Gambino v. United States
Decision Date | 08 December 1939 |
Docket Number | No. 7112-7114,No. 7124.,7112-7114,7124. |
Citation | 108 F.2d 140 |
Parties | GAMBINO v. UNITED STATES, and three other cases. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Michael Serody and B. D. Oliensis, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants in Nos. 7112-7114.
Patrick J. Friel, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant in No. 7124.
J. Cullen Ganey, U. S. Atty., James P. McCormick, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Blair M. Ilderton, Atty., Alcohol Tax Unit, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before MARIS, CLARK, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
The appellants and a number of others were indicted for conspiracy to violate the alcohol tax laws. After the arrest of the defendants and the termination of the conspiracy, one of the defendants, F. J. McMahon, while in the custody of government officers, signed a statement in which he confessed his own guilt and implicated a number of the defendants. Later McMahon pleaded guilty, while the appellants and certain other defendants who had pleaded not guilty went to trial. At the trial the Assistant United States Attorney proposed to have McMahon's statement read in evidence. The following colloquy, ruling and instruction to the jury then ensued:
Mr. Serody: May it please the Court, it is impossible to conceive how a statement made by a defendant who has pleaded guilty can be used against other defendants, when that statement can't be evidence against anybody but the person who has entered the plea.
It will be seen that over objections of the appellants' counsel, who clearly stated the applicable rule of law, the trial judge admitted McMahon's statement in evidence against the defendants who remained on trial in spite of the fact that it was wholly incompetent under a rule of evidence which has been so well settled for so long a time as to become hornbook law. In so doing the trial judge committed a clearly prejudicial error.
To permit the government witness to read what McMahon had said in his confession was to allow hearsay evidence. Professor Wigmore states that this rule "prohibits the use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony to the fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion and his qualifications to make it." Wigmore on Evidence, § 1364. The fact that the hearsay statement is under oath, is not sufficient to remove the objection for there continues to be a deprivation of the defendant's right to cross-examine. Wigmore on Evidence, § 1364 (II).
To this hearsay rule there are of course exceptions as firmly fixed in the law of evidence as the rule itself and there are situations to which the rule is inapplicable. So the rule is satisfied in the case of an admission against interest, for it is obvious that the party making the admission would not cross-examine himself. All he need do is to take the stand on his own behalf and explain the admission, if he thinks it advisable. The hearsay rule is likewise satisfied when a vicarious...
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