Garafola v. Dejoy
| Decision Date | 30 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 17-CV-01827 (JMA)(JMW) |
| Parties | GINA GARAFOLA, Plaintiff, v. LOUIS DEJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff Gina Garafola (“Plaintiff' or “Garafola”) commenced this action against her employer United States Postal Service (“Defendant” or “USPS”) alleging discrimination pursuant to Title VII. (ECF No. 1.) On or about June 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed a second lawsuit (19-cv-3659) against the Defendant alleging discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. The Court then consolidated these two actions into the above-captioned case (17-cv-1827).
Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all the claims in the Plaintiff's consolidated complaints. (ECF No. 58.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
The following facts are taken from the parties' pleadings declarations, exhibits and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements.[1] Except where indicated, these facts are not in dispute.
A. Facts
In or around 2002, Garafola commenced employment as a mail carrier at the Medford Post Office. (See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3, Transcript of July 22, 2019 deposition of Gina Garafola, (“Garafola Dep.”) at 8-9, ECF No 60.) Garafola generally worked 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3).
Garafola self-identifies as a “homosexual female.” (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3; Second Amended Complaint ¶ 7; Garafola Dep. 10-11, 18-19, 21-23.) Since 2007, she has been open about her sexual orientation at the Medford Post office. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3; Garafola Dep. 23.) Garafola alleges that she was discriminated against, in various ways, for her sexual orientation.
Garafola also alleges that, in 2016, she was diagnosed with herniated discs. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 79.) These herniated discs are the basis for her disability discrimination claims. On July 20, 2016, Garafola left a doctor's note dated July 14, 2016 on the desk of her Supervisor, John Perretta (“Perretta”).[2] ((Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 45, 73; Ex. N; Second Amended Complaint ¶ 71).
This doctor note stated, without elaboration, that Garafola “is under my care and needs to be restricted to 8 hrs days + 40 hrs a week.” (Id.) Perretta then gave the note to the Officer in Charge (“OIC”) Marie Giordani (“Giordani”). (Id.)
After consulting with other employees, including USPS Occupational Health Nurse Margaret Mais, OIC Giordani was advised that Garafola's request was to be treated as a request for light duty. Nurse Mais then forwarded a light duty package to Garafola. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 45-49.) Garafola told OIC Giordani that neither she nor her doctor requested light duty. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 45-49.) Garafola objected because the light duty documents requested “private and privileged” medical information. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 45-49, 50-51.) She never submitted the medical packet to her doctor for completion. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 50-51.)
Garafola, however, was never actually placed on light duty. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 51.) After she submitted this doctor's note, USPS followed her doctor's order that she be restricted from working more than eight hours in a day and more than forty hours in a week. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 52; Garafola Dep. 141.)
Garafola subsequently submitted another doctor's note, dated March 3, 2017, (Def. 56.1, Ex. Q), in which her doctor again limited her to 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 53.) Additionally, in this note, the doctor checked off a box which stated that Garafola was “[not disabled [and was] capable of working full-time and performing duties and activities required.” (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 53.) This document included fields for the doctor to provide information about any restrictions the patient may have concerning heavy lifting, prolonged sitting and standing, and repetitive bending. (Def. 56.1, Ex. Q.) Garafola's doctor left each of these fields blank.
Garafola alleges that she was discriminated against, in various ways, because of her disability. She also alleges that she was retaliated against for requesting a reasonable accommodation and then exercising that accommodation.
Garafola also alleges that she has been retaliated against, in various ways, for filing EEO claims complaining of discrimination and retaliation. In 2010, Garafola's filed her first EEO claim, alleging that her supervisor at the time, Scott Collins, discriminated against her based on her sexual orientation and gender and also retaliated against her. In August 2016, Garafola filed an amended EEO complaint alleging that Perretta-her then-supervisor-retaliated against her. (Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 93-103).
In March 2017, Plaintiff filed her first lawsuit, which alleged discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII. (See 17-cv-01827, ECF No. 1.) In June 2019, Plaintiff filed her second lawsuit alleging against the Defendant claims of discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. (See 19-cv-3659, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against, in various ways, for filing EEO claims and for filing and litigating her lawsuits against Defendant.
As discussed infra, between 2015 and 2019, Garafola received multiple letters of warning, which she claims were the result of discrimination and/or retaliation. Many of these letters have been expunged after Plaintiff filed grievances through her union.
Employee discipline in the USPS is progressive. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 8) The first step is a letter of warning. (Id.) A letter of warning may result in a notice of a 7-day and then a 14-day suspension if the misconduct is not corrected and is repeated. (Id.) Finally, if the misconduct persists, it may result in a notice of termination. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 8; Deposition of John Perretta (“Perretta Dep.”) 19-20, 50-52; Ex. D).
In addition to these letters of warning, Garafola claims to have been subjected to a myriad of other adverse actions, including increased supervision, generally, and denial of auxiliary assistance for when she cannot complete her route in eight (8) hours. However, she admits that: she was never suspended or terminated, she lost no salary; she was not denied promotional opportunities; her route was not changed in any way; and her work hours were not changed. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 45-48.)
Defendant had moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's consolidated complaints in their entirety on that basis that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation. (See 17-cv-1827, ECF Nos. 1, 19; 19-cv-3659, ECF No. 1.) Because the Court concludes that on the record presented, considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find in her favor on her claims, Plaintiff's complaints are dismissed in their entirety.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and affidavits demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that “no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). “An issue of fact is ‘material' for these purposes if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,' “ while “[a]n issue of fact is ‘genuine' if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' “ Konikoff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 234 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no issues of material fact such that summary judgment is appropriate. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2004). In deciding the motion, the Court “is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ( that a motion for summary judgment should be denied if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).
Once the movant has met its initial burden, the party opposing summary judgment Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation omitted); see also Maxton v. Underwriter Labs., Inc., 4 F.Supp.3d 534, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ().
In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, “the court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party.” Knight v U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Artis v. Valls, No. 9:10-CV-427, 2012...
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