Gamble v. Black Warrior Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1911
• Citation: 55 So. 190,172 Ala. 669
• Parties: GAMBLE v. BLACK WARRIOR COAL CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

55 So. 190

172 Ala. 669

GAMBLE v. BLACK WARRIOR COAL CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 20, 1911

Appeal from Chancery Court, Walker County; A. H. Benners Chancellor.

Bill by Frank A. Gamble against the Black Warrior Coal Company. From a decree for defendant, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Ernest Lacy, for appellant.

Leith &amp Gunn and Tyson, Wilson & Martin, for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

Appellant filed his bill under sections 5443 et seq. of the Code of 1907, to quiet and determine title as to the mineral rights in 160 acres of land described in the bill. Appellee (respondent in the court below) answered the bill, denying complainant's title, and averring both the legal and equitable titles to be in respondent. Much testimony was taken by both sides, and the case was submitted for final decree upon the pleadings and proof, and upon this hearing the bill was dismissed by the chancellor. From this decree the complainant prosecutes this appeal.

Both parties claim title through Nicholas R. Key to 80 acres of the land, and through Sarah J. Bailey to the other 80 acres Key and Bailey being patentees from the government of the United States. Appellee claims through deeds from these patentees, conveying the mineral rights to one B. M. Long, executed in December, 1882, and from Long to J. W. Dimmick, executed in May, 1883, and by Dimmick to appellee, dated June 22, 1885. Appellant claims by deeds from the same patentees to C. B. Brotherton, trustee, executed May 25, 1907, and from Brotherton, as trustee, to complainant, executed May 31, 1907; all such deeds conveying the mineral rights only to the lands in question. The only basis for the complainant's title is that the deeds from the patentee to Long, executed in December, 1882, were not recorded until November 6, 1907, which was after patentee had conveyed to Brotherton, through whom complainant claims title.

Complainant contends that the deeds from the patentee to Long were void as to him, under section 3383 of the Code (embracing sections 1005, 1006, of the Code of 1896, and sections 1810, 1811, of the Code of 1886). The statute renders conveyances void only for the failure to record the same as to "purchasers for a valuable consideration, mortgagees, and judgment creditors without notice." So the only disputed question for trial in the court below and necessary to a decision on this appeal is whether or not appellant was a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and without notice, of the unrecorded deeds from the patentees to B. M. Long. If he was such a purchaser, he was entitled to the relief prayed; if not, the decree of the chancellor dismissing the bill was correct, and should be affirmed.

From the very earliest decisions of this court, construing statutes rendering conveyances void as to "purchasers without notice," etc., it has been held that actual notice is equivalent to the constructive notice afforded by the registration of the conveyance. The whole object and design of the statute is said to be to give notice of the existence of the conveyance. Ohio Ins. Co. v. Ledyard, 8 Ala. 871.

It has likewise been repeatedly held that,...