Gannon v. Sanders

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before KING; ALCORN
• Citation: Gannon v. Sanders, 244 A.2d 397, 157 Conn. 1 (Conn. 1968)
• Decision Date: 02 July 1968
• Parties: Thomas P. GANNON v. William J. SANDERS et al.

Page 397

244 A.2d 397

157 Conn. 1

Thomas P. GANNON v. William J. SANDERS et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

July 2, 1968.

Paul Smith, Torrington, with whom, on the brief, was John A. Mettling, Torrington, for plaintiff.

Walter M. Pickett, Jr., Waterbury, for defendant, the town of Bridgewater and others.

F. Michael Ahern, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., for named defendant and others.

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

ALCORN, Associate Justice.

The parties would, by this reservation, have this court render a declaratory judgment concerning the efficacy of the steps taken to establish a regional school distrtrict as authorized by chapter 164, part III, of the General Statutes.

The action was commenced by a complaint which sought only an injunction declaring the formation of the district to be null and void along with any other appropriate equitable relief. The defendants who were thus sought to be enjoined were the state commissioner of education, the state board of education, two selectmen of the town of Bridgewater, three selectmen of each of the towns of Roxbury and Washington, and the three named towns as municipalities. After the case was returned to the Superior Court, the regional board of education of the contested school district and the individual members of that board were cited in as additional defendants, the original prayers for relief were abandoned, and, instead, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment determining that the creation of the district was null and void, an injunction restraining the defendants 'from doing or causing to be done any acts or orders pursuant to the provisions of the purported new school district, and from the payment of any expenditures from the funds of any of the three towns in such purported school district' and any other appropriate equitable relief.

The Superior Court ordered that notice of the institution and pendency of the action be given to the taxpayers and voters of the towns of Bridgewater, Roxbury and Washington by publication in a newspaper and that return be made to the court that such notice had been given. The record does not disclose that any return of compliance with that order of notice was made to the court, but an examination of the file discloses such a return. It does not appear, however, that the return was ever brought to the court's attention or that the notice was determined by it to be reasonable and sufficient.

From the record, it also appears that no pleading addressed to the complaint has ever been filed by any of the defendants.

Again, an examination of the file discloses, however, that the complaint was demurred to on the grounds, first, that the members of the regional board of education of the district were necessary parties and, second, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought because 'he is not an elector and tax payer in the Towns of Washington and Bridgewater (sic)' and because the question of the legality of the district is solely for the determination of the state board of education since education is a state function.

It was following the filing of this demurrer that the plaintiff sought and obtained the joinder of the regional school board and its members as defendants. The demurrer remains unresolved on its second ground, however, and no further pleading has been filed. Thus, no issue has been joined, and the case is not ready for final judgment in the trial court. 'The only questions that can be properly considered on a reservation are such as pertain to the proper disposition of the cause on the issues formed by the pleadings, and such facts as may be ascertained by agreement or determined by a finding or verdict.' Bronson v. Thompson, 77 Conn. 214, 219, 58 A. 692, 694; see General Statutes § 52-235; Practice Book § 738.

On this state of the record, the parties joined in a stipulation requesting the court to reserve the case for our advice on the questions printed in the footnote. ¹ Pursuant to that stipulation, the court reserved those questions for our consideration.

During oral argument of the case, counsel for the defendant towns, the defendant selectmen and the defendant regional district board stated, without dissent from other counsel, that the introductory paragraph of the questions reserved should be considered to be: 'Was the holding of said second referendum on August 11, 1967 contrary to the statutes in one or more of the following respects and therefore is Regional School District No. 12 null and void:'

The foregoing recital demonstrates the casual and unorthodox manner in which the parties have seen fit to invoke the limited and 'novel method of judicial procedure' for a declaratory judgment. Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 556, 120 A. 150. We are, in short, asked for an opinion on questions in part reserved by the court and in part orally amended in argument which are said to be determinative of a case in which the issues have not yet been closed in the trial court. Nor can we overlook the absence of any determination by the court that the voters and taxpayers of the defendant towns who would have an interest in the outcome of this litigation have had reasonable notice of the institution and pendency of the action. The parties have stipulated that such notice was given. We have consistently insisted that no declaratory judgment will be rendered unless all persons having an interest in the subject matter are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof. Practice Book § 309(d); Wenzel v. Town of Danbury, 152 Conn. 675, 677, 211 A.2d 683. It should not lie in the power of those who are parties to the action to establish, by agreement between themselves, that other interested persons have had reasonable notice of the action. The essential is for the determination of the court.

Beyond that, we are confronted with an issue as to the standing of the plaintiff to bring the action at all. We turn then to that jurisdictional question. Rothkopf v. City of Danbury, 156 Conn. --, 242 A.2d 771. Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred on this court merely by a reservation for advice from the trial court; Hoblitzelle v. Frechette, 156 Conn. 253, 240 A.2d 864; nor by the silence or agreement of the parties. Liebeskind v. City of Waterbury, 142 Conn. 155, 159, 112 A.2d 208.

We have reiterated many times that, as a fundamental concept of judicial adminsitration, no one is entitled to set the machinery of the courts in motion unless it be for the purpose of 'obtaining redress for an injury he has suffered or to prevent an injury he may suffer, either in an individual or representative capacity.' Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter, 130 Conn. 494, 498, 35 A.2d 837, 839; Wexler Construction Co. v. Housing Authority, 149 Conn. 602, 605, 183 A.2d 262, and cases cited; Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 661, 145 A.2d 832. An action for a declaratory judgment 'is not a procedural panacea for use on all occasions.' Liebeskind v. Waterbury, supra, 142 Conn. 158, 112 A.2d 210. It is a special statutory proceeding. General Statutes § 52-29; Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 133 Conn. 403, 409, 51 A.2d 907, 910. Under the rules adopted to implement the statute, '(t)he Court will not render declaratory judgments: Upon the complaint of any person unless he has an interest, legal or equitable, by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to his rights or other jural relations; or (b) unless there is an actual, bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of...