Gallagher v. Town of Fairfield
| Decision Date | 15 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | 3:10-cv-1270 (CFD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | JOY GALLAGHER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF FAIRFIELD, FAIRFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION, ANN CLARK, DEBORAH JACKSON, JOHN BOYLE, THOMAS CULLEN, and SALVATORE MORABITO, Defendants. |
The plaintiff, Joy Gallagher, brought this action against the Town of Fairfield ("Town"), Fairfield Board of Education ("Board"), and, in their individual and official capacities, Ann Clark (Fairfield's Superintendent of Schools), Deborah Jackson (Principal of North Stratfield Elementary School), John Boyle (Fairfield's Deputy Superintendent of Schools), Thomas Cullen (Director of Operations), and Salvatore Morabito (Director of Safety, Security, and Construction) (collectively, the "defendants"), alleging disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12201 et seq., disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., a violation of her rights to equal protection and her First Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various Connecticut statutory and common law claims. The defendants now move to dismiss several of Gallagher's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Since September 1983, Joy Gallagher has been employed as an art teacher at the North Stratfield Elementary School in Fairfield, Connecticut. During the summer of 2007, the Fairfield Board of Education erected a wall that split Gallagher's classroom into two rooms. Gallagher's new classroom was reduced considerably in size as a result of the project, and had no operable windows, no exterior door, and no mechanical air conditioning or ventilation. Gallagher allegedly expressed her concerns with the air quality and safety of her new classroom. Parents of students also allegedly voiced their concerns to the defendants.
When school resumed in the fall of 2007, Gallagher continued to complain about the conditions in her new classroom. Gallagher claimed that due to the poor ventilation in the room, there were strong odors from the construction paints, sealants, and adhesives. In September and October 2007, Gallagher also reported water damage to the ceiling tiles around the classroom's skylight. Allegedly due to exposure to the odors, dust, and mold from her classroom, Gallagher became ill with asthma. A "Ms. Fitzgerald," the Assistant Superintendent of Schools in Fairfield, subsequently evacuated the classroom until repairs could be made; however, Gallagher still had to use the room every morning and afternoon to load and unload art supplies for her classes in other classrooms.
Due to her illness, Gallagher was placed on medical leave from October 29, 2007, to January 7, 2008. Gallagher also filed a workers' compensation claim in December 2007. Anindependent medical examination requested by the Board allegedly confirmed the causal connection between Gallagher's illness and the classroom.
Pursuant to her doctor's orders, Gallagher requested that, before she returned to work, an air filter be placed in the classroom and that the water damage to the ceiling be remedied. On January 7, 2008, Gallagher returned to work. An air filter had been put into the classroom, but the water damage had not yet been addressed. On January 9, 2008, while Gallagher was teaching a class in the classroom, workers removed the skylight, causing the release of particles and dust into the room. Gallagher allegedly suffered an immediate and severe allergic reaction and left school.
Gallagher returned to work for a meeting on January 22, 2008, and resumed teaching in her classroom the following day. Gallagher allegedly continued to suffer from, among other things, fatigue and headaches, and had difficulty breathing. After running a high fever on February 7, 2008, Gallagher's doctor removed her from work for the remainder of the 2007-08 school year.
In August 2008, Gallagher returned to work. Gallagher's health allegedly continued to suffer but was improved through medication. In April 2009, Gallagher discovered that the air filter put into her classroom in January was recycled from another school, which had since been demolished due to mold problems. The allegedly contaminated air filter in Gallagher's classroom was then replaced with an air filter of inferior quality, Gallagher asserts. Gallagher then requested that a specific type of air filter and a "hepa hood" be installed.2
In August 2009, Gallagher was removed from work by her doctor for the entire 2009-10 school year due to her illness. On February 20, 2010, Gallagher was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, an environmentally induced disease. Gallagher has not returned to work since February 2010 and has brought this suit alleging disability discrimination, violation of her constitutional rights, and various Connecticut statutory and common law claims.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citations omitted). In determining whether the plaintiff has met this standard, the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007).
In Counts One and Two, Gallagher alleges disability discrimination and retaliation, respectively, against the Town, the Board, and the individual defendants in their official capacity, in violation of Title II of the ADA. The defendants have moved to dismiss these claims,claiming that employment discrimination claims are only actionable under Title I of the ADA, not Title II.
Title I of the ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Individual plaintiffs routinely bring claims against their employers for disability discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title I of the ADA.3 See, e.g., Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 747 (2d Cir. 2001); Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 331 (D. Conn. 2010). In contrast, Title II of the ADA addresses the discriminatory exclusion of disabled individuals from participation in "services, programs, or activities of a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not yet ruled whether employment discrimination claims are actionable under Title II of the ADA. See Brown v. Connecticut, No. 3:08cv1478, 2010 WL 2220580, at *18 (D. Conn. May 27, 2010) (). But the recent trend within the District of Connecticut, especially since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), appears to hold that Title II does not apply to employment claims. See id. at 18-19; see also Cormier v. City of Meriden, No. CIVA.3:03CV1819, 2004 WL 2377079, at *1-9 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004)(acknowledging the split in the U.S. Circuit Courts on the issue of whether Title II covers employment discrimination claims in the public employment context, and concluding, based on the court's independent analysis, that employment discrimination claims are not actionable under Title II). Those decisions are principally based on indications in Garrett that the Supreme Court would not construe Title II to apply to employment discrimination claims. This Court agrees with that prediction. Furthermore, allowing employment discrimination claims to be brought pursuant to Title II enables a plaintiff to circumvent the important administrative exhaustion requirements of Title I. See Sworn v. W. N.Y. Children's Psychiatric Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Thus, Gallagher's claims in Counts One and Two for employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title II of the ADA are not actionable, and the defendants' motion to dismiss those counts is granted.
In Counts Three and Four, Gallagher claims discrimination and retaliation for failure to accommodate her disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
The defendants claim that Gallagher was employed by the Fairfield Board of Education, not the Town of Fairfield, and therefore argue that the Town was not Gallagher's "employer" for purposes of her Rehabilitation Act claims. At oral argument on the defendants' motion to dismiss, Gallagher conceded that the Town is not her employer and is not liable for discrimination pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, with respect to the Town of Fairfield, the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts Three and Four is granted.
The defendants also move to dismiss Counts Three and Four against the individual defendants in their individual and official capacities. First, courts have held, and Gallagherconcedes, that individuals cannot be held liable under section 504 of...
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