Galveston Wharf Co v. Galveston Ry Co, 411

• Decision Date: 14 March 1932
• Docket Number: No. 411,411
• Citation: 52 S.Ct. 342,285 U.S. 127,76 L.Ed. 659
• Parties: GALVESTON WHARF CO. et al. v. GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO. et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

285 U.S. 127

52 S.Ct. 342

76 L.Ed. 659

GALVESTON WHARF CO. et al.

v GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO. et al.

No. 411.

Argued Jan. 22, 25, 1932.

Decided March 14, 1932.

Messrs. George S. Wright and Alex F. Weisberg, both of Dallas, Tex., for petitioners.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 128-129 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Fryer & Cunningham, of El Paso, Tex., for plaintiff American Grocery Co.

Messrs. John P. Bullington, of Houston, Tex., and Roscoe H. Hupper, of New York City, for respondents.

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The American Grocery Company and others brought this action against the Mallory Steamship Company, the Galveston Wharf Company, and the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company to recover the value of a carload of sardines destroyed by fire at Galveston, Tex., while en route to El Paso in that state. The goods had been shipped from Maine to El Paso on a through bill of lading issued by the Seaport Navigation Company and describing the route as 'Mallory, Southern Pacific.' The Mallory Steamship Company had transported the goods from New York to Galveston, and at the time of the fire the goods were on the pier which that company had leased from the Galveston Wharf Company. The latter company, a chartered transportation company not named in the bill of lading, owned, in addition to certain piers, railroad trackage from these piers to connections with railroads running out of Galveston, including that of the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company; that being the Southern Pacific line described in the bill of lading as the delivering carrier. There was no attempt to prove negligence on the part of any of the defendants. The district court, a jury being waived, held that the goods had been delivered by the Mallory Steamship Company to the Galveston Wharf Company, that the latter was in possession of the goods as a common carrier, and that at the time of the loss they had not been delivered to the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company. The judgment, entered in the district court against the wharf company, was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, which directed judgment against the railway company upon the ground that the wharf company was acting as a transfer agent for the railway company, and was not liable for the loss. 13 S.W.(2d) 983. The Supreme Court of the state reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed that of the district court. 25 S.W.(2d) 588, 36 S.W.(2d) 985. This Court granted a writ of certiorari. 284 U. S. 608, 52 S. Ct. 41, 76 L. Ed. —.

The wharf company, petitioner, in the view that the question of the liability of carriers under an interstate bill of lading is governed by the federal decisions,¹ contends that the state court erred in holding (1) that the possession of the shipment at the time of the fire had passed from the steamship company to the wharf company; (2) that the wharf company had possession as a connecting carrier and not as agent of the railroad carrier named in the bill of lading; and (3) that the wharf company was liable as insurer of the shipment when its filed tariff provided that it should not be liable save for its negligence. The American Grocery Company, plaintiff in the action (which joined in the Wharf Company's petition for certiorari), contends that it is entitled to recover 'from some one of the three defendants in the trial court,' and that it is the steamship company which should be held liable. The railway company, respondent, also urges that there had been no delivery of the goods by the steamship company, and further that, it such delivery had been made, the wharf company held the goods as common carrier and not as the railway company's agent, and that the tariff of the wharf company was inapplicable.

First. The Court of Civil Appeals, while reversing the judgment of the district court, did not disturb the finding that the steamship company had delivered the goods to the wharf company, but on the contrary reaffirmed it. The Supreme Court held that this finding was supported by evidence, and reached its conclusion upon that basis. The petitioners insist that the three courts were in error, and that the finding is opposed to the undisputed evidence. We are unable to agree with this contention. The tracks of the wharf company were on the pier, and there the steamship company and the wharf company had adjoining offices. The wharf company had its own force of men on the pier to handle the shipments for rail transportation. It was the practice to have cars spotted conveniently to receive the shipments according to the routing. The steamship company placed the goods on the pier in convenient locations where the wharf company, which according to custom had already received the billing and had full information of the shipments, could load them into the waiting cars.² In the instant case, it appeared that the ship had arrived early in the morning (January 13, 1926) and had been fully discharged by 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon; that, as the goods were unloaded, they were put in the usual manner in suitable locations for the picking up and loading into cars by the wharf company; that, out of 1,081 tons so discharged on that day and put in the designated places, the wharf company had actually loaded into cars all but 379 tons, and that carloads similarly routed, and placed in approximately the same location as the shipment here involved, had been so loaded. There was evidence that the latter shipment had been suitably placed on the wharf befofe 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and was ready by that time for loading by the wharf company and completely at its disposal,³ but the wharf com- pany stopped work about 6:30 o'clock without loading it, and that it was burned that night. Questions are raised with respect to notice of readiness for loading and as to the checking of the shipment, but it cannot be said that the testimony is so clear and definite on these subjects as to preclude a finding of delivery to the wharf company. No receipt had been given by the wharf company, but the state court found, upon evidence, that the steamship company did not require the wharf company to give receipts before it removed shipments from the wharf, and that receipts were often given a considerable time after such removal. On points where the testimony permitted conflicting inferences, the state court was entitled to reach its conclusion that the shipment had been placed under the complete control of the wharf company, to be handled according to its own convenience, and hence should be deemed to have been delivered to the wharf company.⁴

Second. The wharf company did not dispute that it was a common carrier. As such, it had facilities and rendered service. It is also manifest that it received the goods for transportation to the connection with the railway company that was to take them to...