Galaxy Lights Ltd. v. Priestley
| Decision Date | 14 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | C. A. 19-503 WES |
| Parties | GALAXY LIGHTS LTD., Plaintiff, v. KINDA PRIESTLY and J. GOODISON CO. INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Before the Court is Defendant Kinda Priestley's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 45. For the reasons that follow that motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff owns the Santandrea, a 95-foot tugboat converted into a private superyacht. See Def.'s Statement Undisputed Facts (“DSUF”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 45-2; see also DX13, ECF No. 45-15. In October 2017, the Santandrea was at the J. Goodison Shipyard (“shipyard”), which is operated by Defendant J. Goodison Co. Inc, for engine repairs and was logged as a “dead ship” with no operable engines or steerage. DSUF ¶¶ 6, 7, 20. Defendant Priestly owns the M/V Monhegan (“Monhegan”), an 85-foot converted commercial ferry,[1] which was also moored at the shipyard. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8. On October 29, in anticipation of a well-forecasted storm,[2] the Monhegan was moved from its mooring on the east side of the Goodison Travel Lift Finger Pontoon to the south pier on the west side of the pontoon, bringing it closer to the Santandrea, which was also moored on the west side.[3] Id. ¶¶ 13-16.
The storm hit on the evening of October 29 and continued into the morning of October 30. During the storm, the Monhegan, operated by Dale Maxcy, “remained at her berth with engines operating” and with lines connected to the pier.[4] Id. ¶ 21; Pl.'s Counter-Statement of Material Facts (“PCMF”) ¶ 21, ECF No. 46-1. At around midnight, at least some of the Santandrea's mooring lines parted and at least one of the cleats securing the mooring lines failed. DSUF ¶¶ 24-25. As a result, the Santandrea drifted from its berth and allided[5] with the Monhegan. Id. ¶¶ 24-27; PCMF ¶¶ 24-27. Both ships, as well as the pier, were damaged. DSUF ¶ 28. Plaintiff, owner of the Santandrea, claims that Defendant Priestly is liable in negligence for the damages that the Santandrea sustained in the allision. Compl. 7-8, ECF No. 1. Defendant Priestly argues that Plaintiff is solely at fault for the allision and that she is therefore entitled to summary judgment.
To succeed at summary judgment, the moving party must show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A factual dispute is genuine if it “may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,” and the fact finder must “make a choice between the parties' differing version of the truth at trial.” Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F.Supp.2d 300, 301 (D.R.I. 2007). A fact is material if its determination one way or the other “has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.” Id. at 301-02 (internal citations omitted). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must “view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. at 302 (internal citations omitted). If the nonmoving party “fail[s] to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue, [that failure] warrants summary judgment to the moving party.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Priestly was negligent in moving the Monhegan prior to the storm, that she negligently prepared the Monhegan for the storm, and that this negligence proximately caused the damage to the Santandrea. Compl. 7-8. Defendant Priestly claims that she is not liable as a matter of law because Plaintiff is presumed negligent, eliminating the negligence claim against her. Def.'s Mem. Law Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.'s Mem.”) 2, ECF No. 45-1.
The elements of negligence under admiralty law are the same as the elements of negligence under the common law. Crowley v. Costa, 924 F.Supp.2d 402, 414 (D. Conn. 2013) (internal citation omitted). A plaintiff must prove duty, breach of duty, and causation. Id.
In addition, under admiralty law, there are several rules that create presumptions of liability in negligence cases. Here, each party argues that a different rule applies and guarantees them victory. Defendant Priestly advocates for the Louisiana rule, Def.'s Mem. at 2, and Plaintiff advocates for the application of the Pennsylvania rule, Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J (Pl.'s Mem.”) 11, ECF No. 46. The Court concludes that the Louisiana Rule applies and that Defendant Priestly is entitled to summary judgment.
The Louisiana rule “applies to vessels moving or drifting due to an external force, such as the current or wind,” that allide with a stationary object[6] and “creates a presumption that the moving vessel was negligent.” Fischer v. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d 586, 593 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing The Louisiana, 70 U.S. 164, 174 (1865)). This rule applies to ships that break away from their moorings. See Compania de Navigacion Porto Ronco, S.A. v. S/S American Oriole, 474 F.Supp. 22, 26-27 (E.D. La. 1976) aff'd, 585 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1978) . “The custodian of the drifting vessel bears the burden of disproving fault by a preponderance of the evidence.” James v. River Parishes Co., 686 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir. 1982). “The presumption derives from the common-sense observation that moving vessels do not usually collide with stationary objects unless the moving vessel is mishandled in some way.”[7] Bunge Corp. v. Freeport Marine Repair, Inc., 240 F.3d 919, 923 (11th Cir. 2001). “The presumption is universally described as ‘strong,' and as one that places a ‘heavy burden' on the moving ship to overcome.” Id. (citations omitted). Application of the presumption shifts the burden of production and persuasion to the other vessel. In re Complaint of ENSCO Offshore Co., 9 F.Supp.3d 713, 722 (S.D. Tex. 2014). The presumption can be rebutted by a showing of one of the following: “that the allision was the fault of the stationary object, that the moving vessel acted with reasonable care, or that the allision was an unavoidable accident.” Bunge Corp., 240 F.3d at 923; see also Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp. LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2009).
Defendant Priestly argues that the Louisiana rule applies to this set of facts because the Santandrea broke from its moorings and, pushed by the elements, hit the Monhegan, which was stationary. Def.'s Mem 8. Defendant Priestly also argues that Plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption because it has not presented any expert testimony supporting its claim that the Monhegan is at fault for the allision. Id. In response, Plaintiff argues that the rule does not apply because the Monhegan was not stationary at the time of impact and, even if the rule does apply, the impact was the Monhegan's fault or was inevitable. Pl.'s Mem. 7, 14-15. The Court agrees that the rule applies and that Plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption that the Santandrea was negligently operated.
Plaintiff challenges the application of the Louisiana rule and argues that the rule cannot apply because the Monhegan was not stationary at the time of the incident or, at the very least, whether the Monhegan was stationary is a genuine issue of material fact. See Pl.'s Mem. 2, 9. Plaintiff relies on testimony that the Monhegan's engines were running throughout the storm and were being used to keep the ship “off the dock” to which it was tied and that Defendant Priestly and Maxcy were not relying on the mooring lines to keep the Monhegan in position. Id. at 9; PXB 54:18, ECF No. 46-3. During her deposition, Defendant Priestly testified that she and Maxcy “decided the best course of action was . . . we had tied up all of those lines and we had gotten the main engines running that morning and that the best course would be to basically bury [the Monhegan] against its lines and sort of drive it just a little but against - you know, just enough to engage the props into the waves and to basically keep it stationary.” Id. 53:23-54:6. She went on to explain that engines were engaged “just enough to provide some positive pressure against those lines to keep [the Monhegan] off the dock” and to “hold[ it] parallel to the pier.” Id. 54:16-18, 73:20-21.
Plaintiff seems to think that just by pointing out the Monhegan's use of engines it has established that the Monhegan was not stationary at the time of the incident. Plaintiff has not however, pointed to any evidence that the Monhegan moved from its mooring at any point during the course of the storm. In fact, Plaintiff agrees that the Monegan remained in one position throughout the storm. Thus, it cannot be said that the question “may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,” Vineberg, 529 F.Supp.2d at 301. Deciding that this issue creates a genuine issue of material fact would go against the record of the case and would belie the very nature of the sea -- for, no matter how securely tied, whether it be a ship or a dock, objects in the ocean move to and fro with the movement of the water. Perhaps Plaintiff has established that the Monhegan was “moving” in some sense of the word, but the purpose of the rule makes clear that perfect stillness is not required. The Court is confident that the rule would not apply if the Monhegan were underway at the time of incident, but that is not the case. See 33 C.F.R. § 83.03 (i) (); see also Yarmouth Sea Prods., Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1997) (). No reasonable fact finder could...
To continue reading
Request your trial