Galloway v. State, No. 21
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Writing for the Court | HARRELL. |
Citation | 365 Md. 599,781 A.2d 851 |
Parties | George GALLOWAY, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland. |
Docket Number | No. 21 |
Decision Date | 19 September 2001 |
781 A.2d 851
365 Md. 599
v.
STATE of Maryland
No. 21, Sept. Term, 2000.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 19, 2001.
Kathryn Grill Graeff, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief) Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY,1 RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.
George M. Galloway, Jr., Petitioner, while serving a sentence for prior convictions, was charged with harassment and stalking, pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 121A,2 for letters he wrote from prison to the victim of the crimes for which he was imprisoned. On 26 October 1998, a pre-trial hearing was held in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on Galloway's written motion to
The Circuit Court, in a written opinion and order dated 28 October 1998, denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the charge of harassment. The court denied the motion to dismiss, but granted the motion for judgment of acquittal, as to the charge of stalking.3 On 4 November 1998, after entertaining further argument from counsel, the court found Galloway guilty of the crime of harassment. Sentencing proceeded immediately, and Galloway was sentenced to 90 days incarceration for the conviction. On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Galloway's conviction of harassment. Galloway v. State, 130 Md.App. 89, 744 A.2d 1070 (2000). We granted Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. Galloway v. State, 358 Md. 608, 751 A.2d 470 (2000). We agreed to consider the following question:
Did the trial court err in denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss and in convicting him of harassment under Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 121A, now codified with minimal changes as § 123, specifically in the face of a challenge that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face and as applied to Petitioner and in the face of a challenge that the facts did not support such a conviction?
I.
In 1995, Galloway was convicted of stalking and kidnapping Kimberly Javin (Javin), his "common law wife." For these crimes, he was sentenced to twelve years incarceration at the Maryland Correctional Training Center (MCTC). It was while serving this sentence that it was alleged that he committed the crime of harassment which is the subject of the present case. According to the agreed statement of facts, between 11 April 1997 and 11 March 1998 he sent 122 letters to Javin at her residence. In addition, he sent an additional 11 letters to her in care of Javin's parents to their home address. Both before and after 17 April 1997, Javin, her parents, Galloway's former attorney in the kidnapping/stalking case, and the assistant warden and a correctional psychologist at MCTC, requested of Galloway that he not send letters to Javin. The prosecution, at the 4 November 1998 hearing, stated that at least five people, including Javin, told Galloway directly to stop writing these letters.
By stipulation, the parties agreed that Javin, if called to testify, would state that "the letters seriously alarmed her and caused her to fear for her life on or after... [Galloway's] release date, which she believ[ed] to be April of 1999." It was agreed further that Javin would testify that her fears stemmed from the fact that Galloway was serving a prison term after having been convicted of stalking and kidnaping her on 20 March 1995. As a condition of his sentence and future probation flowing from those crimes, Galloway was
Galloway was charged with harassment and stalking. Maryland Code, (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, § 123, the harassment statute, provides:
(a) Course of conduct defined.—In this section "course of conduct" means a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over a period of time, that evidences a continuity of purpose.
(b) Applicability.—This section does not apply to any peaceable activity intended to express political views or provide information to others.
(c) Prohibited Conduct.—A person may not follow another person in or about a public place or maliciously engage in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person:5
(1) With intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other person;
(2) After reasonable warning or request to desist by or on behalf of the other person; and
(3) Without a legal purpose.
(d) Penalty.—A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, is subject to a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment for not more than 90 days or both. (Emphasis added).
The trial judge acquitted him of the stalking charge, but found him guilty of the harassment charge. Galloway argued that § 123 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the U.S. Constitution6 and, in
In sending the victim over 130 letters over the course of eleven months, the Court can find that [Galloway] maliciously engaged in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed and annoyed the victim. In repeating the same messages and expressing [Galloway's] desire to reunite with the victim, the Court can find that Defendant intended to harass the victim. As [Galloway] admits in his letter that he knew that victim did not want him to contact her, the Court can find that [Galloway] received a reasonable request to desist. As these were personal letter [sic], the Court can find that they served no legal purpose. Therefore, the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is denied.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment, agreeing that the language of § 123 was neither vague nor overly broad and that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of harassment.
In this opinion, we shall address the following: (1) is § 123 unconstitutionally vague; (2) is § 123 unconstitutionally overly broad; and, (3) if § 123 can withstand constitutional scrutiny, was the evidence adduced against Petitioner sufficient to support a finding of harassment. We determine, after examining the legislative history of § 123 and surveying the treatment accorded similar statutes by other courts, that a reasonable person standard should be read into the language of subsection (c)(1) of § 123, and with that judicial gloss, § 123 survives constitutional scrutiny.7 We further conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Petitioner's conviction of harassment.
II. Constitutionality of § 123
In determining the constitutionality of statutes, "[t]he basic rule is that there is a presumption" that the statute is valid. State v. Wyand, 304 Md. 721, 727, 501 A.2d 43, 46 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. State, 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d
A. Legislative History of § 123
According to the 1986 Maryland Laws, chapter 721, the purpose of § 123 is
prohibiting a person from following another person in a certain manner or from engaging in certain other conduct under certain circumstances; defining a certain term; providing penalties for a violation of this...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Smith, No. 91
...v. State, 372 Md. 285, 291-92, 812 A.2d 1016, 1020 (2002); Deese v. State, 367 Md. 293, 305, 786 A.2d 751, 758 (2001); Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 649, 781 A.2d 851, 880 (2001); White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d at 861-62. We do not re-weigh the evidence, but "we do determine whether the ......
-
State v. Suddith, No. 39
...v. State, 372 Md. 285, 291-92, 812 A.2d 1016, 1020 (2002); Deese v. State, 367 Md. 293, 305, 786 A.2d 751, 758 (2001); Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 649, 781 A.2d 851, 880 (2001); White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d at 861-62. We do not re-weigh the evidence, but `we do determine whether the ......
-
Walker v. State, No. 74 Sept. Term 2012.
...a presumption that the statute is constitutional, and the burden rests on Petitioner to show why that is not the case. Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 610–11, 781 A.2d 851 (2001). Petitioner argues that he must have notice of what type of activity is criminalized under § 3–602 and that the ......
-
Pizza Di Joey, LLC v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 2411, Sept. Term, 2017
...case. A finding that a statute is void for vagueness is a finding that the statute 209 A.3d 207 is unconstitutional. Galloway v. State , 365 Md. 599, 611, 781 A.2d 851 (2001). Vagueness is another 241 Md.App. 179 way of stating the due process principle that statutes must provide "persons o......
-
State v. Smith, No. 91
...v. State, 372 Md. 285, 291-92, 812 A.2d 1016, 1020 (2002); Deese v. State, 367 Md. 293, 305, 786 A.2d 751, 758 (2001); Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 649, 781 A.2d 851, 880 (2001); White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d at 861-62. We do not re-weigh the evidence, but "we do determine whether the ......
-
State v. Suddith, No. 39
...v. State, 372 Md. 285, 291-92, 812 A.2d 1016, 1020 (2002); Deese v. State, 367 Md. 293, 305, 786 A.2d 751, 758 (2001); Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 649, 781 A.2d 851, 880 (2001); White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d at 861-62. We do not re-weigh the evidence, but `we do determine whether the ......
-
Walker v. State, No. 74 Sept. Term 2012.
...a presumption that the statute is constitutional, and the burden rests on Petitioner to show why that is not the case. Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 610–11, 781 A.2d 851 (2001). Petitioner argues that he must have notice of what type of activity is criminalized under § 3–602 and that the ......
-
Pizza Di Joey, LLC v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 2411, Sept. Term, 2017
...case. A finding that a statute is void for vagueness is a finding that the statute 209 A.3d 207 is unconstitutional. Galloway v. State , 365 Md. 599, 611, 781 A.2d 851 (2001). Vagueness is another 241 Md.App. 179 way of stating the due process principle that statutes must provide "persons o......