Galveston Ry Co v. Gonzales

• Decision Date: 29 January 1894
• Docket Number: No. 158,158
• Citation: 151 U.S. 496,38 L.Ed. 248,14 S.Ct. 401
• Parties: GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO. v. GONZALES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

151 U.S. 496

14 S.Ct. 401

38 L.Ed. 248

GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO.

v GONZALES.

No. 158.

January 29, 1894.

Statement by Mr. Justice BROWN:

This was an action at law instituted in the circuit court for the western district of Texas at El Paso by the defendant in error, Victor Gonzales, alleged to be 'a citizen of the state of Chihuahua, in the republic of Mexico,' against the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company, to recover damages to the amount of $4,999 for personal injuries.

The petition alleged the plaintiff to be 'a citizen of the state of Chihuahua, in the republic of Mexico, and that the defendant is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the state of Texas, and is a citizen thereof, operating and running cars on the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway track from the city of Houston to the city of El Paso, in the state of Texas, and is a common carrier of freight and passengers for hire, * * * and has and keeps an office and an agent in the said city of El Paso, Tex., for the transaction of its business, with W. E. Jesup as its local agent in said El Paso.' The petition further alleged that 'on and prior to the 29th day of July, 1889, and ever since that time, the defendant has been engaged in propelling trains and cars on said railway track for the transportation of freight and passengers for hire, as aforesaid, from the city of Houston, in the state of Texas, into and through the county of Jeff Davis, in said state, and through the county of El Paso into the city of El Paso, Tex.' The petition further alleged as the cause of plaintiff's action that after having paid his fare to an agent of the defendant, and entered as a passenger on its train from Valentine station to El Paso, he was forcibly and violently ejected from the train while moving at the rate of 15 miles an hour, thereby causing him to fall to the ground with such force that his leg was broken, and he was thereby crippled for life, for which he prayed judgment in the sum of $4,999.

Defendant appeared specially for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, and pleaded in abatement 'that nevertheless, while it admits that defendant operates a line of railway through the county where this suit is pending, and maintains a ticket and freight office and depot, and has an agent on whom process, under the laws of Texas, may be served there, the said defendant is not an inhabitant of the judicial district in which the suit is pending; that it is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under the laws of Texas, having its principal office, habitat, and domicile in the city of Houston, Harris county, Tex., and beyond and not within this judicial district, but within the eastern district of Texas;' wherefore the defendant prayed judgment whether the court had jurisdiction, etc.

Plaintiff demurred to this plea, setting up that the defendant is an inhabitant of the eastern district of Texas.

The case came on to be heard upon this plea in abatement and demurrer, and the court, being of the opinion that the law was for the plaintiff, and that the court had jurisdiction, sustained the demurrer, proceeded to a trial of the case upon the merits, and submitted it to a jury, who rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $900.

Defendant sued out this writ of error under the authority of the act of February 25, 1889, authorizing this court to review questions of jurisdiction of the circuit court, without reference to amount. 25 Stat. 693.

Hubley Ashton and Charles H. Tweed, for plaintiff.

Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case raises the question whether a railway company incorporated under the laws of a certain state, and having its principal offices within one district of such state, can be said to be an inhabitant of another district of the same state, through which it operates its line of road, and in which it maintains freight and ticket offices and depots.

We have no doubt of our authority, under the act of February 25, 1889, to review the decision of the court below, sustaining its jurisdiction over the case; and we have already held that the provision of the Texas statute which gives to a special appearance made to challenge the court's jurisdiction the force and effect of a general appearance, so as to confer jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is not binding upon the federal courts in that state. Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 44; Railway Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 13 Sup. Ct. 859.

By section 1 of the act of August 13, 1888, revising the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, (25 Stat. 433,) it is enacted that 'no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant;' and by Rev. St. § 740, 'when a state contains more than one district, every suit not of a local nature, in the circuit or districts courts thereof, against a single defendant, inhabitant of such state, must be brought in the district where he resides.' The above provision of the act of 1888 is manifestly a restriction upon the jurisdiction conferred by the act of 1875, which contained a similar provision, but with the additional privilege of bringing such suit within any district 'in which he,' the defendant, 'shall be found at the time of serving such process or commencing such proceeding.'

It will be noticed that in this, as well as in prior acts regulating the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, a distinction is made between citizens of states and inhabitants of districts. This distinction has been carefully observed in all the principal adjudications upon the construction of these statutes; and, for the purpose of determining the habitancy of a railway corporation, it is pertinent to refer to some of these cases. In one of the earliest, viz. Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mason, 35, a suit was begun by trustee process or writ of garnishment sued out by an alien against a defendant, described as 'now commorant of the city of Paris, in the kingdom of France, of the city of Boston, in the commonwealth of Massachusetts, one of the United States of America, and a citizen of the said United States.' The process was served by the attachment of a lot of land in Boston belonging to the defendant, and by summoning his agent to appear and show cause. The defendant never appeared as a party to the suit, and it was contended that the plaintiff was entitled to consider him in default, and to have judgment. It was held, however, by Mr. Justice Story, that where a party defendant was a citizen of the United States, but resident in a foreign country, having no inhabitancy in any state of the Union, the circuit courts had no jurisdiction over him, in a suit brought by an alien, though his property were attached in the district. The case involved the construction of that clause of the eleventh section of the judiciary act of 1789 which provided that 'no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ.' It will be noticed that the words used are 'inhabitant of the United States,' not 'inhabitant of a district,' and, in speaking of these words, Mr. Justice Story said: 'I lay no particular stress upon the word 'inhabitant,' and deem it a mere equivalent description of 'citizen' and 'alien' in the general clause conferring jurisdiction over parties.' That he meant the word 'inhabitant' as 'inhabitant of the United States' is evident from what follows: 'A person might be an inhabitant, without being a citizen; and a citizen might not be an inhabitant, though he retain his citizenship. Alienage or citizenship is one thing; and inhabitancy, by which I understand local residence, animo manendi, quite another. I read, then, the clause thus: 'No civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against an alien or a citizen, by any original process, in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found, at the time of serving the writ.' It cannot be presumed that congress meant to say that if an alien or a citizen were not an inhabitant of, or commorant in, the United States, a suit might be maintained against him in any district, and process served abroad upon him, or judgment given against him without any notice or process served upon him.' There is nothing here which indicates that Mr. Justice Story confounded citizenship of a state with inhabitancy of a district.

In Shaw v. Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 12 Sup. Ct. 935, a citizen of Massachusetts sought to maintain a bill in equity in the circuit court for the southern district of New York against the Quincy Mining Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Michigan, and having a usual place of business in the city of New York; and the question arose whether the court had jurisdiction over such a suit. It was held that it did not. In the opinion of the court it was said that the word 'inhabitant,' in the act of 1789, was apparently used, not in any larger meaning than 'citizen,' but to avoid the incongruity of speaking of a citizen of anything less than a state, when the intention was to cover, not only a district which included a whole state, but also two districts in one state.

In construing the acts of 1887 and 1888, it was held that they could not be considered as giving jurisdiction to a circuit court held in a state of which neither party was a citizen, and that, 'in the case of a corporation,...