Garanin v. City of Scranton

• Decision Date: 22 December 2022
• Docket Number: Civil 3:19-CV-1275
• Parties: VSEVOLOD GARANIN, et al. Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SCRANTON, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

VSEVOLOD GARANIN, et al. Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF SCRANTON, et al. Defendants.

Civil No. 3:19-CV-1275

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

December 22, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

Pending before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 91). The plaintiffs, Vsevolod Garanin and his affiliated entities, filed this lawsuit against the City of Scranton and several individual City officials, alleging violations of their civil rights with respect to rental properties Garanin owned in Scranton, Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs' remaining claims consist of violations of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and the First Amendment, a Monell^[1] claim against the City, as well as related state law claims for malicious prosecution and tortious interference.^[2] For their part, the defendants contend that

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their actions did not violate the plaintiffs' civil rights, and further, that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

After consideration, for the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Background^[3]

During the relevant time period, the plaintiff, Vsevolod Garanin, owned and operated Garanin Properties LCC, Ferndrive LCC, Auric Investment Holdings LLC, and Rock Property Holdings LLC. Auric Investments owned and operated an apartment building at 300-302 William Street in Scranton, Pennsylvania (“William Street property”); Ferndrive owned and operated two rental properties, one at 614 Willow Street in Scranton (“Willow Street property”) and one at 126-128 School Street in Scranton (“School Street property”); and Rock Property Holdings owned and operated an apartment building at 1208-1210 Philo Street in Scranton (“Philo Street property”). Garanin's amended complaint alleges that the defendants-the City of Scranton and several individual City officials-violated his civil rights and state law when they condemned his properties and refused him permits.

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Thus, in September of 2018, Auric contracted to replace the roof of the William Street property and received a permit for the work in early October 2018. However, the property was condemned on October 27, 2018 after city officials received a call about a leaking roof and a wet ceiling tile falling on a child, who was taken to the hospital thereafter. Garanin and Auric received notice of the condemnation on October 31, 2018, which advised Garanin that the ceiling was leaking and there was exposed wire; there were no smoke or carbon monoxide detectors in the apartment; and that the tenant was using the oven as a heat source because of an issue with the baseboard heating. Auric appealed this condemnation, which the Board of Housing Appeals upheld. While the appeal was pending, Garanin contends that city officials harassed the tenants to vacate the property. This ultimately led to the city issuing Auric two Prohibited Occupancy citations in January and February of 2019.^[4]

With respect to the Philo Street property, Inspector Carmona condemned one unit of the property on February 2, 2019, after the tenants complained about a lack of heat in the apartment and the smell of gas, and after UGI “red-tagged” a furnace

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in the second-floor unit due to a gas leak. Rock Property appealed the condemnation, but the Board of Housing Appeals upheld the condemnation. The plaintiffs assert that the appeal was initially delayed by Hinton refusing to accept a signature from Rock Property's authorized agent. Thereafter, in March of 2019, the plaintiffs received a letter informing them that the Philo Street property was not properly registered under the City's rental registration ordinance, and that they had 72 hours to comply with the registration requirements. This notice also informed the plaintiffs that failure to comply with the ordinance would result in a six-month closure of the property. With respect to this closure, the parties' narratives starkly contrast with one another-the defendants contend that the property was never registered, and on April 10, 2019, the property was closed pursuant to the rental registration ordinance; the plaintiffs contend that payment for the rental registration was accepted on April 3, 2019, but the property was then closed for failure to register on April 10, 2019.

Similarly, Ferndrive's Willow Street property was closed in January of 2019 for failure to register under the rental registration ordinance. Defendant Uher stated that initially a complaint was made regarding the property, and while she was unaware whether that complaint was ever investigated, she ultimately closed the property when she realized the rental registration had not been paid. Unlike the Philo Street property, Ferndrive was not given an opportunity to pay the outstanding fees prior to the closure. Ferndrive appealed the closure, which was ultimately upheld by

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the Board of Housing Appeals. However, Garanin asserts that similar to the Philo Street appeal, this appeal process was delayed by Hinton, who refused to accept a signature from Ferndrive's authorized agent.

Finally, with respect to the School Street property, in September of 2018, the City denied a permit application due to unpaid rental registration fees. This property had been condemned, and Garanin claims that in order to lift the condemnation, work needed to be performed at the property. Hinton withheld the permit based on the unpaid rental registration fees, and Garanin never appealed the denial of the permit. Ultimately, in 2019, Garanin sold all of the properties involved in this suit.

The amended complaint also alleges that during the relevant time, Garanin and his entities were subject to disparate treatment from the City and its officials. He claims that other property owners in the Scranton area at times had unpaid rental registration fees and were not denied work permits, nor were their buildings closed. He further asserts that some of these actions taken by the City were motivated by his appeals of the City's actions and his filing of lawsuits in violation of the First Amendment.

Thus, the plaintiffs brought this civil rights action on July 23, 2019, and filed an amended complaint on January 7, 2020, asserting violations of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, the First Amendment, and protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, the complaint sets forth

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claims for Monell liability, malicious prosecution, and tortious interference with existing and prospective business and contractual relationships.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which we granted in part and denied in part. (Docs. 62-63). As a result of this ruling the claims remaining in this case are as follows: a procedural due process claim against the City and Hinton as to all properties, Defendant Uher as to the Willow Street and Philo Street properties, and Defendant Carmona as to the Philo Street property (Count I); a substantive due process claim against all defendants (Count II); an equal protection claim against all defendants (Count III); a First Amendment claim against all defendants (Count IV); a Monell claim against the City (Count VI); a malicious prosecution claim under Pennsylvania state law against all defendants except Defendant Courtright (Count VII); and a tortious interference claim against all defendants other than Defendant Courtright (Count VIII).

The defendants have now filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. (Doc. 91). They assert that there are no genuine disputes of material fact with respect to these claims, and alternatively, that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims. However, as we will discuss, we find that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to several of the plaintiffs' claims. In addition, with respect to these isolated claims, we conclude that qualified immunity is not appropriate at this time. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below,

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the defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part as follows: the motion will be granted with respect to the procedural due process claim based on the emergency condemnations of the William Street and Philo Street properties, as well as the denial of the work permit for the School Street property; the substantive due process claim; the Equal Protection claim; the First Amendment Claim; the malicious prosecution claim; and the tortious interference claim as it relates to the condemnations of the William Street and Philo Street properties. However, the motion will be denied with respect to the procedural due process claim involving the closures of the Willow Street and Philo Street properties under the rental registration ordinance; the Monell claim against the City; the tortious interference claim as to the closures of the Willow Street and Philo Street properties pursuant to the rental registration ordinance; and the punitive damages claim.

III. Standard of Review - Motion for Summary Judgment

The defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc.,

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702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law...