Galveston, Harrisburg San Antonio Railway Company v. Wallace No 108 Galveston, Harrisburg San Antonio Railway Company v. Crow No 109

• Decision Date: 19 February 1912
• Docket Number: Nos. 108 and 109,s. 108 and 109
• Citation: 223 U.S. 481,56 L.Ed. 516,32 S.Ct. 205
• Parties: GALVESTON, HARRISBURG, & SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Plffs. in Err., v. L. V. WALLACE. NO 108. GALVESTON, HARRISBURG, & SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Plffs. in Err., v. J. D. CROW. NO 109
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

223 U.S. 481

32 S.Ct. 205

56 L.Ed. 516

GALVESTON, HARRISBURG, & SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Plffs. in Err.,

v L. V. WALLACE.

NO 108.

GALVESTON, HARRISBURG, & SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY

and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company,

Plffs. in Err.,

v. J. D. CROW.

NO 109.

Nos. 108 and 109.

Submitted December 15, 1911.

Decided February 19, 1912.

Messrs. Mexwell Evarts and James L. Bishop for plaintiffs in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 482-488 intentionally omitted] No appearance for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the court:

In both these cases the plaintiff in error was held liable as 'initial carrier' for failure to deliver mohair shipped from points in Texas to the consignee in Lowell. The company denied liability on the ground that under the contract expressed in the bills of lading, its obligation and liability ceased when it duly and safely delivered the goods to the next carrier. It excepts to various rulings of the trial court by which it was prevented from proving that it had fully complied with its contract; had duly delivered the mohair, at Galveston, to the first connecting carrier, which delivered it, at New York, to the next carrier, which, in turn, delivered it to the Boston & Maine Railroad. Neither the pleadings nor proof showed what this company did with the mohair, nor the cause of its nondelivery, if indeed it was not delivered. For there was some evidence tending to show that this mohair might have been among other sacks, the marks of which had been destroyed, and were still held by the consignee awaiting identification. This contention, however, was found against the carrier, and it was held liable to the plaintiffs. ——Tex. Civ. App. ——, 117 S. W. 169, 170.

The question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the goods at Lowell, or, as provided in the bill of lading, at the point of shipment, is suggested in one of the briefs. No such issue was made in the lower court, nor is it referred to in any of the many assignments of error involving the construction and constitutionality of the Carmack amendment to the Hepburn bill of 1906, providing that where goods are received for shipment in interstate commerce, the initial carrier shall be liable for damages caused by itself or connecting carriers, and making void any contract of exemption against such liability, 34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1149.

1. The jurisdiction of the state court was attacked, first, on the ground that § 9 of the original act of 1887 provided that persons damaged by a violation of the statute 'might make complaint before the Commission . . . or in any district or circuit court of the United States.' 24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3154.

It was contended that Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 426, 51 L. ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1075, ruled that this jurisdiction was exclusive, and from that it was argued that no suit could be maintained in a state court on any cause of action created either by the original act of 1887 or by the amendment of 1906. But damage caused by failure to deliver goods is in no way traceable to a violation of the statute, and is not, therefore, within the provisions of §§ 8 and 9 of the act to regulate commerce. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 208, 55 L. ed. 179, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 7, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164.

The real question, therefore, presented by this assignment of error, is whether a state court may enforce a right of action arising under an act of Congress.

Statutes have no extraterritorial operation, and the courts of one government cannot enforce the penal laws of another. At one time there was some question both as to the duty and power to try civil cases arising solely under the statutes of another state. But it is now recognized that the jurisdiction of state courts extends to the hearing and determination of any civil and transitory cause of action created by a foreign statute, provided it is not of a character opposed to the public policy of the state in which the suit is brought. Where the statute creating the right provides an exclusive remedy, to be enforced in a particular way, or before a special tribunal, the aggrieved party will be left to the...