Gammons v. City of N.Y.

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: RIVERA, J.
• Citation: Gammons v. City of N.Y., 2014 NY Slip Op 8869, 25 N.E.3d 958, 2 N.Y.S.3d 45, 24 N.Y.3d 562 (N.Y. 2014)
• Decision Date: 18 December 2014
• Parties: Allison GAMMONS, Respondent, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Appellants.

24 N.Y.3d 562

25 N.E.3d 958

2 N.Y.S.3d 45

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 08869

Allison GAMMONS, Respondent

v.CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 18, 2014.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Michael Shender, Kristin M. Helmers, Margaret G. King and Richard Dearing of counsel), for appellants.

Oshman & Mirisola, LLP, New York City (David L. Kremen of counsel), for respondent.

Robert F. Danzi, New York State Trial Lawyers Association, New York City, and Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo P.C., New York City (Brian J. Shoot of counsel), for New York State Trial Lawyers Association, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

RIVERA, J.

In this appeal concerning a police officer's personal injury action against municipal defendants the City of New York and the New York City Police Department, we conclude that Labor Law § 27–a (3)(a) (1) sets forth an objective clear legal duty that may serve as a predicate for a claim under General Municipal Law § 205–e. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed and the certified question answered in the affirmative.

I.

Plaintiff Allison Gammons was a police officer with the New York City Police Department working on “barrier truck detail” in Brooklyn, New York when she was injured during the course of loading wooden police barriers onto a police flatbed truck. According to plaintiff, she was standing at the rear of the truck holding a barrier when another officer who was helping to load

the truck pushed the barrier into plaintiff's chest, causing her to fall backwards and off the truck onto the street.

Plaintiff sued defendants City of New York and the New York City Police Department seeking damages, asserting causes of action for common-law negligence and under General Municipal Law § 205–e for failure to comply with Labor Law § 27–a, known as the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA), based, in part, on the alleged unsafe and dangerous condition of the truck. At her deposition plaintiff stated the truck was too short to accommodate the full length of the barriers being loaded, the back was left open and unprotected, the side railings were only three feet high, and only one officer could comfortably fit on the truck during the loading process. She claimed that on the date of her injury, defendant Police Department, nevertheless, had available newer trucks that were sufficiently long to accommodate the full length of the barriers without any portion hanging off the back, were equipped with a tailgate, and could hold two officers.

Defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212, claiming that General Obligations Law § 11–106(1)¹ barred plaintiff's common-law negligence cause of action, and the general duty clause of Labor Law § 27–a (3)(a)(1) could not serve as a statutory predicate to plaintiff's General Municipal Law § 205–e cause of action. As an alternative ground, defendants asserted that plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a “recognized hazard” within the meaning of section 27–a (3)(a)(1) because plaintiff claimed her injury was due to the improper use of the truck, rather than its inherent defective condition.

Plaintiff responded that the motion was unsupported by the law and facts. Additionally, in a supplemental bill of particulars, she alleged that defendants violated 29 CFR 1910.23(c)(1)² by failing to equip the truck with a back railing, and asserted

section 27–a (3)(a)(2) as a predicate for this violation. Plaintiff further requested the court search the record in accordance with CPLR 3212(b) and grant her summary judgment on the question of liability under General Municipal Law § 205–e.

As relevant to this appeal, Supreme Court denied the motion in part, concluding Labor Law § 27–a (3)(a)(1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of General Municipal Law § 205–e (30 Misc.3d 1230[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 50286[U], 2011 WL 723596 [Sup.Ct., Kings County 2011] ).³ The Appellate Division affirmed (109 A.D.3d 189, 972 N.Y.S.2d 559 [2013] ) and granted defendants leave to appeal on a certified question whether the court properly affirmed the denial of defendants' summary judgment motion to dismiss plaintiff's General Municipal Law § 205–e claim (2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 90950 [U] [2d Dept.2013] ).

On appeal to this Court, the parties reiterate their arguments below. Defendants contend that Labor Law § 27–a does not provide an injured worker with a private right of action, and, instead, establishes a workplace inspection scheme under which the Commissioner of Labor alone may determine a violation of the statute. Therefore, section 27–a cannot serve as a predicate to plaintiff's General Municipal Law cause of action. Defendants further claim that, regardless, plaintiff has failed to assert a cause of action based on a physical and environmental workplace hazard, in accordance with section 27–a (3)(a)(1). In contrast, plaintiff argues that Labor Law § 27–a (3)(a)(1) contains a clear legal duty and, thus, was a proper statutory predicate for her General Municipal Law § 205–e cause of action, and that her fall from the truck was a “recognized hazard.” We agree with plaintiff that section 27–a is sufficient to serve as a statutory predicate for her claim.

II.

General Municipal Law § 205–e contains a right of action allowing police officers to sue for injuries sustained in the line of

duty “as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments” (General Municipal Law § 205–e [1 ] ). The legislature enacted General Municipal Law § 205–e to overrule this Court's prior decision in Santangelo v. State of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 393, 396–398, 526 N.Y.S.2d 812, 521 N.E.2d 770 (1988), which had extended the “fire- fighter's rule” to police officers, thus barring common-law negligence actions for injuries sustained in the line of duty. Thereafter, the legislature would continue to abrogate judicial decisions interpreting General Municipal Law § 205–e restrictively (see Gonzalez v. Iocovello, 93 N.Y.2d 539, 548, 693 N.Y.S.2d 486, 715 N.E.2d 489 [1999] ). After a decade of legislative rebuffs, we acknowledged that “[e]ach enactment has been promoted as being for the express purpose of clarifying and emphasizing the legislative intent that General Municipal Law § 205–e be applied ‘expansively’ ” (id., citing L. 1990, ch. 762; L. 1992, ch. 474; L. 1994, ch. 664; L. 1996, ch. 703).

In prior cases this Court described how the 1992 and 1996 amendments were intended to enlarge a police officer's right of action under General Municipal Law § 205–e (see Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 72, 77–78, 760 N.Y.S.2d 397, 790 N.E.2d 772 [2003] ; Gonzalez, 93 N.Y.2d 539, 693 N.Y.S.2d 486, 715 N.E.2d 489 ; Schiavone v. City of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 308, 680 N.Y.S.2d 445, 703 N.E.2d 256 [1998] ). Schiavone and Giuffrida noted that in the 1992 amendment the legislature rejected judicial interpretations limiting a police officer's action under General Municipal Law § 205–e to injuries related to safety and maintenance violations concerning a “premises” (Schiavone, 92 N.Y.2d at 314, 680 N.Y.S.2d 445, 703 N.E.2d 256 ; Giuffrida, 100 N.Y.2d at 77–78, 760 N.Y.S.2d 397, 790 N.E.2d 772 ). Instead, the legislature concluded that because “police officers are required to confront dangerous conditions under many and varied circumstances, there is a need to ensure that a right of action exists regardless of where the violation causing injury or death occurs” (L. 1992, ch. 474, § 1 [responding to Sciarrotta v. Valenzuela, 182 A.D.2d 443, 445, 581 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1st Dept.1992) and Cooper v. City of New York, 182 A.D.2d 350, 351, 582 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1st Dept.1992), aff'd. 81 N.Y.2d 584, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432, 619 N.E.2d 369 (1993) ]; see also Giuffrida, 100 N.Y.2d at 78, 760 N.Y.S.2d 397, 790 N.E.2d 772 ; Schiavone, 92 N.Y.2d at 314, 680 N.Y.S.2d 445, 703 N.E.2d 256 ).

Giuffrida and Gonzalez both discussed how in 1996 the legislature again amended General Municipal Law § 205–e to expand its scope and application (Giuffrida, 100 N.Y.2d at 78, 760 N.Y.S.2d 397, 790 N.E.2d 772 ; Gonzalez, 93 N.Y.2d at 548, 693 N.Y.S.2d 486, 715 N.E.2d 489 ; see L. 1996, ch. 703, § 2). Then, in Gonzalez, this Court pointed out that the addition of subdivision (3) to permit liability even in cases where the injury is due

to a violation of a codified common-law duty, constituted another rejection of a judicial decision holding otherwise (93 N.Y.2d at 549, 693 N.Y.S.2d 486, 715 N.E.2d 489 [discussing St. Jacques v. City of New York, 215 A.D.2d 75, 633 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1995), aff'd. 88 N.Y.2d 920, 646 N.Y.S.2d 787, 669 N.E.2d 1109 (1996) (holding overruled by the 1996 amendment) ] ).

Thus, this Court has recognized that these amendments, enacted on the heels of judicial decisions constricting the application of General Municipal Law § 205–e, manifest the legislature's determination to bring courts in line with the legislative goal of providing a cause of action for police officers for negligent noncompliance with the law. Indeed, the legislative history of the 1996 amendments sets the record straight that by amending the statute our state elected officials

“intended to ensure once and for all that section 205–e of the general municipal law is applied by the courts in accordance with its original legislative intent to offer an umbrella of protection for police officers, who, in the course of their many and varied duties, are injured by the negligence of anyone who violates any relevant statute, ordinance, code, rule and/or regulation” (L. 1996, ch. 703, § 1; see also Giuffrida, 100 N.Y.2d at 78, 760 N.Y.S.2d 397, 790 N.E.2d 772 ).

Any doubts as to the legislative directive to the judiciary were laid to rest in Williams v. City of New York, wherein this Court stated...