Galbreath v. Hale Cnty., CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00308-CG-N
Decision Date | 15 September 2015 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00308-CG-N |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Parties | TRICIA GALBREATH, Plaintiff, v. HALE COUNTY, ALABAMA COMMISSION, HALE COUNTY, ALABAMA, and ARTHUR CRAWFORD, Probate Judge, Defendants. |
This action is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) filed by the Defendants, which seeks dismissal of certain claims in the Complaint (Doc. 1) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Tricia Galbreath ("Galbreath") has timely filed a response (Doc. 10) to the motion, and the Defendants have timely filed a reply (Doc. 11) to the response. The motion is now under submission (see Doc. 9) and is ripe for determination.
Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b), the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and recommendation as to the appropriate disposition under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1), and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S). Upon consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set out herein.
Galbreath is a white female and is currently 54 years old. On November 25, 2008, she was hired under written contract by the Defendant Hale County, Alabama Commission (hereinafter, "the Commission") to serve as County Administrator for Defendant Hale County, Alabama (hereinafter, "Hale County"). The Commission is the governing body of Hale County and consists predominantly of African-American commissioners. The Hale County Probate Judge is also the chairman of the Commission. Defendant Arthur Crawford ("Crawford"), an African-American male, was elected Hale County Probate Judge in November 2012, defeating the three-term incumbent following a write-in campaign.2
On November 27, 2012, Galbreath executed an amendment to her employment contract with the Commission (hereinafter, the "Amended Contract").3 Article I of the Amended Contract contained the following provisions:
Article IV of the Amended Contract provided, inter alia:
(Id. at 4 (emphasis added)).
Following Crawford's election, Crawford and the Commission "began a systemic purging of white county employees," terminating Galbreath, the then-Chief Clerk of the Probate Court,4 and the then-County Attorney. Each of these county employees was replaced by an African-American. Galbreath's and the then-County Attorney's replacements were also younger than them.
Galbreath and the then-County Attorney were both terminated at a Commission "executive session" meeting held on June 18, 2013. Galbreath was not given any prior notice that she was going to be terminated or disciplined in any way. Instead, she was called into the meeting under the guise of discussing performance issues and an "improvement plan." The reasons given for her termination at the executive session included absenteeism, failure to carry out duties, and use of foul language. Prior to the executive session, no Defendant had ever raised any of the issues presented to Galbreath, nor did they or anyone acting on their behalf ever give any indication that Galbreath was not performing to their expectations or was otherwise failing to perform her duties. Following Galbreath's termination, Crawford repeatedly made false statements, including repeating the allegations made at the executive session, to persons outside of Hale County government, including persons in state government.
The Defendants have refused to honor the aforementioned terms of the Amended Contract since Galbreath's termination. Moreover, at the time of her termination, Hale County had promulgated personnel policies, including disciplinary procedures and a grievance process, which the Defendants did not follow. Galbreath filed a Notice of Claim with the Commission on September 4,2013. She also filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued her a right-to-sue letter on April 27, 2015.
Galbreath initiated this civil action on June 16, 2015, by filing a Complaint (Doc. 1) with the Court alleging eight causes of action:
Defendant Crawford is being sued in both his individual capacity and in his official capacity as chairman of the Commission.6
The Defendants' motion asserts six separate grounds for dismissal (hereinafter, "Argument I," "Argument II," etc.). The undersigned will consider each separately, though not in the order presented by the Defendants.
In Argument III of their motion, the Defendants argue that McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), compels dismissal of Galbreath's § 1983 claims asserting deprivation of procedural due process (Counts 1 & 7). McKinney noted:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court's interpretation of this clause explicates that the amendment provides two different kinds of constitutional protection: procedural due process and substantive due process. Cf. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S. Ct. 975, 983, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990). A violation of either of these kinds of protection may form the basis for a suit under section 1983. Id.
McKinney noted that "areas in which substantive rights are created only by state law (as is the case with tort law and employment law) are not subject to substantive due process protection under the Due Process Clause because 'substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution.' " Id. at 1556 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)). Thus, ...
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