Gallo v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 21 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:21-cv-03298 (TNM) |
| Parties | Alexander GALLO, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Alexander Gallo, Washington, DC, Pro Se.
Micah Ian Bluming, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
A century ago, Congress limited D.C. landlords’ rights to evict tenants due to the exigencies of World War I. Block v. Hirsh , 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921). The Supreme Court upheld those restrictions, noting that temporary restrictions on property rights during times of emergency "may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change." Id. at 157, 41 S.Ct. 458.
Today, Alexander Gallo raises claims much like those advanced by the landlord in Hirsh . He sues the District of Columbia alleging that the District's emergency tenancy laws enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic violated several constitutional provisions. The District temporarily banned landlords from filing eviction and debt collection actions. Gallo claims a tenant has occupied one of his properties for two years without paying rent and that he has been unable to evict the tenant because of the District's laws. The District moves to dismiss. Because Gallo lacks standing for one claim and fails to state a claim as to others, the Court will grant the District's motion.
Gallo owns several condominium units in the District. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1-1. He alleges a tenant has been living in one of these units for nearly two years without paying rent. See id. Gallo wants to evict the tenant but contends he cannot because of the District's COVID-19 tenancy laws that prohibited filing for evictions during the pandemic. Before these measures, Gallo could have started an eviction action in D.C. Superior Court under D.C. Code § 16-1501, subject to the conditions set forth in D.C. Code § 42-3505.01. See Pernell v. Southall Realty , 416 U.S. 363, 365, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974) ; Suggs v. Lakritz Adler Mgmt., LLC , 933 A.2d 795, 797–98 (D.C. 2007).
The District's rules about evictions temporarily changed with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, Mayor Muriel Bowser declared a public health emergency. See Gov't of the Dist. of Columbia, Declaration of Public Health Emergency: Coronavirus (COVID-19) (Mar. 11, 2020), https://bit.ly/337cO2c. Mayor Bowser extended her order until July 2021.1 Gov't of the Dist. of Columbia, End of Public Health Emergency and Extension of Public Emergency (July 24, 2021), https://bit.ly/3zZM8fL.
Mayor Bowser's declaration of an emergency coincided with the D.C. Council enacting several restrictions on evictions. Days after the Mayor's first declaration, the D.C. Council enacted a moratorium on evictions. See COVID-19 Response Emergency Amendment Act of 2020, D.C. Act 23-247, § 308 (Mar. 17, 2020). A few months later, the Council expanded the moratorium. See Coronavirus Omnibus Emergency Amendment Act of 2020, D.C. Act 23-317, § 10 (May 13, 2020). Section 10 of this new act amended D.C. Code § 16-1501 to prohibit the filing of "a complaint seeking relief" during a declared public health emergency "and for 60 days thereafter." See id. (the Filing Moratorium). Days later, the Council replaced these prior measures with a consolidated version that reenacted, verbatim, the prior prohibitions on filing a complaint for an eviction. See Coronavirus Support Emergency Amendment Act of 2020, D.C. Act 23-326, §§ 404, 1201 (May 27, 2020).
Around the same time, the Council passed emergency legislation that prohibited a creditor or debt collector from filing or threatening to file a lawsuit for the collection of a debt during the Public Health Emergency and for 60 days after. See COVID-19 Response Supplemental Emergency Amendment Act of 2020, D.C. Act 23-286, § 207 (Apr. 10, 2020). The Council later passed temporary legislation enacting this prohibition into law beyond the period of emergency legislation (the Debt Collection Moratorium). See Coronavirus Support Temporary Amendment Act of 2021, D.C. Act 24-62, § 303 (May 3, 2021); Protecting Consumers from Unjust Debt Collection Practices Temporary Amendment Act of 2021, D.C. Act 24-165, § 2 (Sept. 1, 2021) ().
Together with these restrictions on evictions and debt collection, the District created programs to assist property owners facing financial strain from unpaid rent. In April 2021, Mayor Bowser launched the Stronger Together by Assisting You (STAY DC) program. See Press Release, Exec. Off. of the Mayor, Mayor Bowser Announces $350 Million Rent and Utility Assistance Program for DC Residents , Gov't of the Dist. of Columbia (April 12, 2021), https://bit.ly/3gLibqH. This program allowed certain tenants and housing providers to apply for assistance to cover unpaid rental and utility payments that had accrued during the pandemic. See id.
A month later, the Council enacted the Coronavirus Support Temporary Amendment Act of 2021 (the Payment Plan Program, or PPP). D.C. Act 24-62, § 402 (May 3, 2021) (codified at D.C. Code § 42-3192.01 ). Among other things, this Act requires that during the Public Health Emergency and for one year afterwards, housing providers must offer rent payment plans to tenants who notify providers of their inability to pay all or part of their rent as a result of the Emergency. If a tenant "does not default on the terms of the payment plan," a provider is "prohibited from filing any collection lawsuit or eviction for non-payment of rent." D.C. Code § 42-3192.01(g).
When it became clear the Public Health Emergency would expire in July 2021, the Council passed the Public Emergency Extension and Eviction and Utility Moratorium Phasing Emergency Amendment Act of 2021 (the Phasing Act). D.C. Act 24-125 (Jul. 24, 2021) (codified at D.C. Code § 42-3505.01 et seq. ). This Act permitted property owners to resume filing eviction cases for nonpayment of rent in October 2021, provided these owners meet certain conditions. This included a requirement that the property owner had applied for relief through the STAY DC program. D.C. Code §§ 16-1501(c)(1), 42-3505.01(b-1)(2).
Gallo challenges these laws and programs on several grounds. First, he argues the PPP violates the Constitution's Contracts Clause. See Compl. ¶ 12(iii). Next, Gallo argues the Filing Moratorium and Debt Collection Moratorium violate his constitutional right of access to courts and his rights under the Constitution's Contract Clause, Takings Clause, and Petition Clause. See id. at 2, ¶¶ 5, 12.2 Finally, Gallo contends that judicial estoppel precludes dismissal of his claims. See Pl.’s Opp'n at 4–5, ECF No. 8. The District moved to dismiss, and Gallo opposes that motion. The motions are now ripe.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), Gallo bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claims. See Arpaio v. Obama , 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must "treat the complaint's factual allegations as true ... and must grant plaintiff[s] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cleaned up).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hurd v. Dist. of Colum. , 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). A plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Courts accept complaints’ factual allegations as true and grant plaintiffs "all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." L. Xia v. Tillerson , 865 F.3d 643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
The Court need not, however, credit "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (cleaned up). The Court considers "only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which [it] may take judicial notice." Hurd , 864 F.3d at 678 (cleaned up).
Gallo proceeds without counsel. This triggers special solicitude for him. "A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (cleaned up). More, courts assess a pro se complaint "in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss." Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. , 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). But pro se plaintiffs must still adequately plead their complaint consistent with the edicts of Iqbal and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). See Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor , 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
First , consider Gallo's claim that the PPP violates the Constitution's Contracts Clause. See Compl. ¶ 12(iii). The District responds that Gallo fails to properly allege standing for this claim. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 20–21 (Def.’s Mem.), ECF No. 6-1. To show standing, Gallo must allege: (1) that he has suffered an injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the District's actions; and (3) that a favorable decision is likely to redress the identified harm. See Sabre, Inc. v. DOT , 429 F.3d 1113, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Gallo shows no injury tied to the PPP. In the sole section of his Complaint...
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