Gallo v. Eaton Corp.

Decision Date16 November 2000
Docket NumberNo. 3:97CV2102AVC.,3:97CV2102AVC.
Citation122 F.Supp.2d 293
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesAlbert GALLO, Plaintiff, v. EATON CORPORATION, Defendant.

Robert P. Preuss, Abate & Preuss, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Glenn A. Duhl, Siegel, O'Connor, Schiff & Zangari, Hartford, CT, George J. Kelly, Jr., Siegel, O'Connor, Schiff & Zangari, New Haven, CT, Julia A. Davis, G. Ross Bridgman, Michael C. Griffaton, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.

RULING ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COVELLO, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, Albert Gallo, has brought this action for damages and injunctive relief against the defendant, Eaton Corporation ("Eaton") pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq., and common law tenets concerning breach of contract, defamation, and wrongful discharge/demotion in violation of public policy. Eaton brings the within motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to portions of counts one and two, and counts two through six in their entirety.

The issues presented are whether: 1) Gallo has provided enough evidence to show a continuing violation, thereby excusing his failure to file a timely charge of discrimination under the ADA's 300 day statute of limitations; 2) Gallo has produced evidence of a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination so as to satisfy his prima facie case with respect to his retaliation count; 3) Gallo has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding Eaton's wrongful discharge of him in violation of the public policy embodied in the Major Frauds Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1031; 4) Connecticut law recognizes a cause of action for wrongful demotion in violation of public policy; 5) Gallo has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether: (a) Eaton defamed him by circulating a disciplinary letter to upper level management and, if it did, (b) whether its conduct was privileged; 6) Eaton's employee manual established an implied contract; and 7) Gallo has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding his failure to mitigate his damages following his layoff in 1998.

As set forth in more detail below, the court concludes that: 1) Gallo's failure to accommodate action is time-barred as he has not set forth facts sufficient to establish a continuing violation; 2) Gallo has not produced sufficient evidence of a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination so as to satisfy his prima facie case of retaliation; 3) Gallo has raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning Eaton's wrongful termination of his employment in violation of the public policy embodied in the Major Frauds Act; 4) the Connecticut Supreme Court would not recognize the tort of wrongful demotion in violation of public policy; 5) Gallo has raised a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment as to his defamation action; 6) Eaton's employee manual did not establish an implied contract because Eaton effectively disclaimed any intention on its part to alter its at-will employment relationship with Gallo; and 7) Gallo has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding his failure to mitigate his damages following his layoff in November 1998.

With respect to the allegations of direct discrimination contained in count one of Gallo's amended complaint, the court directs the parties to the accompanying order granting in part and denying in part Gallo's motion for clarification [document 62]. In light of that order, the court denies Eaton's motion for summary judgment as to the allegations of direct discrimination contained in count one, without prejudice to its refiling on or before January 5, 2001.

Accordingly, Eaton's motion for summary judgment (document no. 58) is GRANTED as to counts four and six and DENIED as to counts three and five. To the extent that count one alleges an ADA violation predicated on Eaton's failure to accommodate, Eaton's motion is GRANTED. To the extent that count two alleges retaliation based on Gallo's filing of a charge of discrimination, Eaton's motion is GRANTED.

FACTS

Examination of the complaint, affidavits, pleadings, exhibits, supplemental materials, and Rule 9(c) statements discloses the following undisputed material facts:

The Parties

The plaintiff, Albert Gallo, is a resident of Connecticut. The defendant, Eaton, is an Ohio corporation that maintains a plant in Danbury, Connecticut. Eaton is a leading supplier of high performance, high technology instrumentation and control equipment to the United States Navy. Because Eaton provides products and services to the federal government, the law requires that it comply with government contracting regulations. Eaton must take all necessary steps to assure that its employees adhere to certain cost-charging practices because it frequently undergoes government audits. If Eaton is found to have improperly charged the government in connection with one of its contracts, it subjects itself to serious penalties.

Eaton employed Gallo from 1977 until November 27, 1998. At various times since he began working for the company, Gallo has suffered from, and been treated for, depression.

In 1989, Eaton promoted Gallo to the position of manager of contracts for Eaton's Danbury plant. In that position, he was a member of the plant's upper-level management who reported directly to the plant manager, one Kevin Cummings. Gallo was responsible for "the estimating system, proposal system, quoting system, and for how the plant maintained correspondence during the term of a contract." The primary function of his job was to "manage all contract administration functions and provide coordination for activities necessary to satisfy customer purchase orders/contract requirements in line with the achievement of sales and financial goals[, and to] [p]erform marketing efforts to enhance market share with existing customers and develop additional ones."

Gallo's January 1994 Performance Review with Cummings

In January 1994, during his performance review for the year 1993, Gallo provided Cummings with a two-page statement outlining Gallo's dissatisfaction with, among other things, Cummings' management and Gallo's own job performance. In that statement, Gallo made the following pronouncement: "I have had a problem with depression for several years, but lately it has been worse to the point that I have been on medication for the last few months." The statement went on: "I'm having a difficult time dealing with my life and at times it is very hard to maintain the appearance of a functioning person." During the evaluation, Gallo requested that Cummings include the statement in Gallo's personnel file, but Cummings advised him against it because the statement gave "a very negative presentation of [Gallo], which could be possibly held against him if he applied for another position."

From January 1994 to July 18, 1996, Gallo continually "pushed" for the creation of two new positions, a program manager and a sales manager, which he believed would have accommodated his depression. During this time, however, Gallo did not tie these requests to his depression because he felt, based on Cummings' statement, that any attempt to seek an accommodation would adversely affect his career. From 1994 to July 18, 1996, in response to these requests, Cummings submitted to Eaton "strategic plans for the plant that included a request for $100,000 for a sales manager position[,] [however,] [t]his request was never granted by senior Eaton management ... until 1996." Cummings also refused to create a program manager position to help control the Class 32 line because he "believed that Gallo was the best person to head up the efforts to launch [that line]."

The Investigation of the Danbury Plant's Cost-Charging Practices November 1994 - July 1996

In November 1994, Eaton named one Edward Bartlett as its manager of nuclear operations. In that position, Bartlett became responsible for all Navy nuclear operations in both Milwaukee, where Eaton maintained another plant, and Danbury, where Gallo worked.

In November 1995, Bartlett suggested that Gallo meet with one David Woodward, the manager of contracts in Milwaukee. Bartlett expected that Woodward and Gallo would work together to "review common practices between the Milwaukee and Danbury plants and determine which different practices could be imported from one plant to the other." When Gallo and Woodward finally met that month, they engaged in a "broad conversation regarding bid and proposal (B & P) costs and research and development (R & D) costs."1 During their conversation, Woodward inquired as to how Gallo kept B & P and R & D charges at Danbury so low, as a percentage of Danbury's overhead. The parties differ as to how Gallo responded to Woodward's query. Eaton maintains that Gallo told Woodward that the Danbury plant charged B & P and R & D costs to contracts. Gallo contends that he never told Woodward that the Danbury plant improperly charged such costs.

Shortly after that meeting, Woodward relayed the substance of their conversation to Bartlett, who testified that Gallo's explanation for improper cost-charging sounded inappropriate "because anyone who puts charges in the wrong classification may be committing mischarging which is a federal crime when committed on government contracts." Bartlett ultimately contacted Eaton's in-house counsel for government contracts, Robert Pohto. "Eaton's practice is to conduct a thorough investigation whenever someone makes an allegation involving illegal or potentially illegal activity."

In February 1996, as a result of Woodward's and Bartlett's November 1995 discussion, Eaton began an investigation into the Danbury plant's billing practices as allegedly...

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    • 31 Agosto 2001
    ...termination. "Absent any other evidence of retaliatory motive, mere temporal proximity alone is insufficient." Gallo v. Eaton Corp., 122 F.Supp.2d 293, 303-04 (D.Conn.2000) (prima facie requirements not met where plaintiff only offered temporal evidence that he was terminated two years afte......
  • Montague v. Sodexco, Inc.
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    ...aside from the fact that he was terminated two months after filing a workers' compensation claim) (citing Gallo v. Eaton Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303-04 (D. Conn. 2000); see also Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding no prima facie case of retaliation ......
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  • Summerlin v. Almost Family, Inc.
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    ...alone, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. However, Lijeunesse, in turn, cites to Gallo v. Eaton Corp, 122 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (D. Conn. 2000), which states that "[m]ere temporal proximity alone will not necessarily satisfy [the causal connection] requirement." ......

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