Gamble v. Arpaio

• Decision Date: 10 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. CV-12-790-PHX-GMS (LOA),CV-12-790-PHX-GMS (LOA)
• Parties: Bruce Gamble, Plaintiff, v. Joe Arpaio, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Bruce Gamble, Plaintiff,

v.Joe Arpaio, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-12-790-PHX-GMS (LOA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DATED: January 10, 2013

ORDER

This case arises on Defendant Joe Arpaio's ("Sheriff Arpaio") Motion for Order Authorizing Defendant Sheriff Arpaio to file Motion to Dismiss under Seal and Motion to Enforce Release and Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, lodged under seal on January 7, 2013. (Docs. 30-31) Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(d)¹ and civil Local Rule ("LRCiv") 5.6(b), Sheriff Arpaio requests the Court seal his dispositive motion and attached copy of a settlement agreement executed by the parties when they settled a prior lawsuit which, according to Sheriff Arpaio, bars Plaintiff from bringing this action. (Doc.30) Sheriff Arpaio contends that because the prior "settlement agreement expressly provides that the parties to the agreement shall maintain the confidentiality of the terms of the agreement[,]" good cause exists to seal his dispositive motion. (Id.) Because no compelling reason is proffered to seal Sheriff Arpaio's dispositive motion and the prior settlement agreement, the Court will deny the motion to seal his dispositive motion and attached settlement agreement.

I. Background

After filing his original complaint on April 13, 2012 and thereafter amending that complaint, pro se Plaintiff, an inmate in the Arizona Department of Corrections, filed a Third Amended Complaint on October 9, 2012, alleging his First Amendment rights were violated by Sheriff Arpaio's Maricopa County Jail mail policy which restricted Plaintiff's receipt to only postcards from outside senders. (Doc. 21) Plaintiff claims Sheriff Arpaio's mail policy damaged his business while he was incarcerated in the Maricopa County Jail because he could not receive bank statements and other documents relevant to the production of his CD, "Dream after Dream." (Id. at 3) Though two other counts were dismissed for failure to state a claim, Count I survived the 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) mandatory screening and this § 1983 civil rights action was allowed to proceed. (Doc. 22)

On December 10, 2012, the Court denied as premature Plaintiff's Motion for Disposition of Case because Sheriff Arpaio had until January 7, 2013 in which to file his answer or other responsive pleading as authorized by Rule 12, Fed.R.Civ.P. (Doc. 29) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1) requires Sheriff Arpaio to affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, like release, res judicata, and, perhaps, claim or issue preclusion, in his first responsive pleading. Rule 8(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., enumerates eighteen affirmative defenses, including release and res judicata. See Santiago v. Amdocs, Inc., 2011 WL 6372348, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2011); Lattanzio v. Ackerman, 682 F.Supp.2d 781 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 2010); In re Chase, 392 B.R. 72, 79-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008) ("[R]es judicata is a judicial doctrine encompassing two different principles, commonly referred to as claim preclusion and issue preclusion.") (citation omitted). Rather than file ananswer, Sheriff Arpaio elected to lodge timely motions to seal and dismiss, claiming Plaintiff's lawsuit is barred by the parties' 2008 Receipt, Release and Indemnity Agreement. (Doc. 31-1 at 6-7, Exhibit ("Exh.") A)

Sheriff Arpaio's Motion to Enforce Release and Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice alleges that "[b]y operation of the Release, Plaintiff contracted that Sheriff Arpaio is 'release[d] and forever discharge[d]' from that claim, including 'any and all liability' arising out of the implementation of the [Jail] postcard policy and 'any and all future injuries, death and/or damages arising out of the [MCSO postcard policy], including those not now known to any of the parties hereto, but which may later develop or be discovered, and including but not limited to the effects or consequences thereof, and including all causes of action, claim or right thereof.'" (Doc. 31 at 5) (citing Exh. A at 1, ¶ 3). He seeks dismissal with prejudice of this action because "[t]he Release forever barred [Plaintiff's] claims relating to the matter settled, that is, Sheriff Arpaio's alleged First Amendment violations arising out of the MCSO postcard policy." (Id. at 5)

Though he cites only Arizona substantive law, Sheriff Arpaio's dismissal motion does not address whether Arizona or federal substantive law controls the settlement issue raised in his dismissal motion. See, e.g.,Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian, 967 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[F]ederal law always governs the validity of releases of federal causes of action."). Assuming without deciding that Arizona law controls Sheriff Arpaio's dismissal motion, upon the execution of a release and settlement agreement, Arizona law bars subsequent litigation between the same parties if the parties "unequivocally expressed their intention" to bar all claims which the parties reasonably contemplated and intended to dispose of at the time of the settlement agreement, "even if the claims were unknown at the time of the settlement." See BFD Invs. v. Barnyard Heritage, 2012 WL 3945318 (Az. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2012) (citing Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 7, 373 P.2d 1, 5 (Ariz. 1962); see also Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc. v. Merrick Bank Corp, 680 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1094-95 (D. Ariz. 2010); Invitrogen Corp. v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 2007 WL 841413, at *6-7 (D. Ariz. March 16, 2007); Jackson v. ABC Nissan, Inc., 2007 WL 2701982 (D. Ariz. Sept. 13,2007); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F.Supp. 1049, 1056 (D. Ariz. 1984) ("[T]he Settlement Agreement and Release are effective to bar all claims which the parties reasonably contemplated and intended to dispose of at the time of the Settlement Agreement and Release were executed.") (citation omitted). "Construction and enforcement of settlement agreements, including determinations as to the validity and scope of release terms, are governed by general contract principles." Emmons v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 509, 512, 968 P.2d 582, 585 (Az. Ct. App. 1998). Courts attempt to enforce a contract according to the parties' intent. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 152, 854 P.2d 1134, 1138 (Ariz. 1993).

II. Sealing Dispositive Motions and Exhibits

Historically, "[c]ourts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnotes and citations omitted). "Unless a particular court record is one traditionally kept secret, courts generally apply a strong presumption in favor of access."² Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even "[t]he fruits of pre-trial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public." Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). "Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court to override this presumption where 'good cause' is shown." Id. Whether good causeexists to protect information from being disclosed to the public requires the district court to balance the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality. Id. at 1213.

Under Rule 26(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., district courts have "broad latitude to grant protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many types of information, including, but not limited to, trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information. Id. at 1211 (citation omitted); see also deBarros v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 857 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D. Or. 2012). "[C]ourts have consistently granted protective orders that prevent disclosure of many types of information, such as letters protected under attorney-client privilege which revealed the weaknesses in a party's position and was inadvertently sent to the opposing side, . . . medical and psychiatric records confidential under state law . . . [and] to protect confidential settlement agreements." Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1212 (citing, inter alia, Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365-67 (D. Nev. 1993)). Some district courts have sealed confidential settlement agreements because they "[b]enefit society and the parties involved by resolving disputes relatively quickly, with slight judicial intervention, and presumably result in greater satisfaction to the parties. Sound judicial policy fosters and protects this form of alternative dispute resolution . . .The secrecy of a settlement agreement and the contractual rights of the parties thereunder deserve court protection." Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365; see also Prosurance Group, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Group, Inc., 2011 WL 704456 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011); Daniels v. Bursey, 2006 WL 468015, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2006) (strong public policy favoring settlement of claims was "good cause" to issue protective order for a confidential settlement agreement); but see El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Southwest Forest Products, Inc., 2008 WL 4808892 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2008) (denying parties' joint request to seal confidential settlement agreement for "fail[ing] to articulate how the parties' need for confidentiality of the settlement agreement overcomes the strong presumption of public access to the parties' agreement.").

When a dispute arises, however, on a claim a party breached a confidential settlement agreement, district courts have authorized the filing of the complaint and motion for preliminary injunction under seal pursuant to Rule 26(c)'s good cause standard until requiredby law to unseal them. See, e.g., United Rentals, Inc. v. Ahern Rentals, Inc., 2012 WL 5418355 (D. Nev. Nov. 2, 2012); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Once the [sealed discovery] documents are made part of a dispositive motion, such as a ...