Gamewell Fire-Alarm Telegraph Co. v. City of Laporte

• Decision Date: 04 October 1899
• Docket Number: 9,737.
• Citation: 96 F. 664
• Parties: GAMEWELL FIRE-ALARM TEL. CO. v. CITY OF LAPORTE.
• Court: United States Circuit Court, District of Indiana

96 F. 664

GAMEWELL FIRE-ALARM TEL. CO. v. CITY OF LAPORTE.

No. 9,737.

United States Circuit Court, D. Indiana.

October 4, 1899

Morris Newberger & Curtis, for complainant.

W. C Ransburg and John H. Bradley, for defendant.

BAKER District Judge.

On the 16th day of July, 1890, the complainant entered into a contract in writing with the defendant, agreeing to install a fire alarm and police telegraph system in said city for $3,500, on the condition that the defendant should furnish a suitable room for the central, or battery, station, should secure the right of way through the public streets for the wire circuit, should give the use of all poles then standing that were owned or controlled by the city, and the use of a bell to be furnished by the city for giving alarm. It is alleged in the complaint that, in strict conformity with the specifications and conditions of the contract, the fire alarm system was installed in said city and was accepted by it. The conditions of the contract could not have been conformed to without the city having furnished, for the purpose of installing the plant, the room for the central station, the easement of way through the streets, the use of the poles owned by the city, as well as the use of the alarm bell. The complaint sets out a copy of an opinion signed by the then city attorney of Laporte, which plainly discloses that the disability of the city to enter into the contract was within the contemplation of both parties, growing out of the fact that the city was then indebted in excess of 2 per centum of the assessed valuation of the property in said city. It is also alleged that the complainant brought suit in the Laporte circuit court for the purpose of recovering the contract price of the plant, and that, on appeal, it was decided by the supreme court of this state that the contract was void, and that no recovery could be had for the value of the labor and materials furnished in installing the plant either upon the written contract or upon an implied contract. It is further alleged in the complaint that the defendant has been put to some expense and outlay for repairs, betterments and additions to said plant and system, the amount of which is not known to the complainant. It is also alleged that the plant is now a going concern, and that the complainant is ready and willing to operate the system for the use and benefit of the city, upon the condition that the city shall pay a reasonable rental for the past use of it, and a like reasonable rental for its future use. It is also alleged that the system is complete and entire, and incapable of dismemberment and disintegration, without destroying the use thereof, and without doing irreparable injury to the several parts composing the same. The prayer of the bill, aside from the prayer for a temporary restraining order, is that an account be taken for the past use of the system by the defendant, and that it be ordered to pay the complainant the amount found due and owing for such use; that it be declared and adjudged that the defendant is, and since the delivery to it of said plant has been, a trustee holding the plant, and every part thereof, and all the easements, franchises, and privileges thereunto appertaining, for the use and benefit of the complainant, subject only to the public burden and duties necessarily incident to the use thereof for public safety and convenience, and that, unless some arrangement mutually satisfactory to said defendant and complainant be made, the defendant, as such trustee, be required and compelled to make over unto the complainant the possession of said fire-alarm plant, and every part thereof, together with all easements, franchises, and privileges appurtenant thereto, as an entire plant and property; and that the court will forever enjoin and restrain the defendant, and all its officers, agents, attorneys, and employes, from interfering with the complainant, and its officers, agents, and employes, in the management and operation of the said system and plant, after the same shall have been made over to the complainant, and from interfering in any wise with the disposition or use thereof. To this complaint the defendant has interposed a demurrer, and in argument has insisted-- First, that the complainant has an adequate remedy at law; and, second, if it has no remedy at law, that it is not entitled to relief on the...