Gammage v. State
| Decision Date | 30 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D14–3898.,2D14–3898. |
| Citation | 181 So.3d 1256 |
| Parties | Patrick Duncan GAMMAGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Brooke Elvington, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
Patrick Gammage appeals his convictions after a jury trial for three counts of tampering with jurors and his three consecutive five-year sentences. We reverse his convictions and sentences, and we remand for the trial court to enter judgments for the lesser-included offenses of attempted tampering with jurors and for resentencing.
The State charged Gammage with three counts of tampering with jurors in violation of section 918.12, Florida Statutes (2013). The offenses occurred on October 23, 2013. The State presented evidence that on that date, Gammage was the defendant in a criminal case involving a confidential informant (C.I.). On the morning of his trial in that case, a police lieutenant uninvolved in the case parked his truck in the parking lot of the courthouse. He observed Gammage exit his vehicle with a stack of papers in his hand. Gammage walked over to a man and a woman and gave each of them half of the stack of papers. Gammage then entered the courthouse. The lieutenant watched the woman hand one of the papers to another man about to enter the courthouse. The lieutenant approached that man inside the courthouse, and the man told the lieutenant his name and handed the lieutenant the piece of paper. The paper was introduced into evidence and contained an article printed from the internet. The article was titled "Convicted felon: Lying confidential informant sent me to prison." The article described a C.I. who had been used in the past by the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office in drug task force cases. The C.I. admitted in the article that she had lied and planted evidence in order to help law enforcement make arrests. The C.I. mentioned in the article played no role in Gammage's case, and the article made no reference to Gammage's case.
Upon viewing the paper, the lieutenant informed the bailiffs and the trial court what he had witnessed. He later interviewed two other people who had each been handed the same article. A search warrant was obtained for Gammage's car, in which additional copies of the article were found. Gammage's trial was cancelled that day.
The State also presented the testimony of Gammage's ex-girlfriend. She had ridden with Gammage to the courthouse for his trial, and he handed her some fliers, telling her to hand them out to everybody entering the building. Gammage told the ex-girlfriend that the purpose of the fliers was to sway the jury. She handed copies to three people. The ex-girlfriend testified that Gammage also gave some fliers to a man to hand out in the parking lot.
Three potential jurors all testified that they were reporting for jury duty on the morning in question. Each had been approached by a woman and asked if they were reporting for jury duty, and when they answered yes, the woman handed each of them a copy of the article. All three potential jurors ended up turning the papers over to the lieutenant. Each potential juror looked at the article; one "could see that it was something that wasn't good," the second noticed that it mentioned charges being trumped up and untrue, and the third read the headline about a felon sending someone to prison.
Based on this evidence, the jury found Gammage guilty of tampering with jurors. The trial court sentenced Gammage to three consecutive five-year sentences, the maximum sentence permitted by law. See § 918.12 (); § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2013) ().
On appeal, Gammage contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could find Gammage guilty of the charged offenses of tampering with jurors if it found that he attempted to influence the judgment of the jurors. He argues that the charged offense, a third-degree felony, does not encompass an attempt to influence a juror and that such an attempt would be a lesser-included offense by operation of the attempt statute, section 777.04, Florida Statutes (2013). He claims that he is entitled to a new trial or a reduction of his convictions to first-degree misdemeanors.
"Where the Legislature intended for the endeavor or attempt to commit a crime to be included as a violation of the substantive offense, it has so stated." Carruthers v. State, 636 So.2d 853, 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (). "In such cases, a conviction for the principal substantive offense may be obtained based on a finding that the defendant attempted to commit the crime." Id. (citing Keel v. State, 438 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) ). But where the statute "does not include language which would [indicate] that the Legislature intended for the attempt to commit th[e] crime to be included as a violation of the substantive offense," the attempt does not constitute the substantive offense and the attempt statute thus applies. Id. (); see § 777.04(1) (); Piantadosi v. State, 399 So.2d 382, 383 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ().
The State did not proceed on the theory that Gammage "influence[d] the judgment or decision" of any juror. Instead, the State proceeded only on the theory of attempt, and the jury was instructed that the offense of tampering with jurors is committed when a person "unlawfully attempts to influence the judgment or decision" of a juror. But the word attempt is not included in section 918.12. Rather, the statute speaks in terms of a person "influenc[ing]" a juror. To influence means "to affect or alter the conduct, thought, or character of by indirect or intangible means" or "to have an effect on the condition or development of." Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1160 (1986 ed.); see Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Survivors Charter Schools, Inc., 3 So.3d 1220, 1233 (Fla.2009) (). The word influence denotes an effect and therefore does not include an attempt or endeavor. Because the plain language of the statute does not by its express terms include attempt, an attempt to commit the substantive crime prohibited in section 918.12 invokes the application of the attempt statute, section 777.04, resulting in an offense of a lesser degree.
By comparison, the witness tampering statute, section 914.22, expressly states that a person violates the statute if he or she attempts to tamper with or harass a witness, victim, or informant:
(1) A person who knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, or threatens another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, or offers pecuniary benefit or gain to another person, with intent to cause or induce any person to [take certain actions] commits the crime of tampering with a witness, victim, or informant.
§ 914.22, Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). In analyzing an earlier but similar version of the witness tampering statute, the Fourth District held in Hestor v. State, 363 So.2d 26, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), that "there is no separate crime of attempted tampering with a witness" because the "express terms" of the substantive crime "itself include...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gammage v. State
...Therefore, we reversed the convictions and remanded for entry of convictions for attempted tampering with jurors. See Gammage v. State, 181 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). Gammage did not raise the double jeopardy issue in that appeal.On remand, the trial court entered an amended judgment a......
-
Gammage v. State, 2D14–3898.
...motion to enforce mandate, claiming that the trial court did not comply with the directions in this court's opinion in Gammage v. State, 181 So.3d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). He contends that the trial court did not enter judgments for and resentence him on the lesser included offenses of atte......