Gallant v. LaFrance
Decision Date | 02 August 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 63,63 |
Parties | Eugene G. GALLANT v. August P. LaFRANCE, Secretary of State. Appeal . Sept. 14 as of |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Eugene G. Gallant, Providence, for plaintiff.
J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Joseph L. Breen, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.
DECISION Aug. 2, 1966.
This is an appeal from the judgment emtered by a superior court justice denying and dismissing a complaint seeking to enjoing the defendant Secretary of State from placing the name of the candidate of the Democratic party for the office of representative in congress for the first district on the primary ballot in the manner authorized by the provisions of G.L.1956, §§ 17-12-5 (now § 17-12-4) and 17-15-8, as amended.
The plaintiff, a declared candidate for said congressional office, bases his complaint on two contentions. They are in substance, first, that with the passage of P.L.1966, chap. 116, an act adopted May 6, 1966 reapportioning the house of representatives, the members of the Democratic state committee elected at the Democratic party primary in September 1964 ceased to hold office as provided by art. I, sec. 1, of the Democratic state committee rules and are therefore without authority to endorse candidates a provided in G.L.1956, § 17-12-5 as amended (now § 17-12-4); and second, that any purported endorsement would be in violation of constitutional limitations.
For reasons which will be fully set forth in an opinion to be filed subsequently, we hold the plaintiff's contentions to be without merit and, in the interest of advisiong the defendant Secretary of State at the earliest possible moment, affirm the judgment entered in the superior court.
OPINION Sept. 14 as of Aug. 2, 1966.
This is an appeal from a superior court judgment denying and dismissing a complaint which in effect seeks a judicial determination that the provisions of G.L.1956, § 17-12-4, as amended, 1 authorizing the endorsemtn of primary candidates, are not applicable to the Democratic state committee as presently constituted.
The gravamen of the cause is readily discernible from the pleadings. They establish that plaintiff and at least one other voter have filed declarations of their candidacies in the Democratic primary for the nomination of representative in congress for the first district pursuant to G.L.1956, § 17-14-1, as amended. 2 The pleadings further establish that a meeting of the Democratic state committee had been called for July 1, 1966, at which time the order of business would include the endorsement of candidates seeking nominatiosn in the Democratic primary.
Predicated on the premise that any such endorsements would lack validity, the complaint prays that defendant Secretary of State be restrained from placing the name of the purportedly endorsed candidate for congress for the first district in the first column of the voting machines to be used at the primary election.
The placing of the names of endorsed candidates in the first column is prescribed by G.L.1956, § 17-15-8, as amended, 3 and unless otherwise ordered by lawful authority is binding on defendant in his official capacity.
The plaintiff first contends that the composition of the Democratic state committee on July 1, 1966 does not conform to the committee's own rule regulating its membership, and since the applicable rule was adopted on the authority of now G.L.1956, § 17-12-1, failure to comply with the rule is a violation of the statute. Any purported statutory action, he argues, must be ineffective and a nullity, citing Newman v. Millspaugh, 9 A.D.2d 715, 192 N.Y.S.2d 30 (N.Y.).
We have no quarrel with teh principle enunciated in the authority cited, but it is not applicable here for the reason that we cannot accept the premise that the Democratic state committee is not composed in accordance with its rule.
Article I, sec. 1 of the Democratic state committee rules provides as follows:
'The affairs of the Democratic Party of Rhode Island shall be directed by a committee known as the 'Democratic State Committee,' consisting of two members, one woman and one man from each General Assembly Representative District; said members shall be elected in the primary held to nominate a candidate for Governor, and they shall hold office until their successors are elected and qualified.'
Pursuant to the foregoing, the present membership of the Democratic state committee was elected in that party's primary held on September 17, 1964 and serves until a new committee is elected in the primary to be held September 13, 1966.
However, with the passage of P.L.1966, chap. 116, the house of representatives was radically reapportioned. See Sweeney v. Notte, 95 R.I. 68, 183 A.2d 296. Numerous new representative districts were created and most, if not all, of the districts from which the present members of the Democratic state committee were elected were obliterated. The act became effective May 6, 1966 and sec. 29 thereof provides in part 'that the provisions hereof shall first be effective in connection with elections to be held on or subsequent to the first day of September, 1966 * * *.'
Seizing upon this language, plaintiff argues that since the endorsement of primary candidates is an integral part of the primary and the primary an integral part of the general election, the membership of the state committee, to be valid, must come from the newly-structured representative districts.
This is a non sequitur. Members of the state committee are elected at the party primary in which candidates for public office are nomnated. Since the endorsement of those seeking nomination must necessarily precede the primary, the state committee at the time of endorsement will necessarily be composed of members elected at the prvious primary.
The general assembly recognized this and out of an abundance of caution, although in our opinion unnecessarily, provided by sec. 25 of said chapter 116 that nothing contained in said chapter should be contrued so as to cut short the tenure of those state committee members presently serving.
It should be borne in mind that the members of the state committee, although elected from representative districts, are not concerned with the endorsement of candidates for the house of representatives. We are not here confronted with two committee members, a man and a woman, elected from a district now abolished acting with relation to a newly created district. Rather, the membership of the state committee, acting pursuant to G.L.1956, § 17-12-4, as amended supra, endorse candidates for state-wide offices and representatives in congress. Furthermore, the cited section expressly limits the right of congressional endorsements to such members of the state committee as reside within the congressional district under consideration.
We hold, therefore, that the men and women elected to the Democratic state committee in the party primary held Setember 17, 1964 from the representative districts as they then existed, presently constitute the lawful membership of the...
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