Gallentine v. Hous. Auth. of Port Arthur
Decision Date | 18 January 2013 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-417 |
Parties | BERLINSIA GALLENTINE, Plaintiff, v. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS, and SELEDENIO QUESADA, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the court is the Housing Authority of the City of Port Arthur, Texas, (the "Housing Authority") and Seledenio Quesada's ("Quesada") (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (#5). Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff Berlinsia Gallentine's ("Gallentine") claims for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 on the ground that they are legally and factually infirm. Gallentine opposes Defendants' motion, arguing that her claims are viable. Having considered the instant motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that Defendants' motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
This dispute arises out of purportedly racially-motivated employment actions taken by Defendants against Gallentine. Gallentine, a black female, began her employment with the Housing Authority on July 7, 1997. She eventually rose to the position of Housing Counselor and is currently Operations Manager. Problems allegedly arose, however, when the HousingAuthority hired Paula Watts ("Watts"), a Hispanic female. Gallentine claims that upon the commencement of Watts's employment, Quesada, the Housing Authority's Executive Director and a Hispanic male, has discriminated against Gallentine on the basis of race and retaliated against her for complaining about racial discrimination.
Gallentine's complaint describes several instances where Quesada allegedly treated her less favorably that Watts. The following are the specific incidents of purportedly discriminatory and retaliatory conduct that, according to the complaint, occurred between 2007 and 20101 :
In addition to these contentions, Gallentine's complaint includes allegations concerning the internal decision-making structure at the Housing Authority. She states that the Housing Authority's Personnel Policy Manual describes the duties of an Executive Director as follows:"set policy, establish priorities, goals and objectives for organizational design, job design and restructuring to provide upward mobility and increased job opportunities for minorities, women and handicapped (i.e., part time, entry level, etc.)." Furthermore, she argues that the Housing Authority is governed by a Board of Commissioners ("Board"), which has delegated to Quesada, in his position as Executive Director, the authority to make policy concerning personnel matters.
Gallentine further alleges that the Board has instituted discriminatory practices, policies, and customs and has adopted or acquiesced in similar practices, policies, and customs instituted by Quesada. The policies and customs include: (1) never personally evaluating Gallentine's tenure or job performance; (2) allowing Hispanic employees, but not African-American employees, to hire their family members; (3) promoting Hispanic employees with less experience or training over African-American employees; (4) allowing Hispanic employees to wear types of clothing that African-American employees cannot; (5) failing to enforce departmental policies concerning the posting of job openings; (6) creating new positions for Hispanic employees and not African-American employees; (7) overloading African-American employees with the job responsibilities of Hispanic employees, yet paying Hispanic employees higher wages; and (8) retaliating against African-American employees for filing complaints with the EEOC or participating in an EEOC investigation.
On May 24, 2012, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to Gallentine, indicating that she had a right to file a claim against the Housing Authority within 90 days of the letter's receipt. Thereafter, on August 23, 2012, Gallentine filed the instant complaint against the Housing Authority and against Quesada in his individual capacity, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, as well as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e, et seq. On September 17, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Gallentine's claims on numerous grounds.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests only the formal sufficiency of the statement of a claim for relief and is "appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 960 (2002). It is not a procedure for resolving contests about the facts or the merits of a case. See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 1356, at 294 (1990). In ruling on such a motion, the court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); In re S. Scrap Material Co., LLC, 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1669 (2009); Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004); Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. Nevertheless, "the plaintiff's complaint [must] be stated with enough clarity to enable acourt or an opposing party to determine whether a claim is sufficiently alleged." Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989)). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); accord Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182 (2008).
Generally, the court may not look beyond the four corners of the plaintiff's pleadings. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1999); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); McCartney v. First City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992). The court may, however, consider matters that are outside the pleadings if those materials are matters of public record. See Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995)); Cinel v. Connick, 15...
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