Galkin v. Lincoln Mut. Casualty Co.
| Decision Date | 15 April 1937 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 115-119.,s. 115-119. |
| Citation | 279 Mich. 327,272 N.W. 694 |
| Parties | GALKIN v. LINCOLN MUT. CASUALTY CO. WELLS et al. v. GALKIN et al. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suits by Samuel Galkin against the Lincoln Mutual Casualty Company and by Norma Wells and others against Samuel Galkin and the Lincoln Mutual Casualty Company, garnishee, which were combined and tried as one suit. From the judgments, the Lincoln Mutual Casualty Company and Samuel Galkin appeal.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Clyde I. Webster, Judge.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
Stewart A. Ricard, of Detroit, for Lincoln Mut. Casualty Co.
A. D. Ruegsegger, of Detroit, for Vernon and Ruth La Forge.
Duane H. Mosier, of Detroit, for Norma and Rose Wells.
Harold M. Silverston, of Detroit, for Samuel Galkin.
In these five suits combined and tried as one, the plaintiffs assert the right to recover under an automobile policy by which they claim Samuel Galkin was insured in the defendant Lincoln Mutual Casualty Company at the time an automobile accident occurred as the result of which the plaintiffs, other than Galkin, sustained damage caused by the negligent use of Galkin's car. Defendant's liability hinges upon whether Galkin's policy had been canceled prior to the date of the accident.
Defendant claims that because of nonpayment of premium it mailed to Galkin at his last-known address notice of cancellation prior to the accident. The policy contains the following provision:
Defendant offered proof of having mailed notice of cancellation to the insured's last-known address prior to the accident. This testimony was met by that of plaintiff Galkin who, although he had continued to reside at the address to which notice was mailed, denied receipt of the same. Appellant contends that by mailing notice (regardless of whether it was received by the insured) it fully performed the terms of the insurance contract and the policy was cancelled. On the other hand, appellees contend that cancellation was not accomplished unless the notice was received by the insured. On the issue of whether the notice was received, the jury found against the insurance company.
The question of law is whether, under the above-quoted terms of the insurance policy, mailing a proper notice constituted cancellation. The insurance code of this state contains the following provision: ‘No policy of casualty insurance, excepting workmen's compensation, but including all classes of automobile coverage, shall be issued or delivered in this state by any corporation or other insurer authorized to do business in this state for which a premium or advance assessment is charged, unless there shall be contained within such policy a provision * * * whereby the policy may be cancelled at any time by the company by giving to the insured a five (5) days' written notice of cancellation.’ Comp.Laws 1929, § 12461.
It is the established law in this state that surety contracts entered into in an attempt to comply with statutory requirements are read in the light of such statutory requirements and the terms of such contracts are construed to comply with the statutory requirements. The statute is read into the contract. Oakland County v. Central West Casualty Co., 266 Mich. 438, 254 N.W. 158. The same rules of construction apply to suretyship contracts and to insurance policies. City of Detroit v. Blue Ribbon Auto Drivers Ass'n, 254 Mich. 263, 237 N.W. 61, 74 A.L.R. 1306. Insurance contracts are subject to statutory regulation. They should be construed in the light of statutory requirements, and mandatory statutory provisions should be read into such insurance contracts. When thus construed the condition imposed by statute upon which the insurer may cancel its outstanding policy is ‘by giving to the insured a five (5) days' written notice of cancellation.’ It is obvious that the insurer did not give notice of the insured by merely mailing notice. On this subject we quote from one of our recent decisions.
Authorities on the question are in flat conflict. We think the better rule is as stated in 3 Joyce on Insurance [2d Ed.], §§ 1669 and 1669B:
“Notice of cancellation, if given by mail, must be received before loss by the party entitled thereto, or by his agent authorized to receive the same, otherwise there is no cancellation, even though a by-law provides for service of the notice personally or by registered mail.' * * *
‘For discussion of authorities, see 6 Couch, Cyc. of Ins. §...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indem. Co. of Glens Falls, N. Y.
-
Koehn v. Central Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha, Neb.
...statutory provisions authorizing cancellation upon 'giving to the insured a five (5) days' written notice of cancellation.' [279 Mich. 327, 272 N.W. 695.] Great American Indemnity Co. v. Deatherage, 175 Okl. 28, 52 P.2d 827; Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Taylor, 10 Cir., 1952, 193 F.2d 756; Galk......
-
Selken v. Northland Ins. Co.
...Land Bank of Omaha v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Adams and Adjoining Counties, 217 Iowa 1098, 253 N.W. 52; Galkin v. Lincoln Mutual Casualty Co., 279 Mich. 327, 272 N.W. 694. In Harrington v. Bremer County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, supra, we stated [203 Iowa 282, 211 N.W. 385]: 'The b......
-
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Babcock
...of statutory requirements, I.e., mandatory statutory provisions are read into insurance contracts. Galkin v. Lincoln Mutual Casualty Co., 279 Mich. 327, 331, 272 N.W. 694, 695 (1937); Chrysler Corp. v. Hardwick, 299 Mich. 696, 700, 1 N.W.2d 43, 45 (1941); Wendel v. Swanberg, 384 Mich. 468, ......