Because a trial court's determination of whether a juror was struck for a discriminatory reason turns largely on the judge's observations of the attorneys and prospective jurors and an evaluation of their credibility, "a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991). More particularly, when reviewing a Batson challenge in the context of a habeas petition, a...
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