Gant v. Maness, 1999-IA-01172-SCT.

• Decision Date: 07 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1999-IA-01172-SCT.,1999-IA-01172-SCT.
• Citation: 786 So.2d 401
• Parties: Bill O. GANT and Alcorn County, Mississippi v. Lila MANESS.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

786 So.2d 401

Bill O. GANT and Alcorn County, Mississippi v. Lila MANESS.

No. 1999-IA-01172-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 7, 2001.

Wendell H. Trapp, Jr., Corinth, William Hull Davis, Jr., Attorneys for Appellants.

James C. Patton, Jr., Louisville, Attorney for Appellee.

EN BANC.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

MILLS, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinions are withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted therefor.

¶ 2. This interlocutory appeal arises from the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, which on June 19, 1999, denied the summary judgment motion of Bill Gant and Alcorn County as to their liability in this personal injury action. The issues certified for interlocutory appeal regard sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, statutory immunity, and the duty of care owed by a public official to a specific member of the public.

FACTS

¶ 3. Danny R. Thompson, who is not a party in this case, pled guilty to second-offense DUI on April 4, 1991. He was sentenced to serve six months in the Alcorn County jail beginning on April 5, 1991. The justice court judge modified the sentence to allow Thompson to leave the jail for work every day and to return in the evening. The jail log reads as follows: "Sentence six months; let him go to work every day at 6:00 a.m. and return every evening. J. Norman." Lila Maness alleges that on Sunday, April 7, 1991, at 6:10 p.m., she was involved in an automobile accident with Thompson. According to Maness, the accident report reveals that Thompson was cited for DUI and for driving without a license. A copy of this report is not included in the record.

¶ 4. Maness subsequently pursued a claim against Thompson and his insurance carrier as well as her own uninsured motorist carrier and recovered a total of $18,657. In addition, on January 21, 1994, Maness filed suit against Alcorn County and Bill O. Gant, who at the time of the accident was Sheriff of Alcorn County. Maness asserts that Gant, by releasing Thompson from jail, permitted the automobile accident to occur. It is undisputed that Thompson was not an employee or agent of either Gant or Alcorn County.

¶ 5. Maness alleges that Sheriff Gant failed to remain properly informed of the whereabouts and actions of Thompson during Thompson's incarceration. She refers this Court to Gant's deposition which, she alleges, reveals Gant's negligence and lack of knowledge regarding Thompson's "comings and goings." Unfortunately, no excerpts from Gant's deposition are included in the record before this Court.

¶ 6. Gant and Alcorn County filed their motion for summary judgment on March 3, 1999. The circuit court denied the motion but subsequently certified issues for interlocutory appeal. We granted this interlocutory appeal on September 24, 1999.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. The issues presented on this interlocutory appeal are questions of law. We review questions of law de novo. See Saliba v. Saliba, 753 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Miss.2000)

.

¶ 8. The standard for reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment is the same standard as is employed by the trial court under M.R.C.P. 56(c). Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Joyner, 763 So.2d 877, 878 (Miss.2000). This Court conducts de novo review of an order granting or denying summary judgment and examines all the evidentiary matters before it—admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. Id. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. Id. If, in this view, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Id. Otherwise, the motion should be denied. Id.

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER SHERIFF GANT CAN BE SUBJECT TO LIABILITY FOR COMPLYING WITH THE ORDER OF THE JUSTICE COURT OF ALCORN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI.

¶ 9. Gant asserts that he cannot be subject to liability for Thompson's actions because he strictly adhered to the sentencing instructions given by the Alcorn County Justice Court. He relies on Miss.Code Ann. § 19-25-79 (1995), which states: "The sheriff of any county shall receive and keep any prisoner committed by a justice of the peace according to the order of commitment."

¶ 10. Maness argues that Gant has interpreted this statute in a manner that relieves him of any responsibility for ensuring that the sentence and commitment order are properly enforced. She asserts that the facts as revealed through Gant's deposition (which is not included in this record) do not show that Gant made a good faith effort to obey the order of the Alcorn County Justice Court. Maness alleges that Gant did not "keep up with the comings and goings of his prisoners." She emphasizes the fact that the automobile accident occurred on a Sunday evening, not a regular workday.

¶ 11. Thompson's order of commitment states: "Sentence six months; let him go to work every day at 6:00 a.m. and return every evening. J. Norman." The order does not specify certain days of the week while excluding others. Sheriff Gant was required to permit Thompson to leave every day. Had he failed to allow Thompson to leave, Gant would have been subject to charges of contempt. See DeWitt v. Thompson, 192 Miss. 615, 7 So.2d 529, 532 (1942) (stating, "Here we have an order of the court issued to the sheriff, who had to obey the order or subject himself to punishment for contempt.").

¶ 12. In Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir.1974), the Fifth Circuit held that public officials were duty-bound to execute an order which was valid on its face. In that case a pastor had been relieved of his duties with a Methodist church in Eupora. Id. at 492. When he refused to leave the parsonage, church officials obtained an eviction order which was executed by the sheriff and his deputies. Id. Simpson later sued the law enforcement officers for executing the order of the justice of the peace. Id. The Fifth Circuit found that the officers'"good faith compliance with [their] duty relieves them of liability." Id. at 495.

¶ 13. Maness acknowledges that "the general premise that the sheriff would not be liable for a tort as a result of obeying a court order pursuant to the aforesaid § 19-25-79 of our codified state laws is applicable to the subject factual scenario." She asserts, however, that according to Simpson Gant must show that he made a "good faith effort" to comply with the order. She argues that he fails to do so. Her only method of supporting this argument, however, is her reference to Gant's deposition where he allegedly reveals his negligence and lack of involvement in Thompson's incarceration. As previously noted, this deposition is not included in this record. Therefore, we are left to examine the order on its face in conjunction with the undisputed facts. The order required Gant to allow Thompson to leave every day. It is undisputed that he made this allowance. There is no evidence before this Court indicating that Thompson did not work on Sundays; nor is there evidence that Gant was negligent in his supervision and awareness of Thompson's "comings and goings." Therefore, we find that Gant complied with the justice court order and is not subject to liability for doing so.

II. WHETHER SHERIFF GANT OWED A DUTY OF CARE TOWARD THE PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY.

¶ 14. Maness asserts that Sheriff Gant had a duty to protect third parties from foreseeable injury at the hands of Thompson. She argues that Gant knew or should have known that Thompson had a propensity to drive under the influence of alcohol, that he was incarcerated to protect the public from his driving while intoxicated, and that his driving while intoxicated would pose a risk to other drivers.

¶ 15. Before an individual defendant may be found to be negligent, thereby entitling a plaintiff to recover from that defendant, the plaintiff must show the existence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. J.C. Penney Co. v. Sumrall, 318 So.2d 829, 832 (Miss.1975). In Robinson v. Estate of Williams, 721 F.Supp. 806 (S.D.Miss.1989), the district court applied Mississippi law to determine whether a sheriff was subject to suit by the estate of an individual who had been murdered by inmates who had escaped from the county jail. The court held that the statutorily-imposed duties of a sheriff in Mississippi are duties owed to the public as a whole and are, therefore, not actionable by a specific plaintiff, absent a compelling showing of extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 808. The court stated:

As far as the Court can determine, no Mississippi court has squarely addressed the duty issues presented herein. However, from the Mississippi authorities discussed, the Court finds it highly unlikely that the Mississippi courts would consider the sheriff to have owed a duty of care to plaintiff's decedent. The sole factor which distinguishes plaintiff's decedent from the populace of Clarke County is the harm he suffered allegedly as a result of the sheriffs negligence. This, according to longstanding Mississippi law, is clearly insufficient to establish a duty of care owing to him in particular:

when the duty imposed upon an officer is one solely to the public, the failure to perform it, or an erroneous or negligent performance, is regarded as an injury to the public and not to an individual member of the public; and an individual harmed thereby may not have redress against the officer unless the individual had in it such a direct and distinctive interest as to set him apart from all others of the public in respect to it, and the fact of the injury does not in itself serve to make out the direct and distinctive interest which is essential.

Id. (quoting State ex rel. Boyle v. Matthews, 196 Miss. 833, 18 So.2d 156, 158 (1944)). The Robinson court granted the sheriffs motion for summary judgment and held that even if the sheriff was negligent as alleged, he was nonetheless protected...