Gammill Lumber Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of Rankin County

• Decision Date: 07 May 1921
• Docket Number: 127.
• Citation: Gammill Lumber Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of Rankin County, 274 F. 630 (S.D. Miss. 1921)
• Parties: GAMMILL LUMBER CO. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF RANKIN COUNTY et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

274 F. 630

GAMMILL LUMBER CO. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF RANKIN COUNTY et al.

No. 127.

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

May 7, 1921

Watkins Watkins & Eager, of Jackson, Miss., for complainant.

May &amp Sanders and R. H. & J. H. Thompson, all of Jackson, Miss and S. L. McLaurin, of Brandon, Miss., for defendants.

HOLMES District Judge.

On the question of federal jurisdiction in this case I cannot do better than use the language of the Supreme Court in Greene v. Interurban Railroad Co., 244 U.S.at page 502, 37 Sup.Ct. 675, 61 L.Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88:

'There being no diversity of citizenship, the jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked, under the first paragraph of section 24, Judicial Code, upon the ground that the suits arose under the 'due process' and 'equal protection' clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and that the matter in dispute in each case was in excess of the jurisdictional amount. Plaintiffs also relied upon certain provisions of the Constitution of the state that require uniform taxation of property according to value and at the same rate for corporate as for individual property. * * * ' And at 244 U.S. 508, 37 Sup.Ct. 677, 61 L.Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E. 88:

'The contention of plaintiffs, set forth in their respective bills of complaint, that the action of the board of valuation and assessment in making the assessments under consideration and the threatened action of defendants in respect of carrying those assessments into effect constituted action by the state, and if carried out would violate the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, presents, without question, a real and substantial controversy under the Constitution of the United States, which (there being involved a sum and value in excess of the jurisdictional amount) conferred jurisdiction upon the federal court, irrespective of the citizenship of the parties. This being so, the jurisdiction of that court extended, and ours on appeal extends, to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191; Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 586. * * * '

And at 244 U.S. 519, 37 Sup.Ct. 681, 61 L.Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88:

'The next question in order is whether the assessments have the effect of denying to plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is obvious, however, in view of the result reached upon the question of state law, just discussed, that the disposition of the cases would not be affected by whatever result we might reach upon the federal question; for no other or greater relief is sought under the 'equal protection' clause than plaintiffs are entitled to under the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the state to which we have referred. Therefore we find it unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question raised under the Fourteenth Amendment.'

Turning to the question of equitable jurisdiction, the bill alleges that the plaintiff is the owner of various and sundry tracts of timber lands situated in Rankin and other counties in the state of Mississippi, and that a cloud is cast upon the title of said lands by the attempt of the defendants to assess and collect an invalid tax. This entitles the plaintiff to bring a suit in equity, unless the contention that under the Mississippi statute it has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law be well founded. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U.S. 516, 525, 5 Sup.Ct. 601, 28 L.Ed. 1098; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, @*2 U.S. 339, 348, 12 Sup.Ct. 250, 35 L.Ed. 1035; Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U.S. 224, 237, 18 Sup.Ct. 98, 42 L.Ed. 444; Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 587, 34 Sup.Ct. 372, 58 L.Ed. 737; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 506, 37 Sup.Ct. 673, 61 L.Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88.

If under Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 Sup.Ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819, P. H. Lindsay, Assessor v. First National Bank, 156 U.S. 485, 15 Sup.Ct. 472, 39 L.Ed. 505, Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 28 Sup.Ct. 7, 52 L.Ed. 78, 12 Ann.Cas. 757, Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 37 Sup.Ct. 673, 61 L.Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88, Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Weld County, Colo., 247 U.S. 282, 38 Sup.Ct. 510, 62 L.Ed. 1110, Shaffer v. Carter, State Auditor, 252 U.S. 37, 40 Sup.Ct. 221, 64 L.Ed. 445, and other similar cases, it be doubtful whether the Mississippi statutes afford an adequate remedy, a court of equity will not decline to take cognizance of the suit, because:

'Where equity can give relief, plaintiff ought not to be compelled to speculate upon the chance of his obtaining relief at law. ' Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 688, 15 Sup.Ct. 555, 558, 39 L.Ed. 578, 584.

This is not simply a case of overvaluation of property in an assessment for taxes, but, while alleging that the assessment exceeds the actual market value of the stock, the bill alleges also that in arriving at the excessive valuation the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff and in favor of other taxpayers by deliberately and intentionally assessing the plaintiff's property at a different and greater per cent. of its real value than the property of other citizens was assessed, in that the property of other citizens, corporations, and individuals, whether real or personal, in Rankin county, Miss., is customarily, systematically and intentionally assessed by the board at not exceeding 60 per cent. of its fair market value, while the property of the plaintiff is assessed at a sum in excess of its real market value, thereby violating designated provisions of the Constitution of Mississippi and the Constitution of the United States.

In so far as the complaint has reference merely to an overvaluation in the assessment it may be that the Mississippi statute affords an adequate remedy by an appeal from the order of the board of supervisors, but in so far as the complaint rests upon a discrimination against the plaintiff by assessing its property at more than 100 per cent. of its actual value, while the property of other persons is customarily and intentionally assessed at not exceeding 60 per cent., a very different question arises. Granting the doubtful proposition that the remedy provided by law and cognizable in the federal courts is adequate for an overvaluation of property, the question arises: What remedy, if any, could the plaintiff obtain by a proceeding at law on appeal from the order of the board of supervisors from the illegal and unjust discrimination against it on the part of the board in assessing its property at more than its real market value, and assessing the property of all other persons, individual and corporate, at not exceeding 60 per cent. of such value, and could any court, in a legal action, give complete or any relief in a case of this character? It is true the circuit or Supreme Court of the state on appeal would have the power to lower the valuation to the extent that it exceeded the real market value; but, if the legal remedy could go no further than this, it would leave the plaintiff's property assessed at 100 per cent. and the property of other persons at not exceeding 60 per cent. of the true value.

The remedy at law afforded the plaintiff by the Mississippi statutes is provided for in section 80 of the Mississippi Code of 1906, as amended by chapter 120 of the Laws of 1918. This section is as follows:

'Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of supervisors or the municipal authorities of a city, town, or village, as to the assessment of taxes, may, within five days after the adjournment of the meeting at which such decision is made, appeal to the circuit court of the county, upon giving bond, with sufficient sureties, in double the amount of the matter in dispute, but never less than one hundred dollars, payable to the state, and conditioned to perform the judgment of the circuit court, and to be approved by the clerk of such board, who, upon the filing of such bond, shall make a true copy of any papers on file relating to such controversy, and file such copy certified by him, with said bond, in the office of the clerk of the circuit court, on or before its next term; and the controversy shall be tried anew in the circuit court at the first term, and be a preference case, and, if the matter be decided against the person who appealed, judgment shall be rendered on the appeal-bond for damages at the rate of ten per centum on the amount in controversy and all costs. If the matter be decided in favor of the person who appealed, judgment in his favor shall be certified to the board of supervisors, or the municipal authorities, as the case may be, which shall conform thereto, and shall pay the costs. The county attorney, the district, or the attorney general, if the state, county or municipality be aggrieved by a decision of the board of supervisors or the municipal authorities of a city, town, or village as to the assessment of taxes, may, within twenty days after the adjournment of the meeting at which such decision is made, or within twenty days after the adjournment of the meeting at which the assessment rolls are corrected in accordance with the instructions of the state tax commission, or within twenty days after the adjournment of the meeting of the board of supervisors at which the approval of the roll by the state tax commission is entered, appeal to the circuit court of the county in like manner as in the case of any person

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