Galloway v. Clarke
Decision Date | 13 November 2018 |
Docket Number | 1:18cv336 (LO/JFA) |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | Lawrence Glenn Galloway, Petitioner, v. Harold W. Clarke, Respondent. |
Lawrence Glenn Galloway, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutionality of his convictions in the Circuit Court of Northampton County. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and Rule 5 Answer, along with a supporting brief and exhibits. Dkt. Nos. 8-10. Petitioner was given the opportunity to file responsive materials pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) and Local Rule 7K. Dkt. No. 11. Petitioner filed a Traverse to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss as well as an affidavit. Dkt. Nos. 17-18. The matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, respondent's Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and the petition will be dismissed, with prejudice.
The record reflects the following. Petitioner is detained pursuant to a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Northampton County, entered July 28, 2014, and amended on August 4, 2014. Commonwealth v. Galloway, Case Nos. CR13000175-01, -02, -03, -07. Petitioner was convicted by a judge of one count of driving under the influence ("DUI") (third or subsequent offense), in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-266/270, one count of refusal to take a breathalyzer, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-268.3, one count of driving on a DUI related revoked license, in violation of Virginia Code § 46.2-301, and one count of failure to provide proof of insurance, in violation of Virginia Code § 46.2-902.1. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to seven years and six months imprisonment with no time suspended. Id.
Petitioner pursued a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which was denied on August 25, 2015. Record No. 1593-14-1. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia stated the facts as follows.1
Id. (footnote omitted). In his direct appeal, petitioner claimed that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of DUI. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia refused the petition for appeal on July 13, 2016. Record No. 151850.
After pursuing his direct appeal, petitioner timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia. Record No. 170601. Petitioner asserted the following claims in his state habeas corpus petition.
Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the state habeas petition on October 20, 2017. Id.
On March 9, 2018, petitioner filed the instant federal petition, wherein he challenges his convictions on the following grounds.
See Dkt. No. 1.
In Claim 1(a) petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating Virginia Code § 46.2-901, however, petitioner was not convicted of violating that statute. Rather, petitioner was convicted of violating Virginia Code § 46.2-902.1, for failing to provide proof that the vehicle he was driving was insured. Because petitioner's arguments supportingClaim 1(a) all relate to providing proof of insurance, Claim 1(a) will be taken as asserting that there was insufficient evidence to convict petitioner of violating Virginia Code § 46.2-902.1.3
Where a state court has made an express determination of procedural default, the state court's finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness, provided two foundational requirements are met. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1241 (4th Cir. 1988). First, the state court must explicitly rely on the procedural ground to deny petitioner relief. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 259 (1989). Second, the state procedural rule used to default petitioner's claim must be an independent and adequate state ground for denying relief. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260; Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991). When these two requirements have been met, federal courts may not review the barred claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, such as actual innocence. Harris, 489 U.S. at 260.
The state habeas court held that petitioner's instant Claim 1(a) was Record No. 170601.
The Fourth Circuit has consistently held that "the procedural default rule set forth in Slayton constitutes an adequate and independent state law ground for decision." Mu'min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia'sexpress finding that Slayton barred review of Claim 1(a) also precludes federal review of this claim. Clanton, 845 F.2d at 1241.
Before bringing a federal habeas petition, a state prisoner must first exhaust his claims in the appropriate state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Granberry v Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). To comply with the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Thus, a petitioner convicted in Virginia first must have presented the same factual and legal claims raised in his federal habeas corpus application to the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal or in a state habeas...
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