Gamboa v. Clark

• Decision Date: 16 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 90291–7.,90291–7.
• Citation: 348 P.3d 1214,183 Wash.2d 38
• Parties: Magdaleno GAMBOA and Mary J. Gamboa, husband and wife, Petitioners, v. John M. CLARK and Deborah C. Clark, husband and wife, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

183 Wash.2d 38

348 P.3d 1214

Magdaleno GAMBOA and Mary J. Gamboa, husband and wife, Petitioners

v.John M. CLARK and Deborah C. Clark, husband and wife, Respondents.

No. 90291–7.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Feb. 10, 2015.

Decided April 16, 2015.

Kevan Tino Montoya, Tyler Michael Hinckley, Montoya Hinckley PLLC, Yakima, WA, for Petitioners.

Christopher Martin Constantine of Counsel Inc. PS, Tacoma, WA, for Respondents.

Opinion

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 For many years, Magdaleno and Mary Gamboa have used a gravel road adjacent to their property as a driveway to access their home. The road is primarily on the property of their neighbors, John and Deborah Clark. The Gamboas and Clarks used the road for their respective purposes for many years without an objection from either family. After disputes arose between them, the Gamboas filed suit to obtain a legal right to use the road.

¶ 2 This case requires us to determine whether the Gamboas met one of the requirements of the rule that would allow them to continue using the road. Specifically, the Gamboas must show that their use of the road was adverse to the Clarks (i.e., without the Clarks' permission). Since the evidence shows a reasonable inference that the Clarks let the Gamboas use the road out of neighborly acquiescence, we hold that the Gamboas did not show that their use of the road was adverse to the Clarks. Therefore, the Gamboas may not continue using the road, and we affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

¶ 3 The Gamboas and Clarks own adjoining parcels of land separated by a gravel road in a rural area in Yakima County. The Gamboas own a 17–acre western parcel to farm alfalfa, and the Clarks own a 25–acre eastern parcel to farm grapes. The parcels were created in 1964 when the original co-owners, the Padghams and McConnells, split up the 42–acre parent parcel into the 17– and 25–acre parcels described above. The Padghams and McConnells sold the 25–acre eastern parcel (which included the road) to the Slouin family, the family preceding the Clarks to that parcel. The Padghams and McConnells retained the 17–acre western parcel. The Padghams and McConnells sold their parcel to the Gamboas in 1992, and the Slouins sold their parcel to the Clarks in 1995.

¶ 4 Since coming to the parcel in 1992, the Gamboas used the gravel road as a driveway to access their home and some of their alfalfa crop. The Gamboas have occasionally bladed the road and on one occasion applied gravel to maintain its condition. When the Clarks came to their parcel in 1995, they used the road to farm grapes, including watering the grape plants and spraying for weeds. The trial court found that “[t]he Gamboas and the Clarks both used the roadway as described above without any disputes until 2008. Each party was aware of the other's use of the roadway, but no one objected to the other's use until a dispute arose in 2008.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 195.

¶ 5 A dispute arose in 2008 over the Gamboas' dogs and the Clarks' irrigation practices, and “it eventually escalated into a dispute over which of them owned the land on which the roadway was situated.”Id. Land surveys revealed that a small portion of the gravel road (the portion where it connects with East Allen Road) is on the Gamboas' property, but that the rest of the gravel road is on the Clarks' property until the road reaches an area where the Gamboas have an express easement over the Clarks' property (the express easement dating back to 1964 when the parent parcel was split).

¶ 6 At trial, the trial court listed the elements for a prescriptive easement as follows:

that the claimaint's use must be adverse to the right of the owner of the servient parcel; that the use by the claimant be open, notorious, continuous, hostile and uninterrupted over the prescriptive period of ten years, and that the servient owner has knowledge of such use at the time when he or she would be able at law to assert and enforce his or her rights.

Id. at 196. The trial court noted that “the primary element in dispute ... is whether the use by the Plaintiffs Gamboa was ‘adverse’ to the rights of the Defendants Clark over a period of at least ten years.” Id. at 196–97. The court defined “adverse use” as follows: “A claimant's use is adverse unless the property owner can show that the use was permissive.” Id. at 197. It found “that Mr. Clark did not give the Gamboas [ ] express or implied permission to use the road, and therefore, the use of the road was adverse.” Id. Additionally, the court concluded that the Gamboas' land use was adverse “[i]n view of the fact that the use made of the roadway ... by the Plaintiffs Gamboa was ‘open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted,’ and in a fashion that a true owner would use his own land, all for more than a ten-year period.” Id. at 198 (quoting Nw. Cities Gas Co. v. W. Fuel Co., 13 Wash.2d 75, 85, 123 P.2d 771 (1942) ).

¶ 7 The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court applied the wrong legal presumption and burden of proof regarding adverse use. Gamboa v. Clark, 180 Wash.App. 256, 280–82, 321 P.3d 1236 (2014). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by applying a presumption that the claimant's use is adverse unless the property owner can show it was permissive. Id. at 280–81, 321 P.3d 1236. Instead, the Court of Appeals cited Northwest Cities for the proposition that the initial presumption is that the claimant's use is permissive and the claimant can shift the presumption from permissive use to adverse use depending on the facts. Id. at 267, 321 P.3d 1236. The Court of Appeals cited this court's decisions in Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wash.2d 690, 175 P.2d 669 (1946), and Cuillier v. Coffin, 57 Wash.2d 624, 358 P.2d 958 (1961), however, to say that the presumption of permissive use will not shift to adverse use if the evidence supports a reasonable inference of neighborly accommodation or if the evidence demonstrates noninterfering use of a roadway constructed by the landowners' predecessor. Gamboa, 180 Wash.App. at 282, 321 P.3d 1236. Here, the Court of Appeals found the evidence supported a reasonable inference of neighborly accommodation and demonstrated noninterfering use of a roadway constructed by the Clarks' predecessor. Id. Thus, the court held that those inferences prevented the presumption of permissive use from shifting to a presumption of adverse use. Id.

¶ 8 We granted discretionary review. Gamboa v. Clark, 181 Wash.2d 1001, 332 P.3d 984 (2014).

ISSUE

¶ 9 Is there an initial presumption that a claimant's use of land is permissive in prescriptive easement cases?

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The seminal case on prescriptive easements is Northwest Cities, 13 Wash.2d 75, 123 P.2d 771. In that case, we articulated a set of principles about prescriptive easements by looking to both our case law and scholarly texts. See id. at 82–86, 123 P.2d 771. Although we did not originally intend the principles to be a “compendium of the general law of easements,” id. at 88, 123 P.2d 771, we have reaffirmed many of those principles, calling them “fundamental propositions” that are “binding upon us.” Roediger, 26 Wash.2d at 706, 175 P.2d 669. The propositions relevant to this case are as follows.

¶ 11 “Prescriptive rights ... are not favored in the law, since they necessarily work corresponding losses or forfeitures of the rights of other persons.” Nw. Cities, 13 Wash.2d at 83, 123 P.2d 771. To establish a prescriptive easement, the person claiming the easement must use another person's land for a period of 10 years and show that (1) he or she used the land in an “open” and “notorious” manner, (2) the use was “continuous” or “uninterrupted,” (3) the use occurred over “a uniform route,” (4) the use was “adverse” to the landowner, and (5) the use occurred “with the knowledge of such owner at a time when he was able in law to assert and enforce his rights.” Id. at 83, 85, 123 P.2d 771. Whether the Gamboas' use was adverse is the sole issue in this case.

¶ 12 The claimant bears the burden of proving the elements of a prescriptive easement. Id. at 84, 123 P.2d 771. We review whether a claimant has established those elements as a mixed question of law and fact. Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 479, 485, 618 P.2d 67 (1980). A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; a trial court's “conclusion that the facts, as found, constitute a prescriptive easement” is reviewed de novo. Lee v. Lozier, 88 Wash.App. 176, 181, 945 P.2d 214 (1997).

1. Adverse Use and the Presumption of Permissive Use

¶ 13 We generally interpret adverse use as meaning that the land use was without the landowner's permission. See, e.g., Roediger, 26 Wash.2d at 707, 175 P.2d 669. There is no requirement that the claimant believe he or she owns the property to establish adverse use—a claimant's subjective intent is irrelevant. Dunbar v. Heinrich, 95 Wash.2d 20, 27, 622 P.2d 812 (1980) ; see Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wash.2d 853, 860–61, 676 P.2d 431 (1984) (abandoning a subjective intent requirement to establish hostility, i.e., adversity, in adverse possession cases). That being said, we start with the presumption that when someone enters onto another's land, the person “does so with the true owner's permission and in subordination to the latter's title.” Nw. Cities, 13 Wash.2d at 84, 123 P.2d 771. However, we have limited the presumption of permissive use to three factual scenarios. First, the presumption applies to cases involving unenclosed land. See Roediger, 26 Wash.2d at 710–11, 175 P.2d 669 (saying that “[i]f it be true that the lands are un[e]nclosed, the presumption is that the use was permissive, and, therefore, that no easement was acquired”). Second, the presumption applies to enclosed or developed land cases in which “it is reasonable to infer that the use was permitted by neighborly sufferance or acquiescence.”

Id. at 707, 175 P.2d 669. Third, the presumption applies when the evidence demonstrates that the owner of the property...