Galeazzi v. Ryan, CV-16-2510-PHX-ROS (JFM)
| Decision Date | 23 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | CV-16-2510-PHX-ROS (JFM) |
| Parties | Steve Galeazzi, Petitioner v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Red Rock Correctional Center at Eloy, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 22, 2016 (Doc. 1). On October 27, 2016 Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 9). Petitioner filed a Reply on November 14, 2016 (Doc. 12).
The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure.
On January 17, 2012, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on 16 counts of discharging a firearm at a structure (class 2 dangerous felonies), one count of attempt to commit second degree murder (class 2 dangerous felony), and one count of threatening or intimidating (class 6 dangerous felony). (Exhibit F, Indictment.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 9, are referenced herein as "Exhibit ___.")
An evaluation of Petitioner's competency to stand trial was conducted pursuant to Rule 11, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Exhibit G, M.E. 1/24/12; Exhibit H, M.E. 2/1/12.) Petitioner was eventually deemed competent to stand trial. (Exhibit I, M.E. 3/22/12.)
On July 19, 2012, Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit J), wherein he agreed to plead guilty to one count of discharge of a firearm at a structure (class 2 dangerous felony), and one amended count of aggravated assault (class 3 dangerous felony), with an agreement for concurrent prison terms, and other conditions. The Plea Agreement reflected that the discharge of a firearm count had a sentencing range of 7 to 21 years, with a presumptive sentence of 10.5 years, and the aggravated assault had a sentencing range of 5 to 15 years, with a presumptive sentence of 7.5 years.
Petitioner entered his plea pursuant to the Plea Agreement on July 19, 2012 (Exhibit K, M.E. 7/19/12.) In the course of the plea colloquy, Petitioner related his use of psychiatric medications:
(Exhibit L, R.T. 7/19/12 at 5.)
The State filed a Sentencing Memorandum (Exhibit M), recommending that Petitioner be sentenced to an aggravated, effective term of 18 years in prison.
Petitioner filed a Sentencing Memorandum (Exhibit N), seeking a mitigated sentence of 7 years in prison, citing his "long history of medical conditions and mental health deficiencies" (id. at 1), including a childhood diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyper Activity Disorder, hallucinations, behavioral disorders, ensuing drug usage, and contracting HIV. Petitioner argued the offenses were the result of an "addled mind." (Id. at 4.)
The Presentence Report recommended sentences "greater than the presumptive." (Exhibit O at 10.)
On August 31, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated sentence of 18 years on the discharge of a firearm, and a concurrent aggravated sentence of 12 years on the aggravated assault, for an effective sentence of 18 years in prison. (Exhibit P, Sentence.)
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2; Exhibit A, Docket.)
Moreover, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (1995).
On November 5, 2012, Petitioner commenced a post-conviction relief proceeding by filing his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit T). Counsel was appointed (Exhibit U, M.E. 11/8/12), but eventually filed a Notice of Completion (Exhibit V), evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. Counsel was ordered to remain in an advisory capacity, and Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per petition. (Exhibit W, M.E. 4/17/13.)
Petitioner then filed his pro per PCR Petition (Exhibit X), asserting a coerced confession, ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced guilty plea, and illegalsentence, all based on factual allegations that counsel refused Petitioner's request for a jury trial and offered wrong advice as to the prison term that would be imposed under the guilty plea. The State responded, arguing that the petition was not supported with sufficient facts. (Exhibit Y, PCR Response.)
On July 2, 2013, Petitioner moved to withdraw the petition and submit an untimely amended petition. (Exhibit Z.) The request was granted. (Exhibit CC, M.E. 8/16/13.)
Petitioner then submitted an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit DD), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel in advising Petitioner about the sentence to be expected under the plea agreement, failing to request a mitigation hearing based on Petitioner's mental health, and advising Petitioner he would lose at trial. He also argued his plea was knowing and voluntary because of his mental health condition and medications. The State again responded. (Exhibit EE.)
On July 27, 2014, the PCR Court dismissed the Petition, finding it to be without merit. (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit D, Exhibit 2, M.E. 1/27/14.)
Petitioner then filed a petition for review, labelled "Motion to File Opening Brief (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit B.) Petitioner argued inter alia that counsel was ineffective for misadvising Petitioner about his sentence, failing to request a mitigation hearing, and arguing that due to his medications his plea was not knowing and voluntary.
The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. The court affirmed the PCR court's rejection of Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance and voluntariness of the plea. The Court declined to reach issues raised for the first time to it, including claims that he should have been advised about potential aggravating factors, and that the trial court, prosecutor and his counsel all had a conflict of interest. (Exhibit KK, Mem. Dec. 8/10/15.)
Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit LL, Mandate.)
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Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 22, 2016 (Doc. 1). Petitioner's Petition asserts the following two grounds for relief:
In Ground One, Petitioner claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to request a hearing for "medical and [psychological] reasons" and failed to have experts testify at sentencing. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges counsel advised him to accept the plea agreement but never discussed aggravating factors with Petitioner.
(Order 10/4/16, Doc. 4.) In addition to the foregoing, Ground Two argues that counsel misadvised him about the sentencing under the plea agreement.
For clarity, the undersigned delineates the claims as follows: 1(a) ineffective assistance re hearing; 1(b) ineffective assistance re experts; 2(a) ineffective assistance re sentencing prediction; and 2(b) advice re aggravating factors.
Response - On October 27, 2016, Respondents filed their Response ("Answer") (Doc. 9). Respondents argue that Ground 1(a) () is waived by failing to adequately support it (id. at 21-22). Respondents argue that Ground 1(b) () is waived by failing to adequately support it (id. at 23), the claim is procedurally defaulted (id. at 23-24), and the claim is without merit because not adequately supported with information about the available evidence or witnesses (id. at 24).
Respondents argue that Ground 2(a) () is without merit (id. at 24-27), and Ground 2(b) () was procedurally barred (id. at 27-28) and is without merit (id. at 28-31).
Respondents filed a Notice of Errata (Doc. 11) on November 10, 2016, correcting the page number of a pin cite, and the date on the Answer and Certificate of Service.
Reply - On November 14, 2016 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc.12). Petitioner argues the merits of his claims, his struggles with mental health, and his contrition.
Respondents argue that Ground 1(b) () is procedurally defaulted and Ground 2(b) (regarding aggravating factors) was procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and thus are barred from federal habeas review.
Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner's claims only if available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When...
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