Galloway v. Shaddix

• Decision Date: 30 June 1916
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 806
• Citation: 72 So. 617,197 Ala. 273
• Parties: GALLOWAY et al. v. SHADDIX.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

72 So. 617

197 Ala. 273

GALLOWAY et al. v. SHADDIX.

7 Div. 806

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1916

Appeal from Chancery Court, Etowah County; W.W. Whiteside Chancellor.

Bill by Mrs. Ira Shaddix, as administratrix, against Mrs. Tina V Galloway and another, to set aside conveyances as fraudulent. From a decree overruling demurrers to the bill respondents appeal. Affirmed.

The bill was filed by appellee as the administratrix of the estate of William Perkins, deceased. It averred that the death of her intestate was caused by the negligence of the appellant Charles V. Galloway on July 4, 1913, and that on September 25, 1913, appellee as administratrix, brought her suit in the city court of Gadsden, claiming damages for the negligent killing of her intestate against Charles V Galloway, and that on December 4, 1915, she recovered judgment against him in the sum of $2,000; that on July 24 25, and 30, 1913, Charles V. Galloway executed three separate conveyances of real estate to the appellant Tina V. Galloway, his wife, conveying substantially all of his property, which deeds were filed for record on July 30, 1913, and that said Charles V. Galloway made said deeds without consideration, and after appellee's cause of action had accrued, and were therefore void as to appellee; and that said Galloway executed fraudulently said deeds to his wife, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding appellee in the enforcement of her judgment.

Culli & Martin, of Gadsden, for appellants.

Dortch & Allen and Inzer & Inzer, all of Gadsden, for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

A personal representative may maintain a bill to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent under our statutes, though his only claim or demand against the grantor is a judgment for damages for the wrongfully caused death of complainant's intestate.

Our statutes against fraudulent conveyances, in common with the present English statutes and similar statutes of other states, have always been so construed by the courts as to effect the intention of the lawmakers; that is, to prevent frauds in the giving away or fraudulent disposition of property for the purpose of preventing certain persons or classes of persons from subjecting it to their claims or demands. Transactions for such purposes are viewed by the courts with disfavor, and the statutes have therefore received a liberal construction. The class indicated by the term "creditors," together with other classes mentioned in the statute, has not been defined by a narrow or technical interpretation, but has been extended so as to include all persons who have claims, demands, suits, or interests, and who may be hindered, delayed, or defrauded by such conveyances. Hence persons who are not, strictly speaking, creditors may nevertheless stand in the equity of creditors, and such are given the protection of the statute.

Claims for damages arising from torts are regarded as within the protection of the statute; and persons having such claims, or those charged with the duty of reducing such claims to judgment or of collecting them, are in equity considered as creditors. This doctrine is held to include claimants of damages for assault and battery, for libel and slander, and for breach of promise to marry. And we see no reason why it should not include a personal representative who is charged with the duty of collecting damages for the wrongful death of his intestate, which damages, when collected, are to be distributed as directed by the statute. We can see no reason for denying relief merely because the damages recovered in such cases are not compensatory, but punitive only.

Whatever the damages recovered under the homicide statute may be called, they go into the estate for distribution as provided by the statute; our, and similar statutes, have uniformly been held to include all actions or claims, though they sound in damages merely.

As the administrator must bring the action at law to recover damages, it would seem that he would also be the proper party to file the bill to set aside conveyances alleged to be intended to hinder and delay him in the collection and satisfaction of his suit and judgment against the wrongdoer. Our statutes, different herein from most others, allow simple creditors, as well as judgment creditors to file such bills; and, as we have said, the personal representative is a person who has a lawful suit, damages, or demand, within the meaning of the statute, if the wrong which caused the damages accrued prior to, or in point of time preceded, the gift or conveyance sought to be set aside. The personal representative in such case must be classed as one having an existing right, and not a subsequent one. It is not the judgment that creates the relation, but the wrong which produces the injury and gives rise to the damages which are subsequently recovered.

Our statutes once limited bills of this kind to judgment creditors, but they have long since been amended so as to include also simple creditors. See Gunn v. Hardy, 130 Ala. 642, 31 So. 443, and Calvert v. Calvert, 180 Ala. 105, 60 So. 261, both of which cases hold in effect that a bill like this can be...