Games v. State, 49S00-9002-PD-114
| Decision Date | 23 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S00-9002-PD-114,49S00-9002-PD-114 |
| Citation | 690 N.E.2d 211 |
| Parties | James GAMES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
The defendant-petitioner, James Games, seeks rehearing following our decision affirming his convictions for murder and robbery. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466 (Ind.1997). We grant rehearing solely to clarify the proper appellate standard for reviewing denials of post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
In his post-conviction appeal, the defendant claimed that the standard of review for the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, [the defendant] would have been convicted of a lesser included offense instead of murder." Brief of Appellant at 35. Rejecting this different outcome or "but for" test, we held that the defendant "must convince this Court that there is no evidence presented which supported a murder conviction and that, as a whole, the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision that his conviction for murder was unfair and unreliable." Games, 684 N.E.2d at 469 (footnote omitted). The defendant argues that this "no evidence of guilt" standard is erroneous. We acknowledge that our articulation of the standard is imprecise and needs clarification, but continue to reject the standard of review advanced by the defendant.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel's performance was sufficiently deficient and that, as a result of counsel's deficiency, prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). At issue here is the resulting prejudice. Under this prong, "the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. The Strickland Court initially defined "reasonable probability" as a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome," rendering the verdict unreliable. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. However, the Court's recent decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), further defined and clarified this definition. See also State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind.1996) (analyzing Lockhart ). The Lockhart Court stated, "Under our decisions, a criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show 'that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.' " Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369, 113 S.Ct. at 842, 122 L.Ed.2d at 189 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693). 1
Reviewing its decision in Nix v. Whiteside, the Lockhart Court stated that, under the prejudice prong, "[s]heer outcome determination ... was not sufficient to make out a claim under the Sixth Amendment." Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 370, 113 S.Ct. at 843, 122 L.Ed.2d at 189 (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986)). The Court reasoned that, "To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel's error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him." Id. at 369-370, 113 S.Ct. at 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d at 189. The Court found that, "an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective." Id. at 369, 113 S.Ct. at 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d at 189. For this reason, the proper standard is not whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged deficiency of counsel, a different outcome would have occurred. Rather, the standard to be applied by the post-conviction court is whether, considering the alleged deficiency, "the ultimate result (his convictions) was fundamentally unfair or unreliable." Games, 684 N.E.2d at 469.
When a defendant thereafter appeals from an adverse judgement by the post-conviction court, he must convince the reviewing appellate court that "the evidence as a whole was such that it leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached" by the post-conviction court. Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind.1995). "[I]t is only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the [post-conviction] court has reached the opposite conclusion, that the decision will be disturbed." Fleenor v. State, 622 N.E.2d 140, 142, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 999, 115 S.Ct. 507, 130 L.Ed.2d 415 (1994).
Thus, when a post-conviction court evaluating a claim of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Richardson v. State
...See Grinstead v. State, 684 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.1997); Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466 (Ind.1997), modified on other grounds, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997). We did not, however, address whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana Constitution provides identical or different protections than it......
-
Ward v. State
...faces an extremely heavy burden in making his Cronic claims. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 481,modified on reh'g on other grounds,690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997). In examining these claims, we look for circumstances that “justif[y] a presumption that no lawyer could provide [Ward] with the effe......
-
Roche v. State
...exception to Strickland (and its narrowness) in Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 478-80 (Ind.1997), reh'g granted on other grounds, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997). ...
-
Bivins v. State
...693 N.E.2d 941, 946 (same), reh'g denied; Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 471-72 (Ind.1997) (same), modified on other grounds, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997); Bellmore v. State, 602 N.E.2d 111, 119 (Ind.1992) However, a violation of the State's pre-trial obligation to disclose these documents is......