Gallo v. Colvin, 13-CV-06528(MAT)
| Decision Date | 11 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-CV-06528(MAT),13-CV-06528(MAT) |
| Parties | PAUL MICHAEL GALLO, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Plaintiff Paul Michael Gallo ("Plaintiff" or "Gallo"), filed this action, pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner" or "Defendant"), denying his application for Supplemental Security Insurance ("SSI").
Currently before the Court are the parties' competing motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, I grant the Commissioner's motion, deny the Plaintiff's motion, and dismiss the Complaint.
On July 7, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability as of May 14, 1997 due to autism. Plaintiff subsequently amended the alleged onset date to the filing date. Administrative Transcript [T.] 37. The application was denied onOctober 14, 2010. T. 71-75. A hearing was held on October 13, 2011 before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Milagros Farnes. Plaintiff, his mother, and vocational expert ("VE") Diane L. Haller testified at the hearing. T. 21-57. On January 6, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled since May 23, 2010, the day Plaintiff attained age 18, through January 6, 2012, the date of the ALJ's decision. T. 28.
On June 21, 2013, the Appeals Councils denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. T. 1-7. This action followed.
Plaintiff was born in 1992 and was 18 years old on July 7, 2010 when he filed his SSI application. T. 208, 37. After graduating from high school in June 2011, Plaintiff participated in a vocational training program where he shadowed different jobs. T. 39-41.
Plaintiff testified that he had a driving permit and was learning to drive at the time of the hearing. Plaintiff testified further that he had participated in special education when he was in school, that he had been diagnosed with autism, and that his autism affects his ability to learn and interact with others. T. 41-42. He testified that he has two friends from high school, but that he has not seen them since graduating. T. 42.
Plaintiff testified that on a typical day, he wakes up, eats breakfast, watches TV, cares for his cat, plays games and doeschores around the house either of his own volition or when his parents leave him a list of things to do. T. 43. Further, Plaintiff testified that he reads fantasy or adventure books, helps his parents grocery shop, fishes with his father, and takes martial arts classes. T. 44-45.
Plaintiff's school records show that he was diagnosed with autism as a child and received home and school-based services with respect thereto throughout his life. T. 163-207, 211-218, 251-268, 306-313, 319-331, 333-344, 349, 351-362, 366-468, 509-510, 529-542, 553, 556-557, 572-586, 489-616, 647-655.
In a Speech/Language Progress Summary report dated May 3, 2010, speech pathologist for the Marion Central School District Robin Pembroke ("Pembroke") reported that Plaintiff was currently undergoing speech/language therapy to address pragmatic language delays. Pembroke noted that Plaintiff had difficulty remaining focused on topics that did not interest him and knowing when to end discussions. Pembroke recommended that Plaintiff continue speech/language therapy services throughout the 2009-2010 school year. T. 514.
An Individualized Education Program ("IEP") report generated by Plaintiff's school dated May 19, 2010 reflects that Plaintiff was in twelfth grade at that time and had difficulty with thinking abstractly, processing speed, grapho-motor skills, speech and language skills, and organization. T. 164-165. Also on May 19,2010, Plaintiff saw school social worker Cathy Grasso ("Grasso"), who reported that Plaintiff was pleasant and hard-working, he completed his work and was doing "very well." She noted further that Plaintiff appeared anxious about interactions with people in a work setting in person or on the phone. Grasso recommended that Plaintiff work on adjusting from high school to post-high school in the upcoming year. T. 515.
On September 3, 2010, Plaintiff met with pediatrician Elliot Kaplan, M.D. for a college physical. T. 346-348. Dr. Kaplan diagnosed Asperger's disorder, but noted that Plaintiff was "very high functioning - doing well." T. 347. The examination was otherwise normal. T. 346-348.
On September 27, 2010, psychologist Christine Ransom, Ph.D. performed a consultative examination of Plaintiff and diagnosed Plaintiff with social phobia, currently mild. T. 288. Dr. Ransom recommended psychiatric intervention for social anxiety, and indicated that his prognosis was "fair" to "good" with treatment. Dr. Ransom assessed that Plaintiff could follow and understand simple directions and instructions; perform simple tasks independently; maintain attention and concentration for simple tasks; maintain a regular schedule and learn simple new tasks. She opined that Plaintiff would have "mild" difficulty performing complex tasks, relating adequately with others, and appropriately dealing with stress due to social phobia. T. 288.
On September 8, 2011, Dr. Kaplan completed an affidavit in connection with a guardianship petition filed by Plaintiff's mother. T. 561-564. Dr. Kaplan indicated that he had last seen Plaintiff in September 2010. He diagnosed Asperger's disorder and indicated that Plaintiff was "high-functioning" with some limitations in insight and socially appropriate behavior. Dr. Kaplan opined that Plaintiff was incapable of making healthcare decisions for himself. T. 564.
On September 14, 2011, pediatrician David Breen, M.D. also completed an affidavit in connection with the guardianship petition. Dr. Breen reported that he examined Plaintiff that day, and diagnosed him with autism. Dr. Breen reported that Plaintiff spoke in a soft voice and was pleasant and cooperative. He opined that Plaintiff was incapable of making healthcare decisions for himself. T. 567-568.
At the hearing, the ALJ asked the VE to consider a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff's age, education, and vocational profile, who had no exertional limitations, but was limited to simple, routine tasks and working in a low stress environment with occasional decision-making, occasional changes in work setting, occasional judgment required, no production and pace work, who needed to be reminded of tasks twice per day, and also requires a ten minute break every two hours. T. 59-60. The VEtestified that such an individual could work as a sorter, grocery bagger, or laundry worker. T. 59-60.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants jurisdiction to district courts to hear claims based on the denial of Social Security benefits. The section directs that when considering such a claim, the Court must accept the findings of fact made by the Commissioner, provided that such findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as " " Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
Section 405 (g) limits the scope of the Court's review to two inquiries: determining whether the Commissioner's findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and whether the Commissioner's conclusions are based upon an erroneous legal standard. Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003).
Under Rule 12(c), judgment on the pleadings may be granted where the material facts are undisputed and where judgment on the merits is possible merely by considering the contents of the pleadings. Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1988). A party's motion will be dismissed if, after areview of the pleadings, the Court is convinced that the party does not set out factual allegations that are "enough to raise a right to relief beyond the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's claim for benefits under the disability standards for both adults and children, although the ALJ ultimately determined that Plaintiff was not disabled since May 23, 2010 (the date he turned age 18) through January 6, 2012 (the date of the ALJ's decision). T. 16-24.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1382c(a)(3)(C)(1).
In evaluating disability claims in children, the Commissioner is required to use the three step process promulgated in 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924. First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in any substantial gainful activity. Second, if the claimant is not so engaged, the Commissioner must determinewhether the claimant has a "severe impairment" or combination of impairments. Third, the Commissioner must determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments correspond with one of the conditions presumed to be a disability by the ...
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