Le'Gall v. Lewis County
| Decision Date | 30 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 22019,22019 |
| Citation | 923 P.2d 427,129 Idaho 182 |
| Parties | Richard and Mary Le'GALL, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LEWIS COUNTY, Idaho, a political entity, Defendant-Respondent, and Wherry Publishing, Inc., and Robert E. and Patricia Wherry, husband and wife, Defendants. Boise, April 1996 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Boise, for respondent. Brian K. Julian argued.
This is a negligence case. We conclude that (1) the trial court correctly included a nonparty in the special verdict form; (2) the trial court's references to the nonparty in the special verdict form confused the jury; (3) the trial court's incorrect proximate cause instruction did not mislead the jury or prejudice the claimants; (4) the trial court's inclusion of a Seppi instruction in the special verdict form was sufficient; (5) the trial court correctly refused to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction; (6) the trial court correctly refused to give an instruction on the Life Safety Code; and (7) whether the negligence of the nonparty and an alleged tortfeasor should have been combined was not preserved for appeal.
Richard Le'Gall (Le'Gall), and his supervisor, Russ Reneau (Reneau), were investigators employed by the Idaho attorney general. They were sent to assist Lewis County (the county) investigate a murder. The state paid their salaries. The county paid their expenses. The county rented an apartment for the investigators and prepared it for their arrival, placing two beds in one of the bedrooms, with one of the beds near the baseboard heater, and curtains in the bedroom in a window above the baseboard heater. The night that Le'Gall and Reneau arrived in the apartment, Reneau chose the room with the two beds. He placed his suitcase on the bed by the heater. Later, he turned on the heater. During the evening, Reneau and Le'Gall drank several gin and tonics and smoked several cigarettes. Each went to sleep in his own bedroom. Later, Reneau awoke to find the unoccupied bed and the curtains next to the heater on fire. He went to Le'Gall's room and awakened him. As they tried to escape, Le'Gall fell down the stairs, injuring himself.
Le'Gall and his wife (the Le'Galls) sued the county for negligently placing the bed and curtains too close to the heater. They also sued the building owners for negligently failing to have smoke alarms. They did not sue Reneau, but the trial court included Reneau in the section of the special verdict form which asked the jury to apportion negligence. The trial court also directed the jury in the special verdict form to answer a question about damages only if the percentage of negligence attributed to any defendant "or other individual" was more than the percentage of negligence attributed to Le'Gall. The jury returned a special verdict which found Le'Gall 30% negligent, the county 25% negligent, the building owners 0% negligent, and Reneau 45% negligent. The jury found that the Le'Galls' total damages were $35,000. Because the jury found Le'Gall more negligent than either the county or the building owners, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits, with prejudice. The Le'Galls moved for a new trial, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to alter or amend the judgment. The trial court denied all three motions. The Le'Galls appealed. Subsequently, the Le'Galls stipulated to dismiss the building owners from the appeal.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INCLUDED RENEAU ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM.
The Le'Galls assert that Reneau should not have been placed on the special verdict form. We disagree.
When apportioning negligence, the jury should consider the negligence of actors involved in the event giving rise to the negligence action, even if the actors are not parties to the particular action or they cannot be liable to the plaintiff by operation of law or settlement. Hickman v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 114 Idaho 545, 547, 758 P.2d 704, 706 (1988). If the jury could conclude, based on the evidence, that an actor negligently contributed to the plaintiff's injury, then the actor must be included on the special verdict form. Id.
Every person has a "duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). Reneau owed this duty of care to Le'Gall. The county presented evidence that Reneau smoked in his bedroom and could have started the fire with a cigarette. The county also presented evidence that Reneau moved the bed toward the heater. Finally, the county argued that Reneau was negligent when he turned on the heater without moving the bed away from it. Therefore, the county presented evidence of Reneau's duty, a breach of the duty, and a causal connection between the breach and the injury. Because the jury could have concluded that Reneau negligently contributed to Le'Gall's injury, the trial court correctly included Reneau on the special verdict form.
THE REFERENCE TO RENEAU AS THE "OTHER INDIVIDUAL" ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM CONFUSED THE JURY.
The Le'Galls assert that the trial court should not have referred to Reneau as the "other individual" in the special verdict form. We agree.
IDJI 283-B contains the basic special verdict questions for actions in which a nonparty is involved. The special verdict questions at issue in this case are quoted below, with the important modifications by the trial court of IDJI 283-B indicated in italics:
QUESTION NO. 5: We find that the parties contributed to the cause of the accident in the following percentages:
(a) Plaintiff Richard Le'Gall ___%
(b) Defendant Lewis County, Idaho ___%
(c) Defendants Robert and Patricia Wherry
[the building owners] ___%
(d) Russ Reneau ___%
Total 100%
If the percentage of negligence attributed to Plaintiff Richard Le'Gall is equal to or greater than the percentage of negligence attributed to each Defendant or other individual, then you will not answer any further questions, but will sign the verdict because the law prohibits recovery if the Plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than the negligence of any of the Defendants.
If the percentage of negligence attributed to Plaintiff Richard Le'Gall is less than the percentage of negligence attributed to any defendant or other individual, then you will answer Question No. 6.
The county suggested the addition of the words "or other individual." The trial court added the second modification, known as a Seppi instruction, which explains what would happen if the jury found Le'Gall's negligence equal to or greater than that of either of the defendants' negligence. Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 (1978).
This Court has stated the standard for reviewing a possible error of law in a special verdict form. Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 788 P.2d 1293 (1990). In Cosgrove, this Court addressed whether making a proximate cause instruction the first question of a special verdict form caused the jury to decide the issue of negligence and strict liability too quickly. The Court explained that:
It was hardly an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to submit the question of proximate cause to the jury first, since if they found that the product did not cause the appellants' injuries, then the jury would not have to struggle with the other complex scientific issues of whether the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous, or whether Merrell Dow was guilty of negligence. There was no showing that the special verdict form confused the jury, and the jury was correctly instructed on the definition of proximate cause in an instruction patterned after IDJI 230. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in arranging the order of the questions on the special jury verdict form.
Id. at 477-78, 788 P.2d at 1300-01 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Based on the analysis in Cosgrove, the Le'Galls must show that the jury was incorrectly instructed on the law at issue or that the special verdict form confused the jury.
The part of question five in the special verdict form which refers to the Le'Galls not being able to recover if Le'Gall's negligence was equal to or greater than the negligence of any of the defendants is a correct instruction on the law of comparative negligence. I.C. § 6-801 (1990). The references to the "other individual" are unnecessary because the relationship between Le'Gall's negligence and Reneau's negligence was irrelevant to this action. The Le'Galls could not recover from Reneau in this action because Reneau was not a party.
The Le'Galls have not shown that the jury was incorrectly instructed. The references to the "other individual" are unnecessary, but not misstatements of law. Also, the comparative negligence instruction is correct.
The special verdict form contains an implication, however, that the Le'Galls could recover from someone, perhaps Reneau, if Le'Gall's negligence was less than Reneau's negligence. This implication arises because the third paragraph of question five tells the jury to answer question six if Le'Gall's negligence is less than the negligence of the "other individual." The implication is that someone must be liable to the Le'Galls for the damages contained in the answer to question six.
We conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have apportioned negligence to the county differently if the special verdict form had not contained the references to the "other individual." The fact that the jury answered question six shows the third paragraph confused it. Also, during its deliberations, the jury asked the judge: ...
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