Garanin v. City of Scranton

• Decision Date: 17 December 2019
• Docket Number: Civil No. 3:19-CV-1275
• Parties: VSEVOLOD GARANIN, et al. Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SCRANTON, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

VSEVOLOD GARANIN, et al. Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SCRANTON, et al. Defendants.

Civil No. 3:19-CV-1275

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

December 17, 2019

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case

This is the second civil action before us filed by Vsevolod Garanin and his associated entities against the City of Scranton and others. The defendants have now moved to dismiss this lawsuit, or in the alternative, to combine it with Garanin's initial lawsuit, Civ. No. 3:14-cv-2129 ("Garanin I"), also pending before this court, for ease of litigation. After review of these motions, we will grant them both in part. The defendants' motion to dismiss this case shall be granted as to Counts IV and VII, denied as to Counts II, III, and VI, and granted in part and denied in part for Counts I, V, and VIII. Likewise, the defendants' alternative motion to consolidate Garanin's two cases shall be granted in part at this time solely for purposes of global settlement discussions concerning both of Garanin's lawsuits pending before this court, and we will defer a decision regarding further consolidation of the cases for trial pending the outcome of any mediation efforts.

In the eight-count complaint presently before us, Garanin sets forth several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of procedural and substantive due process rights, equal protection, the First Amendment, and protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, the complaint sets forth claims for Monell liability, malicious prosecution, and tortious interference with existing and prospective business and contractual relationships. These allegations are based on the following facts which are derived from the plaintiffs' complaint:

Plaintiff Garanin is a Scranton-area businessman, owning a controlling share in Garanin Properties LLC, the parent company holding Auric Investment Holdings LLC ("Auric"), Ferndrive LLC ("Ferndrive"), and Rock Property Holdings LLC ("Rock Property"), the co-plaintiffs in this case. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1-5). These wholly-owned subsidiaries own the properties which give rise to Garanin's disputes in this second complaint, including 300-302 William Street, 126-128 School Street, 614 Willow Street, and 1208-1210 Philo Street. (Id., ¶¶ 3-5). The defendants in this case are William Courtright, the former mayor of the City of Scranton; Patrick Hinton, the former Director of the City of Scranton's Department of Licensing, Inspections, and Permits; Lori Uher, the Officer of Rental Registration for the City's Department of Licensing, Inspections, and Permits; Tamilyn Carmona, a Code EnforcementOfficer for the City's Department of Licensing, Inspections, and Permits; and the City of Scranton. All defendants worked for the City during all pertinent portions of the plaintiffs' complaint.

According to the complaint, the defendants in this case condemned the William Street property, held by Auric, for fear of a roof collapse despite the fact that Auric had contracted to repair and replace the roof on the building pursuant to a City-issued construction permit for same and had removed tenants from the top floor of the two-story building. (Id., ¶¶ 20, 22, 24). Garanin, on behalf of Auric, appealed this condemnation to the City of Scranton Housing Appeals Board. (Id., ¶ 29). After its condemnation, and during the pendency of Auric's appeal, the City also allegedly instructed PPL to remove the four electric meters from the building since it was not being occupied.¹ (Id., ¶ 30). The Board held a hearing on the condemnation on November 29, 2018. (Id., ¶ 31). Thereafter, on December 4, 2018, the Board issued a decision upholding the City's condemnation of the property. (Id., ¶ 32). Garanin promptly appealed this determination to the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas; this appeal remains pending as of the date of the filing of this complaint. (Id., ¶¶ 33-34). In the interim, the City fined Auric multiple times for prohibited occupancy and quality of life citations since there was still at least onetenant residing in the building, despite the ongoing appeals process, and the City's alleged refusal to remove the tenant from the building.² (Id., ¶¶ 40-44). Garanin's attempts to remedy the situation, through Auric, were allegedly frustrated by the City's continual roadblocks, thus delaying and prolonging the reopening of the building. (Id., ¶¶ 45-57). Similarly, Ferndrive's School Street property remained condemned by the City for an extended period of time, despite Garanin's efforts and compliance with all requirements and the defendants' requests. (Id., ¶¶ 58-62).

With respect to Ferndrive's Willow Street property, the City of Scranton's Department of Licensing, Inspections, and Permits allegedly received complaints regarding the heating in the first-floor units. (Id., ¶ 63). Without conducting an inspection to confirm the tenant complaints or providing notice or a hearing to Ferndrive or Garanin, the defendants closed the property due to "unhealthy and hazardous conditions." (Id., ¶¶ 64-65, 71). After a delayed waiting period for a hearing before the City of Scranton Housing Appeals Board to contest the closure, the Board decided to uphold the City's determination as to the property. (Id., ¶¶ 72-76). On June 12, 2019, Ferndrive, via Garanin, filed an appeal of this decision withthe Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which remained pending as of the time the plaintiffs' complaint was filed. (Id., ¶¶ 77-78).

Garanin, through Rock Property, lastly alleges that the Philo Street property faced similar issues from the defendant. Specifically, on February 2, 2019, Defendant Carmona condemned a unit in this property after UGI "red tagged the furnace" therein without notice or a hearing provided to either Garanin or Rock Property.³ (Id., ¶¶ 79, 88). Defendant Carmona did this despite the fact that a city-licensed mechanical and plumbing contractor was allegedly en route to the building on the same day. (Id., ¶¶ 86-87). Thereafter, Garanin, on behalf of Rock Property, filed an appeal with the Board. (Id., ¶ 93). While this appeal was pending, Garanin attempted to amicably resolve the problems necessary to reopen this unit by scheduling an inspection with the City. Due to close deadlines with the Board of Appeals hearing, Garanin requested a rescheduling of this inspection from Defendant Hinton, who allegedly refused to allow a rescheduling after Garanin turned down a settlement offer from the City. (Id., ¶¶ 116-24). Garanin was further stymied when, after another delayed hearing before the Board, allegedly due to the defendants' actions, the Board decided to uphold Defendant Carmona's decision tocondemn the Philo Street property unit. (Id., ¶¶ 95-97). Rock Property appealed this decision to the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas on June 13, 2019, which remained pending at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint in this case. (Id., ¶ 98).

While the condemnation of this unit in the property was making its way through the appeals process, Rock Property received notice that the entire Philo Street property was out of compliance with the city's rental ordinance and that a rental registration payment was required. (Id., ¶¶ 100-01). Despite Rock Property allegedly submitting this payment and confirming its receipt, Defendant Uher closed the entire property on April 10, 2019 without notice to Rock Property or Garanin on the grounds that the property still had not been registered. (Id., ¶¶ 102-04, 108). A series of appeals followed which were largely reminiscent of the other plaintiffs' experiences with the Board of Appeals; the Board opted to uphold the City's decision on May 16, 2019, and an appeal was pending with the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas as of the time this complaint was filed. (Id., ¶¶ 113-14).

Lastly, Garanin generally alleges that he has been the subject of disparate treatment from the defendants. (See id., ¶ 132). As support for this assertion, Garanin claims that:

Specifically, on June 18, 2019 a permit was denied for the 1930 Bristol Ct. property as owned by the Ethel M. Martinez due to non-payment of rental registration fees. The property was not closed (Exhibit 40).

Once again, on June 19, 2019 a permit was denied for the 722 N. Main Avenue property as owned by the Jewish Discovery Center Inc. due to non-payment of rental registration fees, amongst other reasons. The property was not closed (Exhibit 41).

On the contrary the GARANIN controlled WILLOW STREET PORPERTY [sic] and the PHILO STREET PORPERTY [sic] were closed.

(Id., ¶¶ 133-35) (emphasis in original).

The defendants respond to these factual averments with a motion to dismiss, asserting privileges of qualified immunity and claiming that the plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to include all named defendants in each count of the complaint. The defendants alternatively move to consolidate the 2014 Garanin I case and the present dispute for ease of litigation.

By way of background, Garanin has already filed a civil lawsuit with this court in 2014 containing a similar factual landscape to the present complaint. Civ. No. 3:14-cv-2129. This 2014 matter is still pending before this court, the case having been stayed pending resolution of criminal charges against Garanin in state court. Garanin I is now set to proceed, fact discovery having concluded, and dispositive motions having been filed. In fact, we have entered a case management order in this case, scheduling it for trial in the Summer of 2020, and directing the parties to notify us if they wish to pursue mediation by January 31, 2020. Thus, the 2014 matter and the case at hand present themselves in distinctly different procedural postures, the instant case having reached only the motion to dismiss stage. Given these differencesin procedural posture, despite the similar factual landscape, we find it appropriate to grant the...