Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, WD

• Decision Date: 01 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 621 S.W.2d 382
• Parties: William GAMBRELL, Appellant, v. KANSAS CITY CHIEFS FOOTBALL CLUB, Respondent. 31451.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 382

621 S.W.2d 382

William GAMBRELL, Appellant, v. KANSAS CITY CHIEFS FOOTBALL CLUB, Respondent.

No. WD 31451.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Sept. 1, 1981.

H. George Lafferty, Jr., Kansas City, for appellant.

William J. Burrell, Kansas City, for respondent.

Before PRITCHARD, P. J., and TURNAGE and CLARK, JJ.

CLARK, Judge.

This is a breach of contract action in which Gambrell, a professional football player, sought payment of salary claimed due from the Kansas City Chiefs under his employment contract for the 1974 football season. A jury returned its verdict denying Gambrell's claim and he appeals.

The dispute which generated this suit centered on the extent and duration of Gambrell's disability from a back injury which he suffered during a pre-season game played August 17, 1974. Under the employment contract, a player injured in the course of practice or during a game is entitled to payment of his salary during his continued disability to the limit of the contract term. Although rendered inactive from August to October 1974 by reason of this injury, Gambrell continued to receive his regular salary from the Chiefs in accordance with the contract provision for disabled players. The controversy involves Gambrell's claim that his salary should have continued thereafter until May 1975 when his contract expired.

In October 1974, Gambrell was examined by the Chief's team physician who pronounced Gambrell recovered and physically able to resume play. Gambrell disagreed complaining that his back injury persisted. Soon thereafter, the Chiefs released Gambrell from his contract, an option for unilateral termination available to the Chiefs under the contract whenever the coach determines that the player no longer has sufficient skill and capacity to perform the required caliber of football.

The option to terminate a player's contract is not available to relieve the team from the salary expense for injured and disabled players. Hence, if the August injury still rendered Gambrell incapable of resuming active play in professional football as of the date he was released from his contract, the Chiefs breached that contract and were liable to respond in damages. The evidence and jury submission focused on this sole, disputed issue the extent and duration of Gambrell's disability attributable to the back injury. By its verdict, the jury necessarily concluded that Gambrell's evidence of his continuing disability after October 1974 was not persuasive and that the Chiefs were therefore entitled to release Gambrell and be relieved of expense for his compensation.

In this appeal, Gambrell contends trial errors were made in the following respects: (1) The verdict was not supported by any credible evidence because the Chiefs failed to prove Gambrell had fully recovered from the back injury when the employment contract was terminated; (2) The employment contract as an admitted exhibit should not have been given to the jury on request during deliberations because the contract included a prohibited clause obligating the parties to resolve contract disputes by arbitration; and (3) The jury was erroneously instructed to disregard a hypothetical question Gambrell's attorney attempted to ask a medical witness.

Gambrell's argument as to the first point contends that no evidence in the case proved him physically capable of playing professional football after his August injury and that the Chiefs therefore "did not meet the burden of proof for this element." Quite apparently, Gambrell's contention rests firmly on the assumption that a verdict in the case for the defendant could not have been validly returned unless the defendant's credible evidence satisfactorily proved the condition precedent to the contract termination option, Gambrell's recovery from his injury. The argument is fundamentally unsound and untenable as a matter of law.

The cause of action for breach of contract which Gambrell asserted cast upon him the burden to prove the breach. Hayes v. Reorganized School District No. 4, 590 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.1979). The gravamen of Gambrell's suit was his contention that the otherwise acknowledged unilateral option of the Chiefs to release a football player when his professional skills were deemed inadequate was unavailable as to him because he continued to suffer the disability of his August injury. The burden was therefore on Gambrell to prove he was disabled at the time his contract was terminated, and that the disability was attributable to injuries sustained while performing his services for the Chiefs. Contrary to the assumption Gambrell indulges in his brief, the Chiefs in denying liability shouldered no burden of proof and, indeed, were not obligated to offer any evidence in order to prevail.

Where the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the plaintiff's evidence is not legally conclusive, a verdict in defendant's favor requires no evidentiary support because the jury may disbelieve plaintiff's uncontradicted or uncontroverted evidence. Bakelite Company v. Miller, 372 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Mo. 1963). A defendant who denies liability need not introduce any evidence and a verdict in defendant's favor therefore requires no evidentiary support. Scott v. Gray, 337 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Mo. 1960).

The terms of Gambrell's contract with the Chiefs were uncontested including the option of the employer to release any player who did not demonstrate requisite playing ability. To avoid this consequence and thus establish a breach of the contract by...